66 W. Va. 169 | W. Va. | 1909
The decree sought to be reversed annuls a deed made by David C. Miller to Jacob A. Sterringer. At the death of a son Miller inherited nearly $1,700.00. Theretofore he had been a fairly industrious and frugal man, although at frequent periods addicted to drinking. He was 60 years of age. TJpon coming into possession of this money, near the beginning of the year -1906, he quit work and began to drink excessively. He continued to drink daily for weeks. His money was rapidly squandered. His mind became greatly impaired. Through the advice of friends who were interested in protecting his money, he had purchased a house and lot in Parsons, which was conveyed to him on the 6th day of February, 1906. For the property a fair value was paid, $700 cash. On March 28th, of that year, he conveyed the property to Sterringer for the sum of $500, of which only $200 was paid. For the residue he accepted Ster-ringer’s note, payable in one year, without interest. On the same day, Miller returned the cash payment and the note to Sterringer, for safe-keeping, as he said. Sterringer was a saloon-keeper, whose place Miller frequented and at which he drank. Immediately after the conve3rance to Sterringer, the plaintiff was appointed a committee for Miller. By the committee this suit was promptly instituted, attacking that conveyance.
These questions are presented for our consideration: Should the demurrer to the bill have been sustained? If not, is the decree supported by the evidence ?
The decree is fully justified. In some particulars the evidence is conflicting, it is true, but material facts and circumstances glaringly appear and strongly support the decree. These facts and circumstances make the case distinctly one of fraud and imposition. It may not be a case of absolute want of mental capacity to make a deed. Though the intoxication may have been of less degree than total at the time the deed was executed, yet clearly the evidence establishes that it was the means by which the grantor was misled and deceived to his prejudice. Cases like this one do not so much involve questions of in
That greatest of Virginia law commentators concisely states: “The plea of drunkenness was formerly regarded with as little favor in civil as it still is in criminal cases. For although Lord Coke classes a drunkard as non compos mentis, yet he allows him no indulgence on that account. ‘As.for a drunkard,’ says he, ‘who is voluntarias daemon, he hath (as has been said) no privilege thereby, but what hurt or ill he doth, his drunkenness doth aggravate it.’ But for more than a century this rigorous doctrine has been much relaxed, and it is agreed that drunkenness invalidates, or fenders voidable all contracts and transactions where, (1), The drunkenness was brought about by the opposite party; (2), A fraudulent advantage was taken of it-; (3), It deprived the party of his reason, and of an agreeing mind. * * * * The mere fact that one is drunk when he enters into a contract is no ground for setting it aside, at least in equity, unless under one or the other of the circumstances above stated; but when a person’s habitual addiction to intoxication renders him extremely subject to imposition, such habits, though not carried to an excess constituting absolute incapacity, lay a ground for strict examination whether any instrument executed by him does not in itself, or in the attendant circumstances, contain evidence that advantage was taken of those habits.” 2- Minor’s Institutes, (4th Ed.), 644. In the same connection, this author further says that when the drunkenness is brought about by the party obtaining the contract, the act is so flagrant a badge of fraud that it always renders the contract voidable, both at law and in equity; and that where a fraudulent advantage is taken of the drunkenness, this,, too, is so direct a fraud as always to render the transaction voidable in all courts.
The principle that is particularly applicable to the case under consideration is that equity will relieve one from a contract made by him in drunkenness, though his reason may not have been wholly overthrown, where fraudulent advantage has been taken, or where the drunkenness has been brought about by the
In applying this principle, the following expressions have been used: “If a party has been led into a hard and disadvantageous bargain, while excited by liquor, equity avoids it. And the same rule applies to persons whose minds are enfeebled by habitual intoxication, although not actually intoxicated.” Birdsong v. Birdsong, 2 Head 289. “If, when a man is so drunk as to render him an' easy prey to the fraudulent designs of another, an unfair advantage is taken of his situation to procure from him an unreasonable bargain, a court of equity will interfere and rescind the contract, not on the ground of his drunkenness, but of the fraud” Calloway v. Witherspoon, 5 Ired. Eq. 128. A Canadian chancellor, in the consideration of a case very similar to the one before us, has said: “It is manifest that a man of intemperate habits, a slave to strong drink, when dealing with the tavern-keeper at whose house he lives, and from whom he obtains the liquor which he craves, and with which he daily stupifies or maddens himself, is as liable to be overreached and needs for himself and his family or heirs the protection of this court at least as much as a client who deals with his solicitor, or as a patient who has transactions with his medical attendant. No man is more helpless than a drunkard is in the hands of those who obtain his confidence, and to whom he looks day by day for the gratification of the morbid craving which has possessed him; and the modern doctrine of both law and equity is against giving up even a poor drunkard, or a drunkard’s property, to be the prey of the rapacious and’unprincipled.” McGregor v. Boulton, 12 Grant Ch., (U. C.) 288.
■ The decree in this case being in accord with well recognized • principles of equity, it is affirmed.
’Affirmed.'