155 Mo. App. 528 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1911
This is a suit for damages accrued to plaintiff on account of personal injuries received through the separate negligent acts of the two defendants, which concurred in inflicting his hurt. Plaintiff recovered against both defendants jointly and they each prosecute an appeal from that judgment.
Defendant, United Railways Company, incorporated, owns and operates a street railway system in the city of St. Louis, and defendant, American Storage & Moving Company, incorporated, owns and operates a storage and moving business in which it employs teams of horses and heavy moving vans in the same city. Plaintiff was a passenger on the street car of defendant, United Railways Company, operated by it on the Taylor avenue line, and at the time of his injury was going north on such line on Euclid avenue at its point of crossing with West Pine Boulevard. Plaintiff occupied the rear seat which runs lengthwise along the west side of the car, and while thus sitting reading a newspaper, a runaway team of horses drawing a moving van owned by the American Storage & Moving Company collided with tire rear end of the car adjacent, with sufficient force to protrude the forward end of the wagon pole' through the side of the car and inflict serious injuries upon him. The wagon pole crushed through the side of the street
We will first consider the arguments advanced for a reversal of the judgment by the storage and moving company and second those by the other defendant. It is argued on the part of the storage and moving company that the court should have directed a verdict for it, for the reason plaintiff failed to sustain the burden which the law cast upon him to prove the specific act of negligence alleged against it in the petition. But on consideration of the proof made, we believe the argument to be unsound, for though the team of horses appear to have been hitched to the hounds of the van, it was for the jury to answer as to whether such hitching was reasonably secure; or, in other words, as to whether ordinary care was exercised by defendant to that end. It appears the' employees of the storage and moving company had transported a piano to the Monticello Hotel, located on Kingshighway near West Pine boule
Plaintiff’s first instruction authorized a recovery against the storage and moving company alone if the jury should find the team and van were left at the place and in the circumstances referred to without “any person in charge of said team of horses and without exercising ordinary care to securely hitch them while the driver of said team went into the hotel to deliver a piano for said defendant.” It is argued this submitted to the jury the matter of insecurely hitching the team as a predicate of liability when the petition averred that the team was “not hitched” and is therefore erroneous in that it authorizes a recovery for a specification of negligence not counted upon in the pleading. We believe the argument to be unsound, for the law devolved upon defendant the obligation to exercise ordinary care in hitch
It is argued the court erred in refusing instruction No. 4, as requested by the storage and moving
The court refused to instruct for the storage and moving company at its request as follows:
“The court instructs the jury that if you find and believe from the evidence that the servants of the defendant, United Railways Company, in charge of the car upon which plaintiff was a passenger, by the exercise of due care as defined in these instructions, could have prevented or avoided collision with the team and van of the defendant American Storage & Moving Company, and that but for such want of care on the part of the said servants of said] defendant United Railways Company, said collision and consequent injury to plaintiff would not have occurred, your verdict must be for the defendant American Storage & Moving Company.”
There is evidence in the case tending to prove that the collision of the moving van and street car occurred through the act of the motorman of the street car in slowing it down immediately before the approaching runaway team when he might have gotten the car out of the line of danger by either stopping it before reaching West Pine boulevard or turning on the power after he had done so. It is in view of this proof that the storage and moving company requested the instruction above copied and now argues it should have been given, for the reason that it may be the jury would find the negligence of the motorman was, as between the negligent acts of the two defendants, the proximate cause of the
We come now to consider the appeal of defendant, United Railways Company. It is argued the court-should have directed a verdict for this defendant, but the case is obviously one for the jury on .the specific acts of negligence which the evidence tended to prove against the motorman. As the relation of carrier and passenger exists between these parties, ordinarily a- presumption of negligence or the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur alone would be sufficient as prima facie proof, on showing the facts of the collision and injury. [Olsen v. Citizens’ Ry. Co., 152 Mo. 426, 432, 54, S. W. 470; Rice v. C. B. & Q. R. C., 153 Mo. App. 35, 131 S. W. 374.] But the petition alleges specific acts of negligence against the United Railways Company, for after reciting antecedent facts leading up to his injury, plaintiff avers that while he was in the car traveling north at or near the intersection of West Pine boulevard and Euclid avenue, ‘ ‘ the motorman of the defendant, United Railways Company of St. Louis, in charge of said car, so negligently and carelessly managed and run said car that he suffered and permitted the same to be collided Avith a team of horses and wagon, etc.” This is a charge of specific negligence for it avers -the motonnan carelessly managed and ran
But the question arises in this case, where the suit is against two independent tortfeasors on account of an injury inflicted' through the separate negligent acts of each, which concurred in producing the result complained of, should the judgment be reversed as to tbe United Railways Company only and affirmed as to the American Storage & Moving Company, when either is separately liable for the full measure of the damage done? The matter should be determined, we believe, by reference to the fact as to whether or not contribution, as distinguished from indemnity, may lie in the
“Defendants in a judgment- founded on an action for the redress of a private wrong shall be subject to contribution, and all other consequences of such judgment, in the same manner and to thé same extent as defendants in a judgment in an action founded on contract.” Sec. 5431, R. S. 1909.
It has been determined that this statute intends the allowance of contribution among defendants in a judgment for tort on account of the negligent omission of duty of several independent tortfeasors whose combined negligence concurred and contributed to the same injury in those cases where indemnity is not to be had, and we believe such interpretation to be sound. [See Eaton & Prince Co. v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 123 Mo. App. 117, 100 S. W. 551.] Of course, the matter as to whether or not contribution would lie between these defendants, if one were to pay a judgment recovered against both and the other decline to contribute, or as to whether or not one would be entitled to indemnity from the other, is not to be determined now, for the question is not before us and a decision thereon is expressly reserved. For reference to the doctrine as to both contribution and indemnity and when either prevails, sec 7 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), 364, 365, 366, 367 and notes. It should be said that prima facie
The judgment should be reversed as to both defendants and the cause remanded. It is so ordered.