The principles applicable to this case have been so frequently asserted in this court, that it seems like a work of supererogation to restate or reapply them.
Though the daughter, Margaret, had attained the age of twenty-one in the February prior to the execution of the deed, and, therefore, according to the ruling of this court in Caho v. Endress,
The son, on his arrival, was immediately informed'of Robert Miller’s request to have the curatorship settled, and when he reached home he proposed to his sister that they should give “ their father a home;” that they had “better give him a deed during his lifetime.” To this proposal she readily assented, and on Monday following, without further conversation bn the subject, the deed in question was drawn up at King’s office, in St. Charles, in the temporary absence of defendant, and without his knowledge or solicitation, as he alleges. The daughter states, however, that while she was on the porch of King’s office, and a few moments before the deed was executed, her father told her he had plenty, and that she need not sign the deed unless she wished. The receipt acknowledging payment and satisfaction of all moneys and property received by the defendant as curator of the estate of his wards, was executed
I. have found it difficult to resist the impression, from a perusal of the evidence, that there was a concert of action or at least an understanding between the father and the son that the deed should be procured ; and difficult also to resist the belief that the son came up from St. Louis on the 16th day of May in response to the letter which a disinter
But it is entirely immaterial in this case, so far as concerns the conclusion which should be reached, whether there was concert of action between the father and son or not; it is sufficient that the son was the moving cause of his sister executing the deed ; that she did the act which deprived her, during the lifetime of her father, of all the property she had in the world, irnprovidently, without time or opportunity for proper reflection, and in the absence of independent advice, and while she was not yet emancipated from parental and fraternal influence. And it is well settled that the undue influence need not proceed from the recipient of the ward’s or donor’s bounty, but it is equally fatal to the validity of the gift that such influence was exerted by a third person. Ranken v. Patton,
