Millonzi v. Adjutant General’s Department of TexasMillonzi v. Adjutant General’s Department of Texas
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Andrew W. Austin
Before this Court are State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 25), Plaintiff‘s Response (Dkt. No. 28), and State Defendants’ Reply (Dkt. No. 32); Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 24), Plaintiff‘s Response (Dkt. No. 27), and Federal Defendants’ Reply (Dkt. No. 31). The District Court referred the above motions to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation pursuant to
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Cynthia Millonzi brings this suit against the Adjutant General‘s Department of Texas, John F. Nichols in his official capacity as Texas Adjutant General, Joseph L. Lengyl in his official capacity as Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Ryan McCarthy in his official capacity as Acting Secretary of the Department of the Army,1 and the United States. She alleges discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII, as well as claims brought pursuant to the First Amendment and the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
The investigation ultimately found that Millonzi had submitted false military leave papers, contending that she stated she was eligible for leave to attend training that had not been approved. Col. MacLeod accepted the recommendation that Millonzi be terminated, and forwarded it to Brigadier Genereral Patrick M. Hamilton. Millonzi then submitted an informal EEO complaint that was dismissed, and BG Hamilton thereafter accepted Col. MacLeod‘s recommendation. Millonzi was given the option to retire or be terminated, and she chose to retire. Shortly after, Millonzi filed a second EEO complaint, which was once again dismissed. This time, she appealed to the Office of Federal Operations, which reversed the dismissal. However, the Adjutant General—who has final authority on any appeals—dismissed her complaint after the reversal. Millonzi subsequently retired from the National Guard.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Rule 12(b)(1)
Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to
B. Rule 12(b)(6)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to move to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Title VII Claims
Millonzi brings claims under Title VII for discrimination, based on her gender/sexual orientation, and retaliation, based on her exercise of free speech. Both Federal and State Defendants move to dismiss Millonzi‘s Title VII claims on the basis that they are barred by the Feres doctrine. In Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), the Supreme Court held that military personnel may not bring claims under the Federal Torts Claims Act to recover for injuries that occurred “incident to their service.” This doctrine has since been extended to also bar suits brought by military personnel pursuant to Bivens, § 1983, or Title VII. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 684 (1987) (Bivens); Crawford v. Tex. Army Nat‘l Guard, 794 F.2d 1034, 1035-36 (5th Cir. 1986) (§ 1983); Brown v. United States, 227 F.3d 295, 299 (5th Cir. 2000) (Title VII). See also, Walch v. Adjutant General‘s Dep‘t of Tex., 533 F.3d 289, 294-95 (5th Cir. 2008).
Nearly every circuit to consider the issue, including the Fifth Circuit, has held that the Feres doctrine applies to Title VII claims made by dual-status technicians. Id. at 301.2 Millonzi is correct that, under Fifth Circuit precedent, a dual-status technician‘s employment is not “irreducibly military in nature,” such that all claims made by these individuals are barred; indeed, this standard has only been applied by the Sixth Circuit, and has not yet been adopted by any other circuit. Bowers v. Wynne, 615 F.3d 455, 468 (6th Cir. 2010). Rather, the Fifth Circuit applies a case-by-case approach to the question. In this circuit, claims under Title VII for dual-status technicians “must be categorized as either arising from their position as a civilian employee of a military department, or
The case law makes clear that the action must be “purely” civilian to proceed; any actions that “involve . . . intrusion into military personnel decisions are not permissible,” even if that decision may also have a civilian component. Brown, 227 F.3d at 299. In fact, while courts have noted the theoretical possibility that such a case could exist, the undersigned was unable to find a single case in which a federal court found that a dual-status technician‘s claims were purely civilian in nature.4 Though Millonzi attempts to cast her claims as solely civilian in nature—indeed, she uses the word “civilian” extensively through her Complaint—it is clear that a decision in Millonzi‘s favor
Millonzi does not dispute that the investigation found that she falsified military leave documents or that the actions taken were by her military supervisors. Rather, she asserts that this does not transform the employment decision from a purely civilian one to one covered by Feres. Millonzi relies heavily on the fact that she was not given access to a military lawyer for the EEO appeals process. However, this, by itself, does not mandate a finding that her claims are purely civilian. Millonzi was terminated first from her civilian position, but subsequently retired from her military position due to her termination. See Cantu v. Nichols, 2012 WL 4962115 at *1 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2012) (explaining that the plaintiff was removed from his technician position and later discharged from the National Guard). Moreover, even actions taken during the work week, seemingly in the civilian sphere, may still be decisions that affect the military hierarchy such that they are subject to Feres. Take, for example, the Fifth Circuit‘s decision in Filer. In that case, even though the alleged harassment happened solely during the work week in the plaintiff‘s civilian job,
Millonzi also relies on a decision by the EEOC to support her argument. Dkt. No. 28 at 3-4. In that case, the Commission cited to case law out of the Fifth Circuit to hold that each Title VII complaint by dual-status technicians should be assessed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the “discriminatory act arose in the individual‘s military capacity or civilian capacity.” See Neville v. Donley, EEOC Doc. 0720110023, 2013 WL 5295937, at *4 (Aug. 1, 2013). Applying this framework, the Commission found that it had jurisdiction over the plaintiff‘s claims as the alleged discriminatory acts occurred in a purely civilian sphere. Id. at *5. Noting that the discrimination in that case occurred during the civilian work week, Millonzi argues that the result should be the same here, since that is exactly what happened in her case.
However, Millonzi‘s situation is not analogous to that of Neville. Millonzi contends that she was terminated from her civilian position based on her sexual orientation, and is correct in noting that the effect was originally felt in her civilian status as she was only later asked to retire from her National Guard position. However, the situation is vastly different from that in Neville, where the plaintiff was allegedly harassed by her colleagues during the civilian work week. Millonzi has not alleged harassment, but rather that she was terminated based on her sexual orientation. Additionally, Millonzi was removed from her position for allegedly turning in false leave papers, indicating that
B. Mindes Claims
This leaves only the constitutional claims that Millonzi has characterized as a ”Mindes action.” Millonzi asserts claims for First Amendment retaliation and violations of the equal protection and due process clauses. Here, she asserts that she was forced to leave her position based on her exercise of free speech, discriminated against based on her sexual orientation (or sex), and deprived of a hearing prior to her termination. Millonzi brings these claims alleging that, under Mindes v. Seaman, an individual is permitted to bring suit claiming that an internal military decision violated a Constitutional, statutory, or regulatory rule after exhausting all administrative remedies.
First, Millonzi‘s claims for First Amendment retaliation and equal protection are merely an attempt to recast her Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims. It cannot be the case that a plaintiff whose Title VII claims are barred by Feres can simply recast them as constitutional violations to avoid the Feres bar. The decision in Walch supports this reasoning. In that case, the court found that equal protection claims asserted under § 1983 or Bivens would also be barred by Feres, just as the plaintiff‘s Title VII claims were. Walch, 533 F.3d at 297. The court reasoned that “allowing claims pursuant to Bivens or Sections 1983 and 1985 to be brought by a National Guard technician against his chain of military command—even if some in that command also are technicians in addition to being Guardsmen—is contrary to the principles announced” in prior precedent. Walch, 533 F.3d at 297. Thus, because “[i]t is not possible to disentangle for these purposes [a technician‘s] military role and command structure from [his/her] civilian employment . . . without raising the same concerns as when those claims are brought by traditional guardsmen,” constitutional claims made by a dual-status technician are barred under the Feres doctrine. Id.; see also Bradley v. La. Air Nat. Guard, 2010 WL 5207593, at *5 (E.D. La. Dec. 15, 2010) (finding that claims for discrimination and retaliation brought under Bivens, §§ 1983 or 1985, or Title VII were barred by Feres); Perez v. Puerto Rico Nat. Guard, 951 F. Supp. 2d 279, 291–92 (D.P.R. 2013) (holding that the plaintiff‘s claim for a violation of the Equal Protection clause, made under § 1983, was barred under Feres). Millonzi‘s claims for First Amendment retaliation and equal protection are identical to those made under Title VII, and should therefore be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Regardless, Millonzi‘s due process claim should be dismissed. As was the case in Cantu, Millonzi argues that her procedural due rights were violated because she was not given a hearing.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
In accordance with the foregoing discussion, the Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Dkt. Nos. 24 & 25).
V. WARNINGS
The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which objections are
A party‘s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained in this Report within fourteen (14) days after the party is served with a copy of the Report shall bar that party from de novo review by the District Court of the proposed findings and recommendations in the Report and, except upon grounds of plain error, shall bar the party from appellate review of unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court. See
SIGNED this 2nd day of January, 2018.
ANDREW W. AUSTIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE