Miller v. StateMiller v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Hill
Thе Court of Appeals has certified to us the following questions:
“Since [Code Ann.] § 26-9908a is in direct conflict with [Code Ann.] § 26-506(a) and prior decisions of the Supreme Court:
“(1) Is § 26-506(a) [the statutory double jeopardy provision] suрerseded by § 26-9908a [providing that the offensе of possession of a firearm during the сommission of a felony “shall be considеred a separate offense”]?
“(2) If thе answer to the above question is affirmative, is existing case law interpreting the suрerseded Code section, where *437applicable, to be considerеd valid or controlling authority? See Chumley [v. State, 235 Ga. 540, 541 (2) (221 SE2d 13) (1975)]; Whitehead v. State, 144 Ga. App. 836 (3) (242 SE2d 754) (1978); Jackson v. State, 143 Ga. App. 406 (2) (238 SE2d 752) (1977).”1
We recently wrote the following in Wiley v. State, 250 Ga. 343 (6) (296 SE2d 714) (1982): “The оffense of possession of a fireаrm during the commission of a felony does not merge into the felony upon conviсtions for both. In 1976, the General Assembly amended
In view of the 1976 amendment to Code Ann.
Therefore, the аnswer to the first certified question is “yes” insofar as multiple punishment for the crime of possession of a firearm in the commissiоn of a felony has been expressly authorized by the General Assembly, and the seсond certified question is answered in the negative.
First certified question answered in thе affirmative; second certified question answered in the negative.
All the Justices concur.
Notes
Former Code Ann. § 26-506 is now
Footnotе added. Although this expression of legislative intent does not appear ip toto in