136 Iowa 158 | Iowa | 1907
We can dispose of this appeal by considering three out of tbe numerous questions presented in argument, and these are (1) whether tbe real property in question, which is tbe homestead of the defendants L. R.
Plaintiffs filed an amendment to their petition, in which they asked tbe establishment and renewal of tbe Gilcrest judgments on April 11, 1906. Their right to have tbe judgment for $139.60 revived, depends on whether tbe statute of limitations fixing twenty years as tbe period of time within which an action on a judgment of tbe district court must be brought (Code, section 3447, par. 8), commences to run against a justice’s judgment transferred to tbe district court from tbe time of entry of such judgment by tbe clgrk of tbe district court on tbe docket or from tbe time of tbe rendition of tbe original judgment by tbe justice of tbe peace. It is to be noticed that tbe extension of tbe statutory period for bringing ac
That a judgment entered by the clerk of the district court on a transcript from a justice of the peace is to be treated from the date of such entry as a judgment of the district court is expressly provided in Code, section 4538, and we are of the opinion that the statutory period within which an action may be brought on such judgment commences to run from the date of the entry thereof by the clerk of the district court, and extends for twenty years, as is provided with reference to other judgments of that court. We reach this conclusion by analogy from cases in which it has been held that executions on.such judgments may be issued at any time within twenty years from the entry by the clerk on the records of the district court, and that the lien of such judgments continues- for ten years from the time of such entry; the times within which execution may be issued and for which the lien continues being the same as in case of judgments originally entered in -the district court. McCoy v. Cox, 54 Iowa, 595; Band v. Garner, 75 Iowa, 311; Stover v. Elliott, 80 Iowa, 329: And see Haugen v. Oldford, supra. In Little v. Devendorf, 109 Iowa, 47, it was
If, then, the Gilcrest judgment for $139.60 in the district court of Polk county on transcript from a justice of the peace is to*be treated as a judgment of the district court of Polk county, and, as already indicated, we think it must be so treated and as of the date of May 5, 1886, plaintiffs’ action to revive such judgment, commenced April 11, 1906, was within the statutory period of limitations, and the court erred in denying to plaintiffs a judgment, against defendant L. B. Posebroolc for that amount’.with interest and costs. In this respect the decree of the lower court is reversed. In other respects it is affirmed.