Miller v. RidgleyMiller v. Ridgley
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Hershey
delivered the opinion of the court:
The appellants herein filed a suit in the circuit court of Crawford County to quiet title and to remove as a cloud on the title of certain real estate described in the complaint and owned by the appellants a claim of the appellee that he was the owner of the oil-and-gas rights in and to said
The original and amended complaint filed in this cause set forth all the foregoing facts, which are undisputed by the parties in this cause. To said original complaint the appellee filed a motion to dismiss, and also to the complaint as amended. In said motion the appellee claims that he is the owner of all the oil and gas in and to said real estate free and clear of any leasehold rights, the oil lease existing on said real estate having been released prior to the filing of this suit. The appellants contend that the deed of March 9, 1923, conveyed all the oil-and-gas rights in and to said real estate, and that when the existing oil lease on said real estate was cancelled and released of record neither the grantors nor their heirs had any further interest in the oil and gas in and upon said real estate.
The trial court sustained the motion to dismiss the original complaint, and also the amended complaint. Thereupon the appellants elected to file no further pleading and the trial court dismissed the complaint and suit at appellants’ costs. Inasmuch as oil in place and the rights thereto comprise an interest in real estate, (Watford Oil and Gas Co. v. Shipman, 233 Ill. 9,) and title to same is here involved, a direct appeal is taken to this court.
In general, a landowner is entitled to the surface and all that is below it, and when he makes a deed that contains no reservation and does not limit the estate conveyed, he conveys everything under the surface as well as on the surface itself. (Updike v. Smith, 378 Ill. 600.) His interest in the oil and gas in and upon the real estate is accessory to his legal interest in the land and will pass by a grant of the land unless he expresses an intention to retain that
It has long been settled in Illinois that a mineral estate may be severed from the surface estate by a grant of the land specifically reserving the minerals, and when this has been accomplished by a deed, two estates exist in the land which are subject to independent ownership and to separate taxation and which may be devised or conveyed like any other real estate. Shell Oil Co. v. Moore, 382 Ill. 556; Deverick v. Bline, 404 Ill. 302.
Now let us consider the application of the foregoing principle to the instant case. It is apparent that if the grantors wished to convey all their interest in the oil and gas in and upon said real estate, this could have been accomplished by a warranty deed and without any other provision than that the same was made subject to existing oil leases. The land, both surface and the oil and gas in
A somewhat similar situation is found in the case of Moore v. Griffin, 72 Kans. 164, 83 Pac. 395. The landowners in that case made a lease of the oil-and-gas privileges in said land. Thereafter they conveyed the land excepting and reserving all rights and privileges reserved to them by the lease and to “all oil and gas in said premises.” Their grantee conveyed by warranty deed to another without any reservation or exception. Thereafter, the oil-and-gas lease on said premises was cancelled by consent of the parties to the lease. All of the conveyances were of record, and subsequent purchasers took with constructive notice, and therefore took no interest in the oihand gas. The cancellation of the lease did not extinguish the rights of the original owners of the land nor vest the right to the oil and gas in the owners of the lands at the time of such cancellation. This case is an authority for the legal principle that the owner of the lands does have the right to reserve unto himself all of the oil-and-gas rights when a conveyance is made, if the provision of the deed so stated. The instant case in many respects is analogous. The grantors here made a general warranty expressly setting forth as one of the provisions that “all oil rights [are] reserved to the grantors.”
A somewhat similar situation is also found in Triger v. Carter Oil Co. 372 Ill. 182. There, one Mary Horn inherited an undivided one-third inter®! in a certain tract of land from her husband. Thereafter she leased said land to the Carter Oil Co. Subsequently, by a mineral deed to
It is apparent from the foregoing that the landowners here, before the execution of the March 9, 1923, deed, held said real estate subject to the existing oil lease. By that deed they conveyed all their interest in the surface of said land, subject, of course, to the right of the lessee to take oil and gas from therein, after which the title to same vested in said lessee. The rights to the oil in place, however, were hot conveyed by said lease, nor by the deed in question, inasmuch as the same were reserved to the grantors.
The appellants, however, contend that the deed in the instant case did not reserve any of the oil rights in the grantors on release of the existing oil lease, for two reasons. The first is that because of the use of the word “and” in the provision in question between “All oil rights reserved
The appellants contend, however, that the only oil rights reserved by the provision in such deed are those which are subject to the oil lease, and therefore when the lease is cancelled all oil rights are released. We do not agree with this contention. Of course, as long as the lease existed on the lands, all oil rights were subject to the rights of the lessee, or in other words, were subordinate thereto. These rights of the lessee as hereinbefore pointed out, were to find and to extract whatever oil it could. On doing so it had the right under the lease to reduce the same to possession, and acquire title thereto. It, however, at no time had title to the oil in place. If we use the meaning of the word “and” in the sense of continuation or addition, as contended by the appellants, no other conclusion can be reached except that the grantors intended to reserve all oil rights and that they recognized in addition that the same were subject to the rights of the lessee.
We are thus compelled to determine, at this point, just what the various interests are under this deed. We have found that oil and gas, because of their fugacious nature, are incapable of an ownership distinct from the soil so long as they remain in the earth. Consequently the ownership of the surface determines the extent of ownership of oil underlying the surface. It is therefore impossible to distinguish the ownership of the oil in place in the earth from the ownership of the surface. However, we have
The appellants finally contend that because the grantors and lessors did not reserve the right to enter upon the land here involved after the release or cancellation of the lease this is an indication that they intended to convey all the oil rights in and to said lands except those embraced in the lease. This contention is based upon the claim that although the provision in the deed alleged to have reserved all oil rights to the grantors, it failed to reserve the right to enter upon the surface of the land and remove the oil therefrom. Again we can find no merit in appellants’ contention. The owner of the land has the right to sever his land into estates, and he may dispose of the mineral estate and retain the surface, or he may dispose of the surface and retain the mineral, the mineral estate in this case being the oil-and-gas rights. (Harris v. Currie, 142 Tex. 93, 176 S.W. 2d 302.) Oil rights include the right to explore and find oil. Without the right of ingress and egress, and to use so much of the surface as necessary, there is no actual right to explore for oil. While the mere reservation of the mineral estate does not vest the grantor or reserver with any title to the surface, yet the reservation of the mineral carries with it, as a necessary appurtenance thereto, the right to use so much of the surface of the land as may be necessary to enforce and enjoy the estate reserved.
Appellants place great reliance on the case of Deverick v. Bline, 404 Ill. 302, to support their assertion that these grantors reserved only their rights under an existing oil lease. That case is so entirely at odds with the instant one in regard to its fact situation that it fails to serve as any authority upon which this case may be determined. The Deverick case involved a deed wherein the grantors made a reservation in the following language: “This conveyance is made subject to an Oil and Gas Lease on said premises which Grantors reserve unto themselves and are to receive any and all benefits and profits therefrom.” Such a reservation is clearly different in meaning from that in the instant deed.
The decree of the circuit court of Crawford County is affirmed.
Decree affirmed.