PHILIP A. MILLER, Plaintff-Appellant, v. ARNOLD TOBIN, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 2-88-0583
Second District
July 17, 1989
Moreover, we do not believe that even if plaintiff had pursued this action at the outset in accordance with section 2a, the circuit court would have jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue of the State‘s interest in the subject property. Section 2a creates a statutory remedy for the recovery of money paid to State officials. Nothing in this рrovision purports to supersede the Immunity Act‘s limitation of the circuit court‘s jurisdiction. While plaintiff notes that cases under this provision have been litigated in the circuit court, plaintiff fails to identify these аs cases implicating the considerations of the Immunity Act. Clearly, the typical case involving tax payments under protest (see Getto v. City of Chicago (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 39, 49, 426 N.E.2d 844) will not involve determination of the State‘s interest in property, as does the instant case.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is reversed.
Reversed.
McLAREN and NASH, JJ., concur.
Opinion filed July 17, 1989.
Tyler Jay Lory, James T. Ferrini, and Gary Kostow, аll of Clausen, Miller, Gorman, Caffrey & Witous, P.C., and Mary F. Stafford, of Epton, Mullin & Druth, Ltd., both of Chicago, for appellee.
JUSTICE DUNN delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff, Philip Miller, appeals from a judgment of the circuit court of Lake County dismissing his complaint against defendant, Arnold Tobin, a physician engaged in the practice оf psychiatry. On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court should not have applied the two-year statute of limitations of section 13-212 of the Code of Civil Procedure (
On November 13, 1987, plaintiff filеd a complaint in the circuit court of Lake County alleging that he was injured as a result of defendant‘s violation of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (Confidentiality Act) (
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the statute of limitations had expired and that plaintiff had not complied with
While the Confidentiality Act provides that suit may be brought as a result of its violation (
Section 13-212 states in pertinent part:
“§13-212. Physician or hospital. (a) Except as provided in Section 13-215 of this Act, no action for damages for injury or death against any physiciаn, dentist, registered nurse or hospital duly licensed under the laws of this State, whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought more than 2 yеars after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, or received notice in writing of the existence of the injury or death for which damagеs are sought in the action, whichever of such date occurs first, but in no event shall such action be brought more than 4 years after the date on which occurred the act or omission or occurrеnce alleged in such action to have been the cause of such injury or death.” (
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 13-212(a) .)
While this section clearly applies to malpractice actions against physicians, it is a general limitаtions section designed to apply to all cases against physicians arising out of patient care. Therefore, the pertinent issue is not whether plaintiff‘s suit alleges malpractice, but whether plaintiff‘s injuries arose out of patient care.
A statute of limitations is to be construed in light of its objectives and to fulfill the object for which it was enacted. (Mathis v. Hejna (1969), 109 Ill. App. 2d 356, 360, 248 N.E.2d 767, 769.) Section 13-212 is meant to apply to suits arising оut of patient care. The phrase “arising out of” is broad and generally means “originating from,” “growing out of,” or “flowing from.” (6 C.J.S. Arise 525, 526 (1975).) In Burgdorff v. Siqueira (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 493, 440 N.E.2d 920, defendant wrongfully advised plaintiff to retire from his
In the present case, plaintiff‘s alleged injury occurred during the course of defendant‘s treаtment of plaintiff‘s wife. This situation is analogous to an issue we faced in Horak v. Biris (1985), 130 Ill. App. 3d 140, 474 N.E.2d 13. In Horak, defendant claimed that plaintiff did not have standing to sue for malpractice because the actions complained of were directed to plaintiff‘s wife, not plaintiff. (Horak, 130 Ill. App. 3d at 146, 474 N.E.2d at 18.) We concluded that plaintiff could maintain a malpractice action because plaintiff and his wife were receiving treatment “for the cоmmon purpose of rehabilitating their marital relationship” (Horak, 130 Ill. App. 3d at 146, 474 N.E.2d at 18), and the treatment of one spouse would have an effect on the other spouse and the prospects for successful treаtment. Horak, 130 Ill. App. 3d at 146, 474 N.E.2d at 18.
The present complaint alleges that both plaintiff and his wife were receiving treatment from defendant for marital problems. Therefore, plaintiff‘s injury did arise out of patient care in that рlaintiff and his wife were jointly seeking treatment, and plaintiff‘s injury occurred during his wife‘s phase of the treatment. As such, the limitations period set out in section 13-212 does apply to the present case, and the suit is not timely.
The judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
LINDBERG concurs.
JUSTICE McLAREN, dissenting:
I have several concerns which require my dissent. Initially it should be noted that plaintiff filed a suit containing two counts. He is appealing only the dismissаl of the first count. The first count alleged a doctor-patient relationship to establish an element under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (
The majority opinion cites Horak v. Biris (1985), 130 Ill. App. 3d 140, to extrapolate an affirmance. The Horak case is factually distinguishable for several reasons. First, it was based upon allegations of malpractice as designated by plaintiff-spouse. Second, the act оf malpractice was alleged as a violation of patient care, not a violation of the Act. Third, plaintiff alleged that defendant was treating plaintiff, albeit through plaintiff‘s wife, when the alleged violation of patient care took place. None of those allegations are contained in the instant first count.
The majority states that “[t]he present complaint alleges that both plaintiff and his wife were receiving treatment from defendant for marital problems. Therefore, plaintiff‘s injury did arise out of patient care in that *** plaintiff‘s injury occurred during his wife‘s phase of the treatment.” (Emphasis added.) (186 Ill. App. 3d at 178.) Plaintiff never alleged that the alleged disclosure was made during patient care of either him or his wife. He only alleged the existence of a doctor-patient relatiоnship. The majority has taken a quantum leap to conclude, as a matter of law, that the disclosure was patient care, especially patient care of plaintiff.
Plaintiff did not allege an act of patient care directed to him that caused his injuries. Plaintiff alleged a disclosure of a confidence to a third party outside of plaintiff‘s presence. Plaintiff also alleged the information was given in confidence and defendant was specifically admonished not to disclose such information to the particular third party. Having reviewed the record, there is no plеading or affidavit which could give any court the ability to conclude that the disclosure occurred during patient care. Patient care is traditionally the act or nonact which causes the injury. It is not the same as the doctor-patient relationship. (Lyon, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 653.) In this case, there is an allegation of the latter; there is no allegation whatsoever by any party as to the former.
I find it difficult to conceive a factual scenario where the disclosure of a confidential statement by a physician to a third party out-