94 So. 706 | Miss. | 1922
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal from a judgment awarding a writ of mandamus directed to the appellant, state auditor, and ordering him to issue a Avarrant for the sum of four hundred forty-five dollars and sixty-one cents to the appellee, Mt. Olive- separate school district of Covington county, representing the share of said school district in the semiannual distribution of the equalization school fund provided for in section 2, chapter 21, Laws 1922. There is also before us a companion case (No. 23221) 94 So. 716, involving the same question, and which Avill be determined by the decision of the case at bar.
The suit is for the purpose of determining whether or not the auditor is' legally authorized to issue warrants in the distribution of the additional equalization school fund provided for in section 2, chapter 21, Laws 1922; it being the contention of the assistant attorney-general, representing the auditor, that said section 2 is void because, first, it is in conflict with section 206 of the Constitution, and, second, that it is invalid because it contravenes section 90 of the Constitution. Chapter 21, Laws 1922, is as follows:
“Section 1. That the sum of two million one hundred fourteen thousand five hundred thirty-five dollars ($2,114,-535) be, and the same is hereby appropriated out of any money in the state treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the support and maintenance of the public schools of the state of Mississippi for each of the calendar years 1922 and 1923.
“ (a)' In equalizing school terms, teachers’ salaries shall also be equalized, grade of license held, competency of the teacher and living conditions being taken into consideration.
“(b) County and district school levies shall not be counted against any county or district in the disbursing of this fund.
“(c) The state board of education shall apportion the fund provided for in this act semiannually to the several counties and separate school districts, the auditor being furnished with a certified copy of the apportionment to be used by him in making out the warrants on this fund in favor of the county treasurers and treasurers of separate school districts. Certified copies of the apportionment shall also be sent by the state superintendent to the state treasurer, the superintendent of public education of each county, each county treasurér and the treasurer of each separate school district.
“(d) The manner in which this fund has been disbursed shall be included in the biennial report of the state superintendent of education to the legislature.
“Sec. 3. That this act take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”
The opposing contention of the appellees is that the mandamus should issue: First, because said section 2 is valid as an exercise of the legislative power, and does not contra
Some light may be thrown ripon the questions involved by giving a brief history of the situation. In 1919, section 206 of the Constitution was amended under the initiative and referendum amendment to the Constitution, which at that time this court had declared valid and a part of the Constitution. This amendment to section 206 provided as follows: .
“But the legislature shall have power to make an additional appropriation to be disbursed by the state board of education in such manner as to equalize public school terms throughout the state.”
The amendment to section 206 became a part of the Constitution in 1920. Thus after section 206 was amended chapter 21, Laws 1922, was enacted by the legislature.
Recently this court, in the case of Jos. W. Power, Secretary of State, v. Robertson, 98 So. 769, decided that the initiative and referendum amendment to the Constitution was null and void, and overruled the Howie v. Brantley Case, 113 Miss. 786, 74 So. 662, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 723. It will be observed, therefore, that the amendment to section 206 of the Constitution adopted in 1919 was void because the initiative and referendum law under which it was submitted was void. So we are to now consider section- 206 in its original form, before it was attempted to- be amended.
The main and decisive question in the case before us is whether or not section 2 of chapter 21, Laws of 1922, shall stand or be struck down as violative of either section 206 or section 90 of the Constitution. A consideration of the inquiry brings into review for construction sections 201, 205, 206, and 90 of the Constitution, which sections we here set out in the order named :
“Section 205. A public school shall be maintained in each school district in the county at least four months during each scholastic year. A school district neglecting to maintain its school four months, shall be entitled to only such part of the free school fund as may be required to pay the teacher for the time actually taught.
“Section 206. There shall be a county common school fund, which shall consist of the poll tax, to be retained in the counties where the same is collected, and a state common school fund, to be taken from the general fund in the state treasury, which together shall be sufficient to maintain the common schools for the term of four months in each scholastic year. But any county or separate school district may levy an additional tax to maintain its schools for a longer time than the term of four months. The state common school fund shall be distributed among the several counties and separate school district's in proportion to the nmber of educable children in each, to be determined from data- collected through the office of the state superintendent of education in the manner to be prescribed by law.”
“Section 90. The legislature shall not pass local, private, or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases, but such matters shall be provided for only by general laws, viz.: . . .
“(p) Providing for the management or support of any private or common school, incorporating the same, or granting such school any privileges.”
We think it proper to consider together the first three sections of the Constitution, as they deal with the subject-matter involved. It will be observed that section 201 makes it the duty of the legislature to encourage and promote
It is the contention of the appellant that section 2 of chapter 21, Laws 1922, is void because section 206 of the Constitution furnished a complete and exclusive scheme and provision for maintaining the public schools by state aid; that by implication the legislature is prohibited from extending any further state aid than to maintain the schools for four months as provided in the section; and that moreover the said section 2 is void because it does not provide a distribution of the fund on a per capita basis. The Pridgen case, 106 Miss. 219, 63 So. 416, is cited and relied upon to support these views.
We confess this interpretation of the Constitution is not without merit, and may be said to be a reasonable construction; but we think there is another and different construction, which expresses the true intent, that is equally as reasonable as the one contended for by the appellant, and is the better view.
It is our opinion that, when section 206 .is viewed in the light reflected from sections 201 and 205, it may be reasonably construed to mean that the legislature was com
We find section 201 plainly making it the duty of the legislature to promote public education in the state by all suitable means, by taxation and otherwise, by establishing a uniform system of free public schools, and that they should do this as soon as practicable. Not content with this- command to the legislature, the framers of the Constitution went farther, and clearly enjoined upon the legislature, in section 205, that public schools must be maintained in each school district at least four months during each scholastic year. When they said “at least four months” we understand they meant that four months was to be the minimum term; or, to put it in another way, there must be not less than four months of schooling, and, inferentially, there may be a longer term, or at least a longer term was not intended to be prohibited, either expressly or by implication.
We cannot bring ourselves in accord with the view that the makers of the organic law intended to circumscribe or restrict state aid for public school education in this state, for all time to come, to only four months in the year. It clearly appears to us their purpose under section 206 was to provide for “at least four months” of public schooling, inclusively, not exclusively, without inhibition as to any longer term.
We think it is a reasonable view to interpret that part of section 206 which provides for a per capita distribution
This construction of section 206 is reasonable, and, while the opposite construction put upon it by the appellant may also be reasonable, yet it is our plain duty to adopt the construction upholding the statute where there are two reasonable constructions, one of which upholds the statute and the other invalidates it. Furthermore, we should follow the rule that this court will not declare a legislative act void uiiless it appears to us beyond a reasonable doubt that it conflicts with the Constitution. We do not think beyond a reasonable doubt that section 2 of chapter 21, Laws 1922, contravenes the Constitution. State V. Henry, 87 Miss. 125, 40 So. 152, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 340; Hart v. State, 87 Miss. 171, 39 So. 523, 112 Am. St. Rep. 437; Dantzler v. State, 97 Miss. 355, 53 So. 1; Natchez v. Crawford, 99 Miss. 697, 55 So. 596; State v. Wheatley, 113 Miss. 555, 74 So. 427; Richards v. City Lumber Co., 101 Miss. 678, 57 So. 977; University of Miss. v. Waugh, 105 Miss. 623, 62 So. 827, L. R. A. 1915D, 588 n., Ann., Cas. 1916E, 522; State v. Jones (Miss.), 64 So. 469; Darnell v. Johnson, 109 Miss. 570, 68 So. 780; Postal Tel. & Cable Co. v. Robertson, 116 Miss. 204, 76 So. 560; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 3 L. Ed. 162.
The Pridgen Case, supra, is cited and urged as decisive of this case, but we disagree with counsel in this contention, for the reason that the Pridgen case was not dealing with a fund such as is provided in section 2 of chapter 21, Laws 1922. In that case the court had before it the question of whether a supplemental fund of five thousand dollars could be distributed to supply certain deficiencies in the school term of four months as provided by section 206 of the Constitution, and the court there had in mind only the question of per capita distribution of the supplemental
In the Pridgen case the court could have decided only the question that it had before it, namely, the four-month-term funds; any language in the opinion which may seem to have indicated that all other school funds provided by the state should be distributed per capita was no more than dicta, because such question was not before the court.
There being two reasonable theories of construction of section 206, it is not strange the legislature, and other officials, took the view that it was necessary to amend the section before any appropriation of additional state funds for schooling could be made beyond the four-month term provided for by section 206. This plausible construction was thought by many to have been indicated by the language of the opinion in the Pridgen case, though the court there was only dealing with a supplemental appropriation for the four-month term. Judicial dicta often leads to erroneous conclusions, even for several generations, until corrected by exposing its nothingness.
The history of public school legislation in our state does not, in our opinion, justify the exclusive, narrow, and un- • progressive construction contended by appellant, but the other reasonable construction that section 206 does not limit appropriations to the four-month term is indeed more harmonious with the educational policy and progressive thought of our state as expressed in section 201 of the Constitution and by the people and the Legislature.
Section 1 of chapter 21 of the Act of 1922 provides funds for the four-month term prescribed by section 206, and must be distributed according to its requirement.
Coming now to section 90 of the Constitution, it is our opinion that the funds appnopriated under section 2, chapter 21, Laws 1922, here involved, is not an appropriation contrary to said section 90, because the appropriation is a general law, is not class legislation, nor a local or special law, since the funds are to equalize public school terms throughout the state by a fair and equitable distribution, and may be used for any school district in any county, or for all of them, for uniform education, in the judgment of the state board of education, as provided by the act.
In view of the conclusions reached above, it is our judgment that section 206 does not expressly or by implication limit or restrict the legislature to appropriations for the four-month term mentioned in the section of the Constitution, but that the sovereign power of the legislature to provide funds for public education as commanded by section 201 of the Constitution is not limited to a four-month term by section 206, and may be extended within the bounds of legislative discretion.
The view we announce will tend to advance and promote education in our state, while the other view would restrict it contrary to the public policy of the state.
■Restriction by implication of the sovereign power to enact legislation for the public good is not favored, and where the inhibition is not clear and certain the inherent power of the sovereign as represented by the legislature may be exercised without limit.
We have not discussed the question of,the impairment of obligation of contract as presented by the appellees, be
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
It is always a source of regret, to me to he unable to concur in the conclusion reached by a majority of my Associates in the decision of any case, which regret is here more pronounced than usual for the reason that the construction placed by the majority of my Associates on the section of th¿ Constitution here in question confers upon the legislature the unlimited power to support the public schools which I think it should have, but to so concur would cause me to violate what seems to me the plain language of the Constitution, as well as some of the most elementary rules for the construction of written instruments.
The ground on which the majority of my Associates have sustained this appropriation is that section 206 of the Constitution can be reasonably construed so as to either limit or to not limit the power of the legislature to appropriate money for the support of the public schools for that portion of the terms thereof in excess of four months, and since the legislature by making the appropriation has construed the section as placing no limit on its power to so appropriate money, that construction, since it is a reasonable one should not now be departed from.
As I shall hereinafter attempt to demonstrate, the language of the section permits, of only one construction, but, if it does permit of another, it is the duty of this court to enforce the one which will more nearly carry out the purpose of the constitutional convention in adopting the sections. Ratliff v. Beale, 74 Miss. at page 268, 20 So. 869, 34 L. R. A. 472. Of course the construction placed on the Constitution by the legislature in enacting a statute is entitled to great weight, and should prevail unless it is
Section 33 of the Constitution, by providing that “the legislative authority of the state shall be vested in a legislature,” grants to the legislature all legislative power; consequently any other provision in the Constitution dealing with legislative power, in so far as the scope thereof is concerned, is a limitation on and not an enlargement of the poAver granted by section 33. In fact, the object of state Constitutions, as distinguished from the federal Constitution, “is not to grant legislative power but to confine and restrain it. Without constitutional limitation the power to make laws would be absolute.” Quoted from Sill v. Corning, 15 N. Y. 297, in Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations (7th Ed.), 242; 12 C. J. 750; State v. Edwards, 93 Miss. 708, 46 So. 964; State v. Patterson, 181 Ind. 660, 105 N. E. 228; Field v. People, 2 Scam. (3 Ill.) 79; Commonwealth v. International Harvester Co., 131 Ky. 551, 115 S. W. 703, 133 Am. St. Rep. 256.
If section 33 of the Constitution stood alone, the power of the legislature to establish and maintain public schools Avould be unlimited, and this power it could exercise or not as it should deem best, but the makers of the Constitution were not willing to leave the maintenance of the public schools Avholly to the discretion of the legislature. By sections 201, 205, and 206 of the Constitution they not only made it mandatory on the legislature to provide a system of public schools, but provided that each school
One of the most elementary rules for the construction of a Constitution or statute is that, when it directs how a duty enjoined by it shall be discharged, is in effect a prohibition on the discharge of the duty in any other way. Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations (7th Ed.), 98; Field v. People, 2 Scam. (3 Ill.) 79; 12 C. J. 750; State v. Henry, 87 Miss. 125, 40 So. 152, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 340; State v. Barnes, 24 Fla. 29, 3 So. 433; State v. Patterson, 181 Ind. 660, 105 N. E. 228; State v. Stark County, 14 N. D. 374, 103 N. W. 913; Parks v. West, 102 Tex. 11, 111 S. W. 726; State v. Fountain, 6 Pennewill (Del.) 520, 69 Atl. 926.
In State v. Henry, 87 Miss. at page 144, 40 So. at page 154 (5 L. R. A. [N. S.] 340), this court held: “That where the Constitution deals wdth a subject, its words must be the sole boundary and sacred from the legislatures, except where it permits expressly or by necessary implication; . . . that, where the Constitution schedules powers, giving or taking away, it must be presumed to have scheduled all, and it only must be looked to, with its necessary implications, for the limit of authority or restriction.”
In 1912 the legislature enacted a statute which appears as chapter 5 in the laws of that session (section 1), providing :
And that the money so appropriated should be "distributed to the counties that might be unable to maintain their schools for four months out of their share of the regular common school fund. The second section of the statute here under consideration provides that the money appropriated for the support of the schools by that section shall be disbursed by the board of education in such manner as to equalize school terms and teachers’ salaries throughout the state. Under this statute the board of education is necessarily empowered to aid any county in maintaining its schools for four months that might not be able to do so out of its share of the regular common school fund; consequently every objection that could have been urged to the validity of the statute of 1912 applies with equal force here. The Act of 1912 was construed by this court in Board of Education v. Pridgen, 106 Miss. 219, 63 So. 416, and was held to violate paragraph p of section 90 and sections 205 and 206 of the Constitution, which last section was held to measure the power of the legislature to appropriate money from the state treasury for the support of the common schools, and to prohibit it'from appropriating any money from the state treasury for that purpose except such as should be appropriated as a part of and to be disbursed as the common school fund. But it is said that the court was not there called on to decide that question, for the reason that the appropriation there under consideration was made for the maintenance of the constitutional four-month term of the schools, and consequently all that was there said relative to the measure of the legislature’s power to appropriate money from the state treasury for the support of the schools wThich should not be a part of the regular school fund was mere dieta.
“It thus appears to have been the purpose of the makers of the Constitution to provide for a uniform system of public schools for every county in the state for at least a term of four months in each scholastic year. This could have been done by requiring each county to provide funds to accomplish this purpose, but this was not done. The scheme adopted prescribes what shall be done by the state, and also prescribes the basis for the distribution of the state’s contribution to this purpose, and this basis is necessarily exclusive, otherwise the legislature could ignore the plan of the Constitution and provide another and essentially different plan for the support of the common schools. Each educable child is the unit upon which the state dis
The holding in that case that the statute there under consideration violated section 205 of the Constitution because it permitted assistance to be given to counties that were unable to maintain their schools for four months out of the regular common school appropriation is also here in point, for, as I have hereinbefore pointed out, the appropriation here in question can and was intended to be so used if necessary.. So, also, is the holding in that case that the statute violated paragraph p of section 90 of the Constitution, for the appropriation here, as ivas the appropriation there, is to be used, not for the benefit of all of the schools of the state, but for such only as may need assistance in lengthening their school terms in order that the school terms throughout the state may be equal. That case is controlling here, and should either be followed or overruled.
I do not mean to intimate by anything herein said that an appropriation to the common school fund which is insufficient or which is more than is necessary to support the schools for four months will be void. In the very nature of things it is impossible for the legislature to determine in advance the exact amount of money that will be necessary therefor; consequently, within probably certain limits, any appropriation, in so far as the amount thereof is concerned, that is made by the legislature to that fund will be valid. Before leaving this branch of the discussion, it may not be amiss to point out that the statute under consideration does not disclose, and this court cannot know, that the appropriation made in the first section
“That the sum of tAvo million one hundred fourteen thousand five hundred thirty-five dollars ($2,114,535) be, and the same is hereby appropriated,” etc.
The second section provides: “That the additional sum of one million two hundred sixty-eight thousand seven hundred twenty-one dollars ($1,268,721) be, and the same is hereby appropriated,” etc.
And the mere designation of an appropriation for the support of the schools as an “additional sum” therefore cannot change the nature thereof, for by Avhatever name designated it is for the support of the common schools. Here, as in the Pridgen case, “it seems,” as was there said by Cook, J., “to be the theory that the legislature, by labeling the common school fund ‘supplemental,’ thereby changed the nature of the appropriation, and in so doing they provided a remedy for a condition entirely outside of the scheme marked out by the organic law.”
The statute in so far as its Amlidity and effect is concerned is the same as if it consisted of but one section appropriating three million three hundred eighty-three thousand two hundred fifty-six dollars “out of any money in the state treasury not otherwise appropriated for the maintenance of the public schools of the state of Mississippi for each of the calendar years 1922 and 1923,” and then providing that one million two hundred sixty-eight thousand seven hundred and twenty-one dollars thereof be disbursed in the manner provided by section 2 of the statute as it now appears.
The public policy of a state must be determined from its Constitution and statutes, both past and present, and, if its public policy can be resorted to, as the majority of my Associates say it can, as an aid in construing a state’s
It was said in Ratliff v. Beale, 74 Miss. 247, 20 So. 865, 34 L. R. A. 472, that:
“To find the true meaning of the language of the Constitution, we are to look to the existing body of the law, whether common or statutory, ... to former Constitutions, ... to existing evils, to the objects and purposes to be accomplished, and to the limits intended to be provided,” for “it must-be remembered that our Constitution ■ was never submitted to the people. It was put in operation by the body which framed it, and therefore the question is what that body meant by the language used.”
Article 8 of the Constitution of 1869, which deals with ■“school fund, education and science,” provides by sections 1 and 5 thereof for a uniform system of* free public schools to be maintained for at least four months in each year for the benefit of children between the ages of five and twenty-one years. Section 6 thereof provides for a common school fund to be made up of revenues derived from several sources, three of which were licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquor, fines, and forfeitures.
Section 724 of the Code of 1880, as amended by-chapter 42, p. 77, Laws 1882, provides that- — “Whenever the amount of school fund in the state treasury in any fiscal year, does not, in the aggregate, amount to three hundred thousand dollars, . . . the state treasurer shall transfer from the general fund to the common school fund a sufficient amount to malee the sum of said school fund three hundred thousand dollar’s,” etc.
By section 730 thereof, as amended by chapter 42, p. 77, Laws 1882,- the boards of supervisors of each county were empowered to levy an annual tax of three mills “to make up any deficiency in the aggregate amount of common school funds arising from other sources, necessary to maintain the public free schools of said, county during the time required by law.”
And by section 731 a similar power was granted to the board of mayor and aldermen of any town, constituting a separate school district. Under that Constitution and these statutes the revenue from which the public schools were supported was derived from four sources: First, licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquors and fines and forfeitures amounting annually to about two hundred thousand dollars (page 28 of the Report of the State Superintendent of Education, December 1, 1889) ; second, an annual appropriation from the state treasury of about one hundred thousand dollars (page 28 of the report of the State Superintendent of Education, December 1, 1889) ; third, an annual tax in each county of three mills for the support of the schools in the county; and, fourth, an annual tax from each separate school district for the support of the schools in the district.
“The Constitution establishes a common school fund, and confers on the legislature power to provide additional revenues to maintain the schools four months. During the first years of our free schools a levy of four mills was made upon the whole property of the state, and distributed with the common school fund to the counties, in proportion to the educable children in each. This was found to impose excessive burdens of taxation upon the wealthier counties and towns, and the law was amended so as to allow them to retain their four-mill ],evy, which was subsequently reduced to two mills, provided therewith the schools could be maintained four months.
“The state at present distributes three hundred thousand dollars pro rata to the counties. About two-thirds of this arises from liquor licenses and fines and forfeitures, the constitutional sources of the common school fund; the remaining one hundred thousand dollars is transferred from the general state fund and is derived from direct taxation. Of this three hundred thousand dollars it is evident that the wealthier counties pay far more than is returned to them.
“The state distribution will not maintain the schools more than thirty days, or one-third of the term. The counties are therefore required to levy a tax sufficient to pay for the other two-tliirds of the time, this levy being retained by each county for the support of its own schools. Thus, in a measure, the state seeks to equalize the burden of taxation for free schools, while at the same time she encourages and fosters a more liberal support of them by
“If this county levy were collected by the state and distributed pro rata,, the wealthier counties would be overburdened, and would make every effort to keep the levy as low as possible. It would, of course, inure to the benefit of the less wealthy counties, but would be unjust and inequitable towards those counties that now contribute most largely to the support of the state government.. The very principles that justify the retention of the three-mill levy in the counties led to the establishment of separate school districts, and apply a fortiori to them.”
The report then proceeds to further demonstrate that the support of the schools by state-wide taxation results in an inequality of burdens and benefits to the various sections of the state, to the great dissatisfaction of the sections bearing the greater burden thereof.
When the constitutional convention met its members proposed in writing such changes as they thought should be made in the old Constitution and the form in which the sections dealing therewith in the new should be couched, all of which were referred to appropriate committees. A number of such proposals with reference to the article of the new Constitution on education were made and submitted to the committee on education, of which Gen. Stephen D. Lee was chairman, which committee-on the fifteenth day of the convention’s session reported an article on education as “a substitute for the proposed changes in the Constitution received to date.” Convention Journal, p. 118. Sections 1 and 5 thereof brought forward sections 1 and 5 of article 8 of the Constitution of 1869 in practically the same form as they appear in the present Constitution. Section 6 thereof radically changed the then method of supporting the schools, and was as follow’s:
“There shall be a common-school fund, w’hich shall consist of a poll tax of twro dollars per capita on all males between the ages of twenty-one (21) and fifty-five (55) years; and of not less than four hundred thousand dollars per
Section 11 reproduced section 10 of the Constitution of 1869, which authorized the legislature to supplement the school fund by taxation, but omitted the provision thereof requiring the school fund to be divided pro rata among the children of school ages, that requirement having been embodied in section 6 of the Report. There was both a majority and a minority report by this committee. The signatures to the minority report, which appears on page 131 of the journal of the convention, among Avhich appear some of Mississippi’s historic names, are those of W. T. Martin, R. G. Hudson, EdAvard Mayes, E. 0. Sykes, Wm. D. Wither-spoon, and W. C. Richards. The principal objections raised by this minority to the proposed article were: First, that the amount of money sought to be distributed from the state treasury is too great, amounting, including the state tax, to about two-thirds of the then entire revenue of the state; second, there is much opposition to the free school system, and to burden “the people with oppressive taxation therefor would work its destruction; third, the best interest of the schools and of the people, as appears from the report of the state superintendent of public ed
On the thirty-ninth day of the session (Convention Journal, p. 265) the committee reported that it had compromised its differences, and reported a substitute for its former proposed article on education, by which section 6 thereof was amended so as to provide that the common school fund shall consist of the poll tax, “and of not more nor less than four hundred thousand dollars per annum from the general fund in the treasury.” Mr. Jamison, of the committee, dissented from this report, and offered as a substitute therefor the article on education originally proposed by the majority of the committee, section 6 of which was as hereinbefore set out.
On the forty-seventh day the convention took up the report of the committee on education, and considered it for several days, during which numerous amendments thereto and substitutes therefor were offered, which, in so far as they affected section 6 thereof; may be classified as follows: First, to confer upon the legislature unlimited power in providing for the support of public schools both as to the amount of money it could appropriate therefor and the manner in which it should be distributed; second, to limit this power by providing either the maximum amount of money that could be appropriated from the state treasury for the support of the schools or the length of the term of the schools to the support of which money could be appropriated from the state treasury; third, to prescribe the method for the distribution of the money appropriated for the support of the schools from the state treasury; fourth, to provide for prorating the money appropriated from the state treasury among the children of the
During the progress of the debate:
“Mr. Robinson, of Rankin, was permitted to introduce the following substitute in lieu of substitute heretofore offered by him for section 6 of the substitute of Mr. Jami-son:
“There shall be a common school fund, which shall consist of the poll tax (to be retained in the counties where same is collected) and an additional sum from the general fund in the state treasury, sufficient to maintain the common schools for the term of four months in each scholastic year. Said sum shall be distributed among the several counties in the state, in proportion to the educable children in each. But any county or separate school district may levy further tax to maintain its schools for a longer time than the term of four months.”
Which was amended on the motion of Mr. Dillard by adding thereto the following:
“The common school fund shall be distributed among the several counties and separate school districts in proportion to the number of educable children and youth in each, from data to be collected through the office of the state superintendent of education in the manner to be prescribed by law.”
The Robinson substitute, with the Dillard amendment thereto, “was then adopted in lieu of section 6 of the substitute of Mr. Jamison for the committee’s report.” Convention Journal, p. 355.
Section 10 of the Jamison substitute, which read as follows : “The legislature shall, from time to time as may be necessary, provide for the levy and collection of such other taxes as may be required to properly support the system of free schools herein adopted,” was then stricken out, and, after voting down a few other amendments thereto, among which was one conferring unlimited power on the legis
But it is said that, when section 206 is construed in connection with sections 201 and 205, it will appear that section 206 does not limit the power of the legislature to appropriate money for the support of the public schools. Such was not the opinion of the members either of the convention which adopted the Constitution of 1869 or of the convention which adopted the present Constitution. As hereinbefore pointed out, sections 201 and 205 of the present Constitution are in substance the same as sections 1 and 5 of article 8 of the Constitution of 1869; nevertheless section 10 of article 8 of the Constitution of 1869 and section 11 of the report made by the committee on education to the convention which adopted the present Constitution authorized the legislature to support the public schools without limit either as to the amount of money to be expended therefor or the length of the school terms. But, when the Convention adopted section 206 of the present Constitution, making it obligatory on the legislature to support the schools for four months, it struck out the section in the committee’s report which would have given the legislature the power to support them for longer terms, thereby indicating that it did not intend to invest the legislature with that power. This construction of its powers to appropriate money for the support of the public schools has been uniformly acted on by the legislature since 1892, a period of more than thirty years, save only when it enacted chapter 5, Laws of 1912. Its journals will disclose that numerous attempts were made to submit to the
The department of education has also construed section 206 to be the measure of the legislature’s power to appropriate money out of the state treasury for the support of the public schools. In his report to the legislature of 1914 the then state superintendent of public education recommended that a constitutional convention be called “to provide for a just and equitable distribution of the common school funds . . . which can only be brought about by amendments to the Constitution or through the holding of a constitutional convention.” And the present state superintendent of public education, in his report to the legislature of 1918, stated that “the Constitution should be so changed as to allow the state department of education to divert state school funds not needed in some counties into those counties where there is always a deficit,” and, in order that the Constitutiofi might be so amended, he, on August 4, 1919, filed with the secretary of state, as will appear from the records of his office, the petitions for the submission to the people of the amendment to section 206, under which the statute here in question was enacted.