48 Ga. App. 483 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1934
Lead Opinion
The plaintiff brought a joint suit against Lavergue Blue and S. C. Rainey Jr. for damages on account of personal injuries. Her amended petition made out the following case: On August 19, 1932, at about 8 :30 p. m., the plaintiff was riding as a passenger in an automobile operated by her father. The car was being driven north on the Eorsyth road, and was about eight miles from the city of Macon when the defendant Blue, driving a motor-car from the opposite direction, suddenly and negligently drove his car against the left rear part of the car in which the plaintiff was riding and which was being properly driven on the
The amended petition, properly construed (most strongly against the plaintiff), shows that all the injuries sued for were inflicted in the second collision — the collision with Eainey’s car. It seems clear to us that the petition shows that the negligence of the defendant Blue was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, and that her injuries were not the natural and probable consequences of Blue’s negligence, but were caused by the intervening negligence of the defendant Bainey, a separate, independent agency, over which Blue had no control, and whose negligence and its
Judgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. I am unable to concur in the opinion by the majority of this court. The plaintiff, through no fault of her own, but by reason of the negligent conduct of Blue, was placed in a position of danger. Except for the alleged negligent conduct of Blue in the first place she would not have been subjected to the danger of being struck by another car by reason of being on the wrong side of the road. Under the allegations of the petition, it certainly becomes a matter for a jury to determine whether or not the defendant Blue’s act was the proximate cause of the injury. Whether the plaintiff’s conduct was, if negligent, the proximate cause of the injury woixld also be for determination by the jury. She was confronted with the danger of remaining in the car, which could not be removed until help could be obtained to move it, and which was likely to be struck by an oncoming car, or of getting out in the rain to seek shelter, which would have been dangerous to her health. If the plaintiff had accepted the last alternative, and gotten out of the car in the rain and attempted to walk to shelter, and by reason of such conduct had contracted an illness, may it be said that the jury would not have been authorized in holding Blue responsible for such resultant injury, keeping in mind that the proximate cause is not necessarily the direct and immediate cause ? Dunbar v. Davis, 32 Ga. App. 192 (122 S. E. 895). See Georgia Ry. & Electric Co. v. McAllister, 126 Ga. 447 (54 S. E. 957, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1177). The plaintiff, by the negligence of Blue, was placed in a position to
There is no subject more productive of legal discussion than is the doctrine of proximate cause. Reams have been written in reference thereto, and it will continue to challenge the minds of lawyers and of judges through the years. Proximate cause may not necessarily in juridic contemplation be sole or single nor immediate or direct. There may be other contributing causes which of themselves may be negligent or not negligent. Judge Powell, in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Daniel, 8 Ga. App. 775 (70 S. E. 203), said: “When a negligent act so operates upon a normal situation of prudently conducted activities as to produce through it an injury, which according to the laws of ordinary human probability, would not otherwise have happened, and no other wrongful act is found among the nearby activities which have joined in bringing about the injury, the negligent act may be regarded as the sole and proximate cause of the injury.” Unquestionably, under the allegations of the petition, the alleged negligent act of Blue so upset the normal course of things that the injury, according to the law of ordinary human probability, would not have happened but for such conduct. The question arises whether Rainey can be considered as an independent, responsible agency, so as to relieve Blue of responsibility for his negligence. It is true that the allegations of the petition do show that Rainey was running in violation of the law as to speed when he ran into the car of plaintiff, but it is not shown that such negligent act was the proximate cause of the injury. The night was extremely dark; it was raining; therefore, even construing the petition most strongly against the pleader, which seems to be the basis pf the majority opinion, it is most probable that the accident would
Rehearing
The motion for rehearing makes the following
observation: “The court has probably overlooked a material fact in the record, to wit: that S. C. Rainey was proceeding southward along the Forsyth road, instead of. northward as stated on the second page of the opinion (see brief for plaintiff in error, p. 2, lines 6 and 20; brief for defendant in error, p. 33; petition, par. 12).” In paragraph 9 of the petition it was alleged that Rainey was “ driving an automobile from Macon toward Atlanta, Georgia.” That allegation certainly authorized the statement in the opinion of this court that Rainey was driving his car northward. Courts look to the record, and not to the briefs of counsel, for the facts of a case. However, under all the other facts of the case, even if the petition had shown that Rainey's car was being driven southward, that fact would not have changed our decision. The authorities cited in the motion for a rehearing were not overlooked by the court.
Motion denied.
