The defendant issued to the plaintiff a motor vehicle liability policy which contained provisions for extraterritorial liability and property damage coverage, by the terms of which the defendant agreed to pay all sums which the assured should "become liable to pay as damages imposed upon him by law for bodily injury accidentally sustained by any person or persons,” if caused by the ownership, maintenancе or use of the motor vehicle described in
There was evidence which, taken most favorably to the defendant, tended to show the following facts: While the policy was in force and while the plaintiff was operating the insured аutomobile on a narrow road in the State of Georgia, a heated altercation arose between the plaintiff and one Link, whо was riding in another automobile, over the manner in which the Link automobile had passed the plaintiff’s automobile. After both vehicles had prоceeded some distance, the plaintiff drove past the Link automobile at a speed of fifty miles an hour and intentionally turned to the right in front of it. There was no collision, but as a result of the plaintiff’s conduct, the driver of the Link automobile was frightened and lost control of the automobile, which in consequence ran up an embankment and overturned, causing personal injuries to Link and to one Armstrong, the driver of the Link automobile.
Actions against the plaintiff were brought in the State of Florida by Link and by Armstrong. The plaintiff duly notified the defendant to defend the actions according to the terms of the policy, but the defendant refused to do so. These actions resulted in judgments against the plaintiff, the amount of which hе has paid. The present action is brought to secure indemnity for the sum so paid and for the expenses of defending these Florida actions and for the expenses of defending certain other similar actions in Florida arising out of the same occurrence, but in which the verdicts were in favor of the present plaintiff.
It is agreed that if the plaintiff is entitled to recover he shall have judgment in the amount of $3,115 plus costs.
The bill of exceptions states that the trial judge justifiably found that the plaintiff drove his automobile toward and in front of the Link automobile, intending to frighten its oсcupants, but not intending to inflict any harm upon them, and that he was guilty of recklessness. He ruled that
But the declаrations in the Florida actions are based solely upon the ground that the plaintiffs in those actions were injured by the negligence of the plaintiff in this action. Nowhere is it stated that the injuries were caused by an assault or by an intentional or wilful act. In the absence of anything in any form to indicate the contrary, it must be assumed that the law of Florida is the same as the law of this Commonwealth. Kelley v. Kelley,
It is not contended and could not be contended successfully that bodily injury resulting from negligence is not “accidentally sustained” as those words are used in the policy. H. P. Hood & Sons v. Maryland Casualty Co.
The grounds on which liability has been imposed upon the insured are to be determined from an investigation into the matters decided in the action which established that liability and not from facts subsequently developed in an action by the insured against the insurer. This is clear from the language of the policy itself wherein the defendant agreed to pay, not suсh damages as might be imposed upon the plaintiff for bodily injuries which were in fact accidental, but all sums which the assured should “become liablе to pay as damages imposed upon him by law for bodily injury accidentally sustained . . . .” The defendant further bound itself by the policy to defend “any claims, suits or other legal proceedings alleging such injuries and demanding damages on account thereof, although such claims, suits, legal proceedings, allegations and demands are wholly groundless, false or fraudulent.” The object of the policy is protection against law suits аnd legal liability. This object could not be attained if the insured were compelled to try over again in an action against the insurer the samе issues upon which he has been found liable in the original action. Where an action against the insured is ostensibly within the terms of the policy, the insurеr, whether it assumes the defence or refuses to assume it, is bound by the result of that action as to all matters therein decided which are matеrial to recovery by the insured in an action on the policy. B. Roth Tool Co. v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. 161 Fed. Rep. 709. Royal Ins. Co. Ltd. v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway, 291 Fed. Rep. 358. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v.
This does not mean that the insurer is barred from setting up in the action against it any matter constituting a defence and not alreаdy determined in the original action. There are a number of cases of that type, such as Mathews v. Bloomfield,
There is nothing against public policy in the making оr enforcement of a contract of insurance of this kind. The contract does not contemplate recovery by the plaintiff fоr his own intentional wrong. See Babcock v. Terry,
On the case as it stood, the judge should not have denied the plaintiff’s request for a ruling “that the defendаnt could not disclaim liability in view of the fact that the declarations in the Florida cases alleged negligence only and the verdicts of the juries were based thereon,” and on all the evidence the judge should have found for the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s exceptions must be sustained, and in accordance with the agreement of the parties judgment is to be entered for the plaintiff for $3,115 and costs.
So ordered.
Notes
Compare this with the definition of “ motor vehicle liability policy” in G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90, § 34A,