47 Mo. App. 630 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1892
This was an action brought under section 2611, Revised Statutes, 1889, to recover $500, double damages for injuring certain animals for the plaintiff. At the trial the plaintiff had judgment, and the defendant appealed.
I. The first and principal question presented by the record for our decision is whether there was any evidence adduced which justified the submission of the case to the jury. The determination of this question necessarily requires an examination of all the evidence adduced in the case, from which it may be gleaned that at a point about two miles east of Pattonsburgh, Daviess county, whei’e the defendant’s railway runs in a northwesterly direction, it is intersected at an acute angle by a public road running nearly east and west. For some
It-further appears that the plaintiff, on the night before his animals were injured, had turned them loose on the public road about a mile and a half east of Pattonsburgh. The foot prints of the animals were found in the public road on the east side of the railway track at the point where .the latter is crossed by the cattle-guard and also on the railroad track close up to the east end of the bridge. There were two or three foot prints of a horse and a mule on the bridge timbers. The imprint of the track upon the bridge is described by the witness as looking ‘ ‘ like the mare had m ade a jump or lunge.” The impression of the foot on the tie looked like the “animal was going at some speed.” One track indented into the tie was about one-third and the other two-thirds across the bridge. The animals went upon the railway track and bridge from the public road where they had been turned loose by plaintiff. The foot prints indicated that the plaintiff’s animals, two mares and a mule, had been grazing along the public road. There were foot prints about
After the collision the mule’s head was found four and a half feet west of the trestle on the defendant’s right of way, and there maining parts were “scraped one hundred and fifty to two hundred feet” further on. The carcass of one of the mares was lying on the other side of the track, thirty feet west of the bridge. The other mare was found in a crippled condition about ninety feet west of the bridge. It was the opinion of some of the witnesses that a horse could cross on the bridge.
Does this evidence tend to show á legal liability of the defendant? Under the provisions-of section 2611, Revised Statutes, it had been repeatedly held that it is the place where the animal got on the track, and not where it was killed that fixes the liability. Ehret v. Railroad, 20 Mo. App. 251; Moore v. Railroad, 81 Mo. 502; Nance v. Railroad, 79 Mo. 197; Cecil v. Railroad, 47 Mo. 246. So too it has been as often held that, it is not the duty of a railroad company to fence at public crossings. Sullivan v. Railroad, 72 Mo. 197; McPheeters v. Railroad, 45 Mo. 24; Meyer v. Railroad, 35 Mo. 352; Ehret v. Railroad, supra. Thus it is seen that all the testimony shows that at least two of the plaintiff’s animals came upon the railway track in a public highway and were there struck by the train. There was not the slightest evidence that they crossed
Upon all the facts which the evidence in the least tends to show, the plaintiff was not entitled to a verdict as to the mare and mule which were killed. Henderson v. Railroad, 36 Mo. App. 109; Moore v. Railroad, 28 Mo. App. 622; Ehret v. Railroad, 20 Mo. App. 251.
As to the other mare which was not killed but ■crippled, there was evidence introduced from which the jury might well have inferred that she got upon the track at a point at which the fence was not a lawful one. The evidence that her foot prints were seen •around and about where the post had rotted off and the fence was defective, and that she could have entered upon the defendant’s right of way at that point, ■coupled with the further evidence that she was found in a crippled condition ninety feet west of the bridge on the defendant’s right of way, we think fully justifies such an inference. If the mare was injured on the inside of the defendant’s inclosed right of way, as we must infer was the fact, then we cannot resist the conclusion, without we ignore the evidence, that she either went through the fence where it was defective, or that she passed over the bridge because it was, as a cattle-guard, probably ordinarily insufficient to prevent horses from getting on the defendant’s railroad. At all events, this evidence was sufficient to authorize a submission of the case to the jury as to the crippled mare.
There was no evidence upon which to base the plaintiff’s instructions as to the animals that were killed. They were well enough as to the one crippled.
It results from these considerations that the judgment of the circuit court will be reversed, unless the plaintiff will within ten days hence file with the.clerk of the court a remittitur of $250, this reducing the amount of his recovery to the sum of $150, in which case the judgment will stand affirmed.