18 Misc. 2d 626 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1959
Plaintiff is the widow and executrix of the late Glenn Miller, well-known orchestra leader and musician. Miller died in 1944 while in military service. For some years prior to his entry into war activities Miller had created original arrangements of musical selections, had developed a well-known style and performance associated in the public mind with his own name — Glenn Miller. From 1938 to 1944 these musical performances grew rapidly in popular favor. In 1939 and 1941 Miller contracted to grant Radio Corporation of America (“ R. C. A.” hereafter) exclusive right to use of his name and likeness in producing advertising and selling phonograph records. This exclusive right covered seven of the eight numbers used in the motion picture “The Glenn Miller Story”. It covered all but a very few numbers played by Miller’s orchestra before he had developed his unique style. The sales by R. C. A. of the individual Miller records of these numbers to the date of the instant action ranged from some 300,000 to over 2 million on all of which Miller, and since his death his estate, have received royalties. Contracts between plaintiff as executrix and R. C. A. have been renewed in the same exclusive form in 1951, and again in 1958, with increasing benefits to' plaintiff. ' Such record sales totalled over 15 million to the date of the complaint herein.
The audiences for the renewed Glenn Miller recordings are described by Universal as the “ 1939 ” group of teen-agers, “now in their twenties to early forties” and the “ 1953 ” audiences, teen-agers, who include Glenn Miller’s music as their favorite and who are again to be inoculated with the charm of “ Tuxedo Junction”, “Pennsylvania 6-5000” and “Little Brown Jug ”. These and many other features were poured out in advertising, pamphlet and story form by Decca for its records and Universal for the picture £ £ The Glenn Miller Story ’ ’. Decca advertised the records as “ exact duplications of some of the
There is no doubt that the Universal picture was successful and that the sound track album was indeed a simultaneous financial success to Decca. There is also no doubt that R. 0. A.’s “ memorial album ” of the Glenn Miller records, issued at the same time, was a financial success. Plaintiff’s substantial returns from the picture (over $650,000), and her increased
Paragraph 12 reads: ‘ ‘ Without limiting the rights elsewhere herein granted to us, it is further understood and agreed that the following rights are included in the rights herein granted to.us to be exercised, however, only in connection’with and for the purpose of advertising any photoplay or photoplays or other productions hereunder ’* * * the right to use excerpts from said photoplay or photoplays or other productions hereunder or from the material upon which the same are based in heralds, booklets, programs, posters, lobby displays, press books
Neither the “ musical materials ” referred to in paragraph 3, nor the commercial tie-ups of such ‘ ‘ materials ’ ’ referred to in paragraph 12, could be construed to authorize the piracy of E. C. A. recordings and their marketing under Decca’s insignia without E. C. A.’s knowledge and consent. Plaintiff and her counsel were meticulous in the care taken to remove every basis for such a claim by Universal. The contract is explicit in its grant of the use of the “ musical materials ” of the Miller estate. Yet it preserves a silence wholly understandable with respect to recordings. The phonograph records of E. C. A. of course were no part of the properties granted to Universal for the picture and could not have been correspondingly granted to Decca by Universal. Advertising and publicity in printed media are obviously within paragraph 12, but an album by Decca, a competitor of E. C. A., could not by any stretch of construction be regarded as a “ tie-up ’ ’ such as combination with products as shoes, food or other commodities. The sound track is clearly not “ advertising material” which can be translated into an unlimited phonograph record right by another company, a right never given by plaintiff in the film contract and which she could not grant. Nor can we find any warrant for defendants’ action in paragraph 4 of Exhibit A to the agreement, giving defendant Universal “exploitation and marketing of said photoplay”. Defendants’ brief concedes that “Decca’s primary interest in releasing the records (putting aside its interest in Universal itself) was to make a profit for itself. Decca’s business was to sell records ” — and it is in this frank confession, combined with Eackmil’s action and decision as president of both defendants that we find the motivation for the piracy indulged in.
Throughout this case the repeated emphasis on Glenn Miller, Glenn Miller’s “hit tunes”, Glenn Miller’s genius, etc. establishes the purpose of Decca’s wholesale advertising and sales promotion of the records of the hit tunes from the picture. It would take a most discerning purchaser to look for the name of Gershenson or ask the true origin of the recordings. The former teen-agers and the new generation of teen-agers, at whom the picture and the songs were aimed, would not be so likely to make the distinction. ‘ ‘ Glenn Miller ’ ’ and the ‘ ‘ Glenn Miller music ’ ’ were the attractions. The meticulous care to reproduce his hit songs, with the prominence to his name — these were the essentials of the sharp practice indulged in by defendants. And their action was taken after prompt warning and full knowledge of the risks defendants were taking. Plain
A careful study of the many cases cited in briefs of counsel lead this court to the conclusion that the facts in this case warrant an accounting by defendants to plaintiff as executrix.
Metropolitan Opera Assn. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp. (199 Misc. 786, affd. 279 App. Div. 632 [1st Dept., 1951]) may be considered first. There, as here, an exclusive right to make phonograph records under a particular trade name was involved. Substantial royalties were paid and a substantial minimum was guaranteed. There defendants, like Decca here, had little expenditure involved to produce the records. That case stands for the holding that the owner of musical performances can prevent unauthorized reproduction on phonograph records and that the common-law property right is not lost by a public performance or radio broadcast. Nor is it necessary to show competition between records of the defendant and the contract licensee of recordings. It is the unique quality of the performance and plaintiff’s primary property in that performance which constitute the basis for the action.
In the same vein we find support of plaintiff’s position in: Capitol Records v. Mercury Records Corp. (221 F. 2d 657); Gieseking v. Urania Records (17 Misc 2d 1034) ; International News Service v. Associated Press (248 U. S. 215, 241); Dior v. Milton (9 Misc 2d 425).
Under the principles established by these cases plaintiff becomes entitled to the relief sought without the need to prove the palming off, the competition with income producing media of like character to the damage of plaintiff, etc. In the case at bar Universal was not granted an unlimited license. The agreement of July 24, 1952 was limited and does not include commercial phonograph record rights. The granting clauses of the agreement are decisive. They grant 4 4 motion picture rights ’ ’, 44 television and radio rights ”, but not phonograph recording rights. Thus this contract differs clearly from that involved in Beecham v. London Gramophone Corp. (104 N. Y. S. 2d 473).
It is familiar law “ that in every contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” (Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Armstrong Co., 263 N. Y. 79, 87.) We do not find any contrary principle espoused in Republic Pictures Corp. v. Rogers (213 F. 2d 662 [C. C. A. 9th]), or in Tanner v. Title Ins. & Trust Co. (20 Cal. 2d 814) —cited by defendants. This is not a case where the law extends “ protection to the name of a deceased individual as an individual ’ ’; nor is this a case of ‘ ‘ defamation of the dead ’ ’; nor is it parallel to Schumann v. Loew’s Inc. (135 N. Y. S. 2d 361); nor do the facts herein warrant the citation by defendants for support of Lunceford v. Wilcox (88 N. Y. S. 2d 225) or Coffey v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Corp. (160 Misc. 186). This is not a case of imitation, as was Chaplin v. Amador (93 Cal. App. 358); or Supreme Records v. Decca Records (90 F. Supp. 904 [S. D. Cal., 1950]).
When this case was instituted a temporary restraining order was vacated by Justice Dineen in 1953. But his language shows how clearly the facts upon this trial and the brief of Decca hereinbefore quoted were concealed from him. He points out how the “ imitations ” of Glenn Miller were successful and then says: “ Whether or not defendant Universal had knowledge of plaintiff’s contract with R. C. A. is of no consequence, since the sale of the record album is to be used only for advertising purposes which were granted to it not in competition with R. C. A.” (Emphasis supplied.) (Miller v. Universal Pictures Co., N. Y. L. J., Nov. 16, 1953, p. 1103, col. 5.) Compare this remark of
Since the facts established upon this trial warrant judgment for plaintiff, the question of damages must be considered. Defendants Universal and Decca combined to deprive plaintiff as executrix of the Glenn Miller estate of income. Defendant Decca had no legal right to market the records of Glenn Miller tunes from “ The Glenn Miller Story” picture. Decca made substantial profits from that wrongful act. Decca by control of Universal took unto itself a valuable product in violation of Universal’s contract with plaintiff and in violation of plaintiff’s contract with R. C. A. Religious duplication of R. C. A. records and flagrant utilization of Glenn Miller’s name and high repute were the essence of the wrong done by both defendants to plaintiff as executrix. This court places little weight in the testimony of the defendants’ witness Simonelli on whose weak shoulders it was sought to place the origin of the suggested use by Decca of the records for promoting the picture. Plaintiff at most could have recovered the royalties, had R. C. A. been the beneficiary of the Decca recordings sold. It would therefore seem appropriate to confine plaintiff’s recovery to the royalties from defendants Decca and Universal on the same basis as royalties from R. C. A., i.e., on all records from the sound track of “ The Glenn Miller Story ” sold by Decca or Decca and Universal.
Defendant Decca has wrongfully profited by misappropriating property of plaintiff executrix. Defendant Universal enabled defendant Decca to profit in violation of Universal’s contract with plaintiff executrix. This is an action in equity and equity should at least enable plaintiff as executrix to recover for herself and her children the benefits which the estate would have derived from royalties under the R. C. A. contract. Decca’s wrong can be in part righted by applying the standard indicated. (Westcott Chuck Co. v. Oneida Nat. Chuck Co., 199 N. Y. 247, 251; Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U. S. 251, 259; Winifred Warren, Inc., v. Turner’s Gowns, 285 N. Y. 62, 67-68.)
This court believes that the damages might well be extended to the profits derived by defendant Decca from its sale of the recordings in question. That would be a far larger sum than the royalties on the records. Yet it might be fully justified under the facts. On the other hand, it would seem harsh to enrich the estate so far beyond what it might recover on the royalty basis. Added to this consideration is the unknown factor of R. C. A. and Decca and the absence of R. O. A. from this
Plaintiff has adequately established her right to an accounting. In order that the accounting may be all-embracing, it is directed that the accounting report the profits made by Decea on its sales to date of the records sold from ‘ ‘ The Glenn Miller Story” and also the royalties payable on said sales, based on the royalty basis of the contracts between plaintiff and E. C. A. In the light of this determination no injunction will issue.
There must come a time when “ the morals of the market place ” should approximate those standards measured in terms of common honesty. In determining cases the courts have a responsibility which does not always require the necessity of statutory relief. Equity has that poiver and this is such a case.
Parties having waived findings of fact and conclusions of law, the above constitutes the decision in this case.
Judgment for plaintiff as executrix to the extent indicated. Settle judgment, allowing for direction for accounting.