Miller v. WatsonMiller v. Watson
This appeal comes to us from the Chancery Court of Choctaw County and represents the sеcond time the dispute between these parties has been appealed to this Court. As such, the procedural history of this case is a lengthy onе and an understanding of it is imperative to a resolution of this appeal. On July 28, 1980, Mrs. Lula Bell Miller Watson, the Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Eunie Elkins Miller, her mother, filed a pеtition in the Chancery Court of Choctaw County seeking to be adjudicated the sole heir at law of her mother. She also sought to confirm in herself title to сertain lands which had belonged to her mother. Mrs. Watson and her brother, J.D. Miller (deceased), were the only children of their parents, Mrs. Eunie Elkins Miller and Arthur Miller. (Arthur Miller hаd predeceased Mrs. Eunie Elkins Miller by several years.)
Frank Miller, the appellant, filed an answer to Mrs. Watson‘s petition in which he claimed to be the illеgitimate child of J.D. Miller. In his answer he sought a one-half share of the estate of his alleged grandmother, Mrs. Eunie Elkins Miller. The chancery court, relying on Trimble v. Gordon, 403 U.S. 762, 97 S.Ct. 1459, 52 L.Ed.2d 31 (1977), held that
Following the remand, the parties amended their pleadings to address the constitutionality of
1. That Frank Millеr is the illegitimate son of J.D. Miller and the grandson of the decedent Eunie Elkins Miller.
2. That Frank Miller has known since early childhood that J.D. Miller was his father.
3. That Frank Miller was bоrn October 21, 1939, and thus became twenty one (21) years of age on October 21, 1960.
4. That the testimony of all witnesses who testified at the first trial of this case would be thе same as it was during the first hearing.
This time the chancellor decided that
Frank Miller now brings this appeal and assigns as error the chancеllor‘s ruling that
In the first appeal of this cause, this Court admonished the parties for their failure to appropriately frame and address the issues as fоllows:
In his pleadings, appellee did not claim that he was entitled to inherit from J.D. Miller, deceased, as his illegitimate son, nor did he attack the constitutionality of MCA § 91-1-15 (1972), providing for descent among illegitimates, upon equal protection grounds as discriminating against illegitimates. While the appellant did plead the adverse possession statute, Section 15-1-7, Miss. Code Ann. (1972), as a bar to the claim of appellee, she did not plead the six-year general stаtute of limitations contained in Section 15-1-49, Miss. Code Ann. (1972). The parties, in their pleadings, should have hit the issues of illegitimacy, unconstitutionality and statute of limitations head on like two wild rams during the mating season. Instead, they danced, bobbed and weaved like boxers in the ring, skirting those questions.
On this appeal the parties havе reared back and squarely crashed heads on the issue of constitutionality of
When this Court remands a case for a new trial it is to be tried de novo in the lower court. Clark v. Clark, 203 Miss. 28, 33 So.2d 293 (1948); Sperry‘s Estate v. Sperry, 189 Miss. 321, 196 So. 653 (1940); Pigford v. Ladner, 142 Miss. 435, 107 So. 658 (1926); Peoples Bank in Liquidation v. Pennington, 137 Miss. 653, 102 So. 386, modified on suggestion of error, 137 Miss. 653, 103 So. 144 (1925). Because the parties were to receive a trial de novo upon remand from this Court‘s first decision, the issue of the constitutionality of
(3) An illegitimate shall inherit from and thrоugh the illegitimate‘s natural father and his kindred, and the natural father of an illegitimate and his kindred shall inherit from and through the illegitimate according to the statutes оf descent and distribution if:
(a) The natural parents participated in a marriage ceremony before the birth of the child, even though the marriage wаs subsequently declared null and void or dissolved by a court; or
(b) There has been an adjudication of paternity or legitimacy before the death of thе intestate; or
(c) There has been an adjudication of paternity after the death of the intestate, based upon clear and convincing evidence, in an heirship proceeding under sections 91-1-27 and 91-1-29. However, no such claim of inheritance shall be recognized unless the action seеking an adjudication of paternity is filed within one (1) year after the death of the intestate or within ninety (90) days after the first publication of notice to creditors to present their claims, whichever is less; and such time period shall run notwithstanding the minority of a child. No claim of inheritance based on an adjudicаtion of paternity, after death of the intestate, by a court outside the State of Mississippi shall be recognized unless: (i) Such court was in the state of rеsidence of the intestate at the time of the intestate‘s death;
(ii) The action adjudicating paternity was filed within (90) days after the death of the intestatе;
(iii) All known heirs were made parties to the action; and
(iv) Paternity or legitimacy was established by clear and convincing evidence.
Because Frank Miller‘s answer included a cross-petition in which he allеged that he was the illegitimate son of J.D. Miller and therefore entitled to an interest in Mrs. Eunie Elkins Miller‘s estate, that issue was sufficiently raised by the pleadings. Furthermorе, because the parties stipulated that Frank Miller was indeed the illegitimate son of J.D. Miller and, because they agree that they are the only two intеrested parties in the estate, we are of the opinion that Frank Miller should have been adjudicated an heir of Mrs. Eunie Elkins Miller‘s estate.
As to the aрplicable statute of limitations, as we have previously stated, when this action was remanded it should have been tried under
Based on all of the foregoing, we come to the conclusion that the chancery court once again erred in addressing the constitutionality of
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
PATTERSON, C.J., ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and HAWKINS, PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.
WALKER, P.J., dissents.