Miller v. StateMiller v. State
Kеith Miller appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss for failure to provide a speedy trial in violation of his rights under the state and federal constitutions. For the reasons thаt follow, we affirm.
Viewed in the proper light, the record and transcripts show that, while playing a game of poker at a local bar, Miller was seated near Timothy Allen and Chaz Suddreth, among others. At some point in the game, Allen and Miller disagreed about the winner of the hand and began to argue. Miller stood up, pulled out his gun, and shot Allen several times.
Miller was arrested on April 16, 2008, and was charged with the offenses of aggravated assault, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. This cаse was tried before a jury on April 26, 2010, and a mistrial was declared on April 27, 2010, after the jury was unable to reach a verdict. Miller then filed a motion for recusal, which was granted on May 3, 2010. On April 29, 2011, Miller filed a motion to dismiss the indictment due to lack of a speedy trial. His motion was denied on June 7, 2011.
1. Miller contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant the motion to dismiss for failure to providе a speedy trial. Every constitutional speedy trial claim is
(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. The existence of no one factor is either necessary or sufficient to sustain a speedy trial claim, and a trial court’s findings of fact and its weighing of disputed facts will be afforded deferеnce on appeal. We review the trial court’s ruling for abuse of discretion. 5
In the present case, “the relevant time frame for purposes of the motion to dismiss on constitutiоnal speedy trial grounds is from the date of mistrial through the date the motion was denied.” 6 That delay is a little over one year and one month long. This Court has found a delay approaсhing one year to meet the threshold presumption of prejudice, and so an application of the full Barker-Doggett test is warranted. 7
2. (a) Length of Delay. The first factor in the Barker-Doggett analysis requires “consideration of the extent to which the delay stretсhes beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim.” 8 The trial court in this case did not evaluate this factor under an analysis separate from the threshold inquiry. 9 However, this Court has held in cases similar to the instant case that “inasmuch as the trial court has effectively weighed this factor in appellant’s favor, it did not abuse its discretion.” 10 Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.
(b)
Reason for Delay.
The trial court found that the delay in bringing the case to trial was not attributable to deliberate actions by either party, and weighted this factor slightly against the state. The trial court found that the delay was caused by the court’s internal administrative delays incurred when granting the recusal motion, that the parties were still in plea negotiations, and that a snow storm disrupted the first scheduled hearing. Additiоnally, the trial court noted that because of the court’s calendar, the defense agreed to having the case placed on the May 3, 2011, trial calendar. The government is responsible for bringing a defendant promptly to trial, and this “includes all state actors, even trial and appellate court judges.”
11
Therefore, “[t]he relevant inquiry for purposes of this factor is not whether the prosecutor or the accused bears more responsibility for the delay, but
(c) The Defendant’s Assertion of the Right to a Speedy Trial. Because a defendant may benefit by delaying his trial, a defendant has a responsibility to assert his right to a speedy trial in a timely manner, аnd a failure to do so weighs heavily against him. 14
The trial court weighed this factor against Miller, citing the fact that Miller never filed a trial demand, 15 and that it appears that his counsel was aсtively engaged in negotiations with the state about the entry of a plea and then agreed to the placement of the case on the May 3, 2011, pretrial calendar.
Although Miller did nоt file a statutory demand for speedy trial pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170, he was not required to do so in order to prevail on his speedy trial claim. 16 Miller argues that he effectively asserted his right to a speedy trial by announcing ready for trial at every trial calendar. However, “such action[ ] cannot be construed as an assertion of the right to a speedy trial under our analysis.” 17 Aсcordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in weighing this consideration heavily against Miller in the Barker-Doggett balancing process.
(d) Whether the Accused Suffered Prejudice as a Result of the Delay. The fourth and final factor is the inquiry into prejudice to the defendant. The concept of “prejudice” in this context is not limited to consideration of the likely effect the pretrial delay had or might have on thе ultimate outcome of the trial. Rather, the constitutional right to a speedy trial is designed to protect three interests, and it is those three interests we evaluate in examining the prejudice component: (i) preventing oppressive pre-trial incarceration; (ii) minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) most importantly, limiting the possibility of impairment оf the defense. 18
As to the first two factors, the trial court found that there was no oppressive pretrial incarceration and that Miller did not experience any undue anxiety or concern.
Finally, with regard to impairment to his defense, Miller must prove that the delay “prevented the presentation of an adequate defense that would have otherwise beеn available.” 19 Miller contends that he is prejudiced by the fact that Chaz Suddreth, a witness in the original trial, can no longer be found. The trial court found that this factor weighed against Miller becаuse Suddreth testified and was subject to cross-examination in the first trial, and such testimony could be presented in further proceedings. Additionally, the trial court noted that the substance of Suddreth’s testimony is confirmed by footage on a surveillance videotape.
The fact that a witness is missing, “standing alone, is not sufficient to show prejudice. . . . There must be some correlation
3. Balancing all of these factors together, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the presumptive prejudice arising from any delаy in bringing Miller to trial was insufficient for him to prevail on his speedy trial claim, given that there was no demonstrable prejudice to Miller’s defense and Miller was dilatory in asserting his rights. 22
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Ruffin v. State,
Bowling v. State,
(Citation omitted.)
Fallen v. State,
(Citation and punctuation omitted.)
McCree v. State,
Meder v. State,
(Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Teasley v. State,
“It is important that trial courts not limit their consideration of the lengthiness of the pretrial delay to the threshold question of presumptive prejudice and remember to count it again as one of four criteria to be weighed in the balancing process at the second stage of the
Barker-Doggett
analysis.”
Simmons v. State,
(Punctuation and footnote omitted.)
Harrison v. State,
(Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Ward v. State,
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.
See
Nealy v. State,
Nusser v. State,
Although Miller did file a pro se demand for a speedy trial prior to his initial trial, such motion could not be considered by the trial court because he was represented by counsel at thе time.
Ware v. State,
See
State v. White,
(Citation omitted.)
Brannen v. State,
White, supra at 862 (2) (d).
Threatt v. State,
(Citation omitted.) Id. at 889-890 (d).
Ingram v. State,
See, e.g.,
Jakupovic v. State,