Lead Opinion
Althоugh appellee had not first sought a determination from the commission that Ohio Bell had violated any of the provisions of R. C. Chapter 4905, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the complaint seeking treble damages under R. C. 4905.61.
Bringing suit for treble damages against a utility, therefore, is dependent upon a finding that there was a violation of a specific statute (B. C. 4905.22 in this cause) or an order of the commissiоn. Because such finding is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the commission, paragraph one of the syllabus in State, ex rel. Northern Ohio Tel. Co., v. Winter (1970),
Thus, it was error for the Court of Appeals to reverse the judgment of the trial court, insofar as it held that the Court of Common Pleas had jurisdiction to hear the complaint concerning treble damages.
In reversing the judgment of the trial court, the Cоurt of Appeals held further, in effect, that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear appellee’s first, second, and fourth claims for relief, wherein appellee alleged that Ohiо Bell had charged an unjust and unreasonable rate, had wrongfully terminated his service, and thus had injured his good name and reputation.
Since these allegations are based on purported violations of B. C. Chapter 4905, only the commission has jurisdiction to review them. B. C. 4905.04 and 4905.26. As noted in Winter, supra, at page 10:
“The General Assembly has provided a comprehensive-*195 plan by which subscribers may cоntest the reasonableness of rates, rules, regulations, and quality of service of a public utility, which рlan does not include proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas.”
Thus, it was also error for the Court of Appeals to reverse the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas with respect to appellee’s first, second, and fourth claims for relief.
This court notes, however, that in his third claim for relief, appellee contends that Ohio Bell had wrongfully invaded his right to privacy and should be held liable in the amоunt of $5,000.
In New Bremen v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1921),
Whereas the right of privacy has been recognized as a legal right existing at common law in this state, see Roush v. Peth (1956),
In the instant cause, although appellee disclosed no operative facts giving rise tо his third claim for relief, this court is not convinced that appellee’s claim
No affidavits, depositions, or similar matters were introduced by Ohio Bell in conjunction with its Civ. R. 12(B) (1) motion. See, e. g., Southgate Development Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. (1976),
Since it was erroneous for the Court of Common Pleas to sustain Ohio Bell’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Civ. R. 12(B)(1) in this cause, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with respect to this issue, but reversed as to the other issues herein, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part. I concur in the syllabus and in the judgment of this court reversing the first, second and fourth claims for relief. Since, because the third claim for relief did not properly allege any invasion of privacy, I believe it futilе to remand the cause for further action in the Court of Common Pleas.