*1 OF APPEALS IN THE COURT v. MILLER MILLER [163 N.C. (2002)] Sikes), v. (now Plaintiff RAY TIMOTHY MILLER, MELANIE C.
No. COA00-823 No. COA00-945 2002) (Filed 17 September support— Support, Custody, and Visitation— 1. Child signed prior unsigned memorandum consent order — judgment support not calculated — support setting did err in defendant’s The trial court not signed was not defendant pursuant to a order that consent prior attorney signed had a memorandum his where defendant parties the on signatures which stated that the judgment necessary. prior not The memorandum judgment formal were sup- custody provided question of judgment settled the according guidelines, but that port was be calculated heard for when the matter was had not been determined amount competent was judgment. hearing A was held and final presented supported judge’s use of worksheets which findings. and his Custody, support Support, and Visitation—
2. Child — modifi- guidelines date of temporary order — effective cation amount properly law in 22 Decem-
The trial court followed the its support did temporary a order and modifying ber order the effective not abuse its discretion pursuant the child date of increased child provided a for certain guidelines where decided; paid be to be until could amount when the settled temporary order terminated judgment on 17 in a memorandum of filed issue of provided was to be calculated 1988 which that child pursuant support guidelines; and the trial court to the child pay a father should hearing, determined that defendant held guidelines, per in child under the certain amount week was filed as and set the date the memorandum support, with guidelines amount of child effective date of made under the being given credit temporary order. COURT OF
IN THE MILLER MILLER *2 Custody, and Visitation— Support, 3. Child —con- supporting tempt findings willfulness — findings and con- fully supports court’s the trial The evidence contempt of a in child was willful that defendant clusion had made some not where found that defendant order the court comply, and means had has the payments, and that defendant why as to he should presented defendant had no contempt. not be held in gainful Custody, and Visitation— Support,
4. Child — employment ordered ain by ordering the defendant not err A trial court did employed where de- custody gainfully to remain child action withheld requested be that the child fendant wages. his from part. in concurring part dissenting and
Judge Greene 22 1999 judgment entered December from Appeal April 24 2000 Culler, S. entered by Judge Mark Appeal County District Court. in Davidson J. Gottholm Martin appeal was dis- Plaintiff’s November 1998. plaintiff from order of 16 Rule comply Appellate with for failure to on October 2000 missed consoli- hearing and are appeals were consolidated for 12(b). The Appeals 14 Court purposes opinion. Heard in the of this dated for August 2001. plaintiff-appellee.
No brief filed for defendant-appellant. Tate, Richard Jr. C. for CAMPBELL,Judge. court. two of the trial appeals judgments from for 1999 order appeal from the 22 December is an
COAOO-823 appeal is an fees. COAOO-945 and counsel child contempt paying back for not finding defendant in April 2000 order These 1999 order. support in of the December violation child hearing. for appeals were consolidated
COAOO-823 in a order last appeal is the from the December As this support, it is neces- custody and child orders series of sary provide history this case so as to procedural out to set understanding argument. of defendant’s clear IN THE OF APPEALS COURT v. MILLER granted
Plaintiff an and defendant were absolute divorce on 24 They April Tyler Ray Miller, had marriage, 1995. one child born of the February Kimberly 1997, Judge born 17 November 1989. On 24 S. Taylor County (“Judge Taylor”) Court, of the Davidson District issued support. order, Taylor an order her custody Tyler stated: “no Ray has ever regarding been entered County an pending Miller and action is in Guilford wherein Taylor defendant claims is to determined.” went [be] earnings parties, using on to find the relative Worksheet A Support (which North Carolina Child Guidelines is used when parent, plaintiff), the child is in the sole one here the deter- per mined that defendant should week *3 Taylor order, Judge specifically “[djefendant her stated that shall pay $124.00per week to the Plaintiff for the and maintenance Tyler Ray Miller as the until County.” said child is determined Guilford The action for child cus- tody pending County and child that was in Guilford was where, by Davidson County, agreement parties, transferred to it was then scheduled for with R.B. court ordered mediation Smith as the mediator. July
The mediation was held on 7 conference 1998. The media- report parties agreement tor’s indicated that had the reached an on all issues, and that consent was to be the matter. filed The agreement by parties during reached the the mediation was embodied in a Judgment/Order,” document entitled “Memorandum of also dated July 1998, agreement, and set out the granting terms each party joint custody Tyler and the schedule for when would be parent. with In addition, provision each was a in paragraph 1, there sub-paragraph (8) provided of the agreement parties which that the agreed pursuant that: “Child to be calculated to child guidelines.” agreement following stipula- The contained the relevant tions, in paragraph as set forth of AOCForm 220:
(a) signing With the of Memorandum presiding judge, this the
this Memorandum shall become a judgment/order of the pursuant and shall be court deemed entered to Rule 58 of the North the Carolina Rules of CivilProcedure on date filed with Clerk; (b) provisions fair this Memorandum are and reason- ample opportunity
able and each has had legal obtain legal concerning advice effect and terms of this Memorandum; OF APPEALS
IN THE COURT MILLER contempt powers Memorandum is enforceable (c) this comply terms; its any party with the court should not [and] parties judgment/order not on the formal are
(f) signatures of the necessary [.] and agreement and defendant their signed
This both they acknowledged had respective Both then counsel. stipulations, they into the agree- entered agreement read the voluntarily, they legal effect this ment and that understood by Judge E. signed Jack Klass agreement. agreement The was then County Court, was filed Klass”) of Davidson District (“Judge 1998. on subsequently up proposed, formal attorney drew a con-
Plaintiffs custody provisions to in the incorporating agreed sent order open support payments was left The of child mediation. issue complete earnings was needed to regarding information defendant’s request proposed and a for defendant’s the calculations. The attorney were to defendant’s on about financial information mailed plaintiff’s nothing in record to indicate that 1998.There is proposed request his attorney response order or to received a information. *4 for defendant’s financial subpoena attorney a to defendant’s
Plaintiff’s then issued employer receiving information. After this wage to obtain defendant’s up information, plaintiff’s attorney a revised formal consent drew pursuant support for to which included the calculations child order calculations, support guidelines. According to defend- the child these $170.00per support payment was to be week. ant’s child plain- order, response the revised Finally, receiving after no to request a attorney presented the order to the court with tiff’s revised based on the Memorandum judge sign that the the order September Judgment/Order had filed 1998.On which been signed Honeycutt (“Judge Honeycutt”) M. the Judge James response request in to counsel for order, but a revised consent attorney delayed agreement plaintiff’s filing the revised defendant, it. opportunity to review On 25 had an until defendant’s counsel nothing defendant’s September 1998, having heard further from attorney plaintiff’s filed the revised order. counsel,
MILLER v. MILLER a On 9 October defendant motion to the filed have revised set language consent order aside since the the order recited “and it parties the the appearing signatures court from of the and their respective counsel below the subscribed that have reached an controversy and, at agreement mediation on the matters with the [in] parties,” attorney the that consent of and neither defendant nor his entry Honeycutt filing Judge had consented to the the order. granted regard support provisions this motion with to the child in the order, provisions custody. but refused to aside the child set gave appeal then regarding notice of to this Court order, appeal however, interlocutory. we held the was judgment regarding issues,
The final these and the order from appeals, 1999, by which defendant now was issued on 22 December Judge (“Judge Culler”). Judge Mark S. Culler a hearing Culler held on matter, plaintiff presented wherein testified and parties’ plaintiff’s earnings, expenses, and the child’s reasonable expenses and (including insurance). medical dental recounting history in proceedings order,
After of these his findings expenses made regarding earnings Culler parties. the modify He also found that neither had filed motion to plaintiff
child and that the was “still pursuing calcu- Support lation of the child based on the Child Guidelines judgment.” addition, effective memorandum of continuing Culler found that defendant was to make $124.00 per required by week as child by Judge Taylor. issued law,
In his conclusions of Culler stated that was by entitled guidelines, to child as calculated and ordered pay $162.00per figure week This by presented taking figures hearing by calculated at the using A from guidelines, Worksheet the child indicated which payment per defendant’s would be month. $701.99per figure, Culler took multiplied then month it twelve months, and then divided number weeks obtain the $162.00 weekly support payment However, owed defendant. to setting existing support payment addition defendant’s at *5 $162.00per week, Judge Culler set the effective date as 1998— filing Judgment/Order. date the Memorandum of After giving $124.00 per payments defendant credit week he had made 1998 to 22 December defendant was found to be approximately $4,148.00 in arrears.
MILLER v. MILLER [1] Although defendant lists thirty-eight separate assignments error, essentially single all of these constitute a issue: whether under order, judge the December 1999 the trial erred defend $162.00 support payment per ant’s child at week. by signed Judge
Defendant contends that the “consent order” Honeycutt September signed by on 10 either defend- not attorney, necessary ant or his it a lacked the consent needed for bind- ing agreement (thereby making void), reason, it and that for it this Taylor’s entirety, leaving Judge should have been set aside in its tem- porary only Following order as the order still in effect. reasoning, this taking into consideration the fact that neither party filed a motion for modification of child defendant concludes it was error for Judge Culler to hear evidence on the matter, increasing and issue an order defendant’s child making the retroactive.
However, ignores defendant one crucial fact. Whereas we would ordinarily agree with defendant that consent rendered “[a] inoperative entirety,” without the consent of a will be held in its Overton, 31, 37, (1963), Overton v. revised, sign defendant’s failure to formal consent order drafted by plaintiff’s attorney by Honeycutt, and signed does not obvi- ate the fact sign defendant did the Memorandum of Judgment/Order by By (“Memorandum”) signed signing Klass. Memorandum, agreed custody provisions defendant to all of the incorporated revised, which were then into the formal consent order by signed Judge Honeycutt, provision as well as the in the Memorandum where agreed that child would be according guidelines. determined to the child Furthermore, by signed the Memorandum stated that when presiding judge, court, it became an order of the and that the “signatures judgment/order on the are not formal necessary.” already (Emphasis added.) Therefore, defendant had con- custody portion consenting sented to the of the order virtue of the Memorandum. portion Honeycutt’s
This is not the case as to the per $170.00 requiring that defendant week in child Since sign, to, defendant did not and therefore did not consent per support payment revised, week child stated in the formal consent agreement signed Honeycutt, pro- he was not bound this Furthermore, payment officially vision. as no had been calculated in *6 IN THE COURT OF v. MILLER
MILLER (2002)] N.C. [153 only provision Judgment/Order, Memorandum of support Taylor’s temporary Judge support in effect at the time per week. requiring order Taylor’s specifically above, however, pointed As out custody the child to remain in effect until stated that it was supplied). Thus, when Klass (Emphasis was determined. consent) signed the Memorandum (based on defendant’s custody issue, replaced Judge finally deciding it Judgment/Order custody. Taylor’stemporary order as to custody, the issue of child Having resolved the issue provisions Memorandum, of the remained to be decided. Under the according the child support was to be calculated Therefore, made. when the no determination had been guidelines, but duty Culler, to hear evidence on it was his matter came before the amount of the child issue, and to make a determination as to Crutchley, 518, 524-25,293 S.E.2d Crutchley v. See hearing on the matter of child there (1982). 797-98 At the child, parties’ incomes, expenses for the as to the was evidence the. admit- plaintiff’s expenses. Evidence of defendant’s income was employer, stating defend- ted in the form of a letter from defendant’s along with the cost of insurance for himself and the earnings, ant’s testimony who stated child. Culler also heard custody child, their parties shared under although defendant had the child for fewer Judgment/Order, Memorandum of days year. out of the than 123 Support Guidelines, three differ- the North Carolina Child
Under determining are used in the amount of ent worksheets Custody,” party. A, entitled “Sole is to paid to be each Worksheet physical custody of obligee [plaintiff has be used “when the here] period time pending are involved in the action for child(ren) who days per year than 243 (more is more than two-thirds of the Support Guidelines, Ann. R. N.C. 47. year).” N.C. Child Physical Custody,” B, “Joint or Shared is to be Worksheet entitled custody joint physical children) parents “when the share used parent sought,” and is limited to use where each for whom days, year, for more than one-third of the terms has per year. parent overnights each has for more than where C, “Split Custody,” Worksheet entitled involves the situation Id. at 49. parent involved, and each has where there is more than one child physical custody child. Id. at 51. of at least one
MILLER Therefore, in determining the amount of child owed defendant, A, in using trial court was correct Worksheet since *7 according presented, physical custody to the evidence defendant had year. days per support of the child.fewer than 123 Once child is set guidelines, conclusively pre- accordance with these worksheet it “is sumed to be in such amount as to meet the reasonable needs of the parent child and commensurate with the relative abilities each pay support.” County Jackson, Buncombe ex rel Blair v. 138 N.C. App. 284, 287, 240, (2000). 31 S.E.2d 243 This Court’s review is limited a competent to consideration of whether there is sufficient support fact, whether, findings findings, based on these properly computed support the Court obligations. Hodges child v. App. Hodges, 478, 482, 7, 147 N.C. S.E.2d 10 (2001). 556 We conclude competent support Judge that there was evidence to findings. Culler’s [2] Defendant next contends that Culler erred in awarding plaintiff pay a support retroactive increase the amount of child by application ments 17 1998 as the effective date of the guidelines amount of disagree. child We support “(1) support Retroactive child consists either of child prior party complaint therefor, awarded to the date a files a or a (2) provided existing support retroactive increase in the amount in an Cole, App. 427, 433, order.” 11, (2002). Cole v. 149 N.C. 562 S.E.2d 14 support prior As child was not awarded to the date filed her complaint, present only case deals with the retroactive increase $124.00 support by Taylor payments from the ordered on February $162.00 support payments by 24 1997 to the ordered 1999, Culler on 22 December which were held to be effective as of 17 1998.
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.
an
a
50-13.7(a),
“order of court of this
support
may
any
State for
of a minor child
be modified or vacated at
time, upon
showing
changed
motion in the cause and a
circum-
anyone
subject
stances
either
interested
to the limitations
authority
Accordingly,
G.S. 50-13.10.”
a court does not have the
sponte modify
support
Royall
Sawyer,
an existing
sua
order. See
v.
App. 880,
addition,
(1995).
120 N.C.
However, Supreme may our Court has held that a district court contemplates per- enter an interim order for child which THE OF IN COURT MILLER may at a later time and will be entered manent retroactive order required the interim than require larger 595, (1992). The Court Sikes, 330 N.C. S.E.2d order. Sikes v. had been made no final determination further to hold that since went support, the child proper amount of child regarding the Finally, subject temporary subsequently to modification. and was requisite showing changed circumstances that the the Court held by Ellenberger Ellenberger, as set forth 631, 308 S.E.2d grounds, 309 N.C. S.E.2d rev’d on other of child applicable there is a determination is not until (1983), 599, 411 the case. Id. at S.E.2d upon the merits of based at 590. Taylor setting child bar, at the order entered
In the case language in nature. The *8 support payments at was “temporary support provided it as a order” of the order identified paid temporary $124.00per “should be as child that the sum of support week custody Ray and deter- [Tyler is heard until the Miller] was intended language from this that the order mined.” It is evident is, being a final determination as to temporary. That rather than to be provided for a sum certain support, the order the issue of child paid could be decided. It is to be until amount subsequent modifica- Taylor contemplating the clear that provided that support, as the order tion of child “[a]fter decided, parties agree Tyler Ray if the cannot Miller is heard and on child support in that action or if the Court does not decide on child party action, event, shall have the support in that then that either temporary this order thereafter.” The right to seek modification of subject subsequent modifica- rendered it nature of the order thus tion the court. sup-
Furthermore,
previously
has
held that child
our Court
complaint
files a
port
is awarded “from the time
which
support,’
not ‘retroactive child
but
support to the date of trial is
child
support representing
period
prospective child
is in the nature of
filed to the date of
complaint seeking child
from the time a
App. 356, 361, 446
Taylor
Taylor,
trial.”
(1996). In
grounds, 343 N.C.
COAOO-94B [3] In this appeal, Timothy Ray Miller, appeals from April 2000, entered 24 finding contempt him in for failure ordered Culler in the December judgment. argues first that since we should find the order appealed from in (the COAOO-823void 22 December 1999 order), we should accordingly April find that the 24 2000 order finding him in contempt However, to be void. having prior found the order to be valid, reject we this contention.
Next, defendant asserts that the trial court did not make the find- ings required by of fact N.C. Gen. Stat. 5A-23(e) (2001), § entitled *9 “Proceedings contempt.” for civil N.C. Gen. Stat. (e) § 5A-23 reads in pertinent part: the hearing, judicial conclusion of the the official “[a]t finding must enter a against alleged the contemnor on each of the elements set out in 5A-21(a).” G.S. N.C. Gen. Stat. 5A-21(a) § (2001), in turn reads:
(a) comply Failure to with an order of a court is a continuing contempt long civil as:
(1) force; The order remains in
(2) purpose may The of the order still be served com- pliance order; with the
(2a) noncompliance person The to whom the order is willful; directed is THE COURT OF IN
50 MILLER v. 40 com- is able to the order is directed person to whom (3) The that measures take reasonable or is able to ply with the order comply with the order. person to would enable made no find- the trial court argues that Specifically, defendant find that a “willful.” In order to was conduct ings that defendant’s only failure to com- must find not willfully, “the court acted defendant comply.” possesses means to presently ply that the defendant but 786, (1980) 787 332, 334, 264 S.E.2d Teachey Teachey, 46 N.C. v. 391, 254, 269, 394 150 S.E.2d Mauney, 268 N.C. Mauney v. (quoting contempt proceeding in a we follow of review The standard (1966)). competent is determining whether there is “limited to support the con- findings and whether the findings of fact 709, App. 705, Sharpe Nobles, 127 N.C. of law.” clusions (1997). 291 $162.00 paying the was found that defendant Here, the trial court order, but that 22 December payment pursuant to the per week stipulated was made toward what payment had been no owed from support that would be $3,108.00 in child that “defendant Further, trial court found to 22 December 1999. ability comply with the presently the means and has has had open court himself asked 1999 order.” December $162.00 per week withholding the an order the trial court enter addition, trial court found wages. his why should not be held as to he presented no evidence “defendant contempt of court.” wilful [sic] findings, we con- and the trial court’s the evidence
Based on trial court’s fully findings and the supports these the record clude contempt of the in willful that defendant conclusion order. December 1999 trial argument in defendant’s find no merit
*10 We also unsupported by the evidence. The record contempt order was court’s income, knowledge of the his of defendant’s replete with evidence comply portion of the with the order, and his failure to 22 December for the time requiring defendant fully 1999. This evidence to December period covering of law and conclusions findings of fact supports the trial court’s contempt. in willful therefrom, finding drawn [4] Defendant’s final contention is that the trial court erred order by employed. argues gainfully to remain ing defendant MILLER MILLER parent support pursuant who has been and paying is
“[f]or pursuant to our child agreement Guidelines or to an obviously court order each week it is none of the court’s busi- parent employed.” ness whether or not such a is Defendant contends authority the trial court does not have the to issue such an order. disagree. We specifically
N.C. Gen. Stat. 50-13.4(dl) (2001), § states that initially January 1, orders entered on or after “[f]or withholding provisions the immediate income of G.S. apply.” 110-136.5(cl) regards shall In to immediate income withhold- ing, N.C. 110-136.5(cl) (2001), Gen. Stat. § states that non-IV-D “[i]n cases in which initially a child order is entered on or after January 1, 1994, subject an obligor withholding to income immedi- ately upon entry of so, the order.” This is unless trial court finds “good require cause” not to withholding, immediate income or the parties have reached a agreement written for an alternative ar- rangement. only N.C. Gen. Stat. 110-136.5(cl) (2001). § Not is there finding “good no cause” which would allow defendant to be free from income withholding, open requested but defendant in court support payments that the child wages. be withheld from his acceding request any to defendant’s making without defendant any showing of other source of income from which these made, could be the trial court was within prerogative its to order gainfully employed payment defendant to remain to ensure of his support obligation. Affirmed.
Judge BRYANTconcurs. part part in GREENE concurs the result in and dissents in separate opinion.
in a GREENE, Judge, concurring part in dissenting the result part. majority’s validity agree holding I with the of the memo- judgment/order (the memorandum) subsequent randum of and the (the order) consent order formal and its decision to affirm Culler’s child using order but reach this-conclusion a differ- analysis. majority’s ent As to the trial discussion court’s con- tempt order, I dissent. *11 IN THE COURT OF
52 MILLER (2002)] 40 N.C. [153 I Temporary Order temporary order for that a opinion, this Court held In a recent final order “when neither custody may into a convert temporary in the matter requests] calendaring of the the [addressed entry after the a reasonable time hearing a within order] App.-,-, LaValley LaValley, -N.C. v. [temporary] [o]rder.” pas- LaValley, deemed the 913, In this Court (2002). 915 564 S.E.2d entry temporary the twenty-three months between sage of seeking mod- plaintiffs motion in the cause filing of the order and the tempo- and concluded the prior order unreasonable ification of the rary court to requiring final order the trial into a order had converted at-, test. Id. 564 employ change of circumstances a substantial at 915. S.E.2d Taylor by on temporary signed case,
In this set- May 1998, parties agreed to a mediated February 24 1997. and child the issues of child conference on tlement May filed 8 1998. order to this effect trial court entered an and the conference, parties and Subsequent mediated settlement to the filed 17 1998. memorandum, which was signed court the trial was, September and was followed filed 25 1998 The formal order defendant’s Honeycutt’s granting November 1998 order filed 16 Culler’s order filed as to child Rule 60 motion thus appeals. The record from which defendant December 1999 along and parties to move the case a effort reflects reasonable support. Accordingly,the and child resolve the issues of Taylor’s preserved, obviating order was nature of any change a of cir- findings regarding substantial the need to make prior assessing child cumstances
II Memorandum Issues A Order Interplay Memorandum and Formal between parties and the trial court and signed The memorandum entry subsequent formal contemplated the of a filed in the memoran- agreement contained order that was to reflect provisions to in its terms and If a order is identical dum. such formal Buckingham Buckingham, valid. memorandum, it is deemed MILLER v. MILLER N.C. App. 82, 87-88, 869, 874, denied, 516 S.E.2d disc. review (1999). While the formal order constitutes order, is, however, “merely
valid
it
surplusage” to the memorandum.
at
Id.
B Requirement Consent argues is memorandum invalid because the trial parties court never met with the par- and thus failed to examine the required by Tevepaugh ties as Tevepaugh, App. 489, (1999). S.E.2d 117 I disagree.
The memorandum statement, signed includes a the trial court, attesting the trial agreement court had read the terms of the parties, inquired to the voluntary parties’ toas nature of the agreement thereof, and their understanding and informed the legal effect of the memorandum. There is no in Accordingly, record to refute this statement. defendant’s argument without merit.1
Ill Contempt any Defendant further contends trial court failed to make findings that defendant’s conduct was willful. contempt proceedings,
In the trial findings court’s facts appeal are supported by competent conclusive on when evi- required finding dence. The element willfulness is for a of civil contempt .... ability comply an (1) Willfulness constitutes: to order; (2) with the court and a deliberate and intentional failure so. do Toliver, App. 114, 118, Sowers v. 150N.C. (2002). 562 S.E.2d majority retrospective 1. The further discusses the calculation and nature of argued the child awarded Culler. As were in these issues not defend- Court, brief 28(a). ant’s to this I would P. not address them. See N.C.R. IN THE COURT OF EVANS
EVANS N.C. has had and “defendant case, trial court found In this comply support] ability to with the presently has the means [child finding to make a as whether order,” trial court failed but the comply with the order was “deliberate failure to defendant’s presented merely “defendant The trial court found intentional.” [had] contempt why he not be held evidence as to should no wil[l]ful in the dissent in Shumaker v. For stated court.” the reasons J., (Greene, App. 72, (2000) S.E.2d 55 dis- Shumaker, improper assignment an to defend- senting this constituted part), Instead, it was proof on the issue of willfulness. ant of the burden duty finding whether defendant’s failure trial court’s to make and intentional.” comply with was indeed “deliberate the order finding no for the trial there is Without such an additional contempt. was in willful See that defendant court’s conclusion at App. at 596.2 Sowers, 150 N.C. majority’s (1) affirm summary, I with the decision to agree *13 Honeycutt’s set aside the for- of defendant’s motion to denial (2) Judge Culler’s child order as it relates
mal contempt be reversed. believe the order must order but EVANS, KEITH S. EVANS and HAROLD KEITH JOSEPH JONATHAN Plaintiff COMPANY, EVANS, FARMS, OIL FIELD SUPPLY EVANS WESTERN d/b/a d/b/a CO., COMPANY, TRACTOR & STAMPING & MFG. BROCK LAKE CUSTOM INC., CO., INC., CO., LEE TRACTOR d/b/a LEE TRACTOR OF EQUIPMENT MOUNT, Defendants ROCKY
No. COA01-1022 (Filed September 2002) Liability— to warn —directed verdict failure 1. Products products liability arising not err case The trial court did clamp injuries alleged an used on from defective sustained system by granting a verdict for defendant irrigation an directed warn, the issue of failure to because manufacturer on any provide that defendant’s failure proffer failed to plaintiffs injuries. proximate warnings was the cause of gain- ordering to “remain the trial court erred in 2. I would further note contempt person fully employed.” a child that a can be found It is well established court, id. The trial how- court-ordered See order for his failure paid. ever, is to which child be cannot dictate the source of funds from