Miller v. MeersMiller v. Meers
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Carter
delivered the opinion of the court:
The controverted question in this case is, did the title to the hotel property, subject to the lease to William P. Bissell, vest in plaintiffs in error by virtue of the deed of Martin C. Bissell and wife, or did the deed fail to take effect because of non-delivery. • The first question to be determined is, whether or not the trial court erred in the admission of the testimony of the witnesses Clin and William P. Bissell.
Judge Olin, who drew the will of Martin C. Bissell, was permitted, against the objection of the plaintiffs, to testify that the testator, in making up the list of his property to be included in his will, included in the list
Counsel for defendants, however, strenuously contend that this testimony was proper, as showing that it was not the intention of the grantor that the deed should take effect as a voluntary settlement, and cite the following cases in support of their contention: Cline v. Jones, 111 Ill. 563, Bovee v. Hinde, 135 id. 137, Barnum v. Reed, 136 id. 388, and Price v. Hudson, 125 id. 284, which last case, it is insisted by counsel, is conclusive of the question. We find nothing in that case changing the rule long established. This court there said: “Any disposition made of the deed by the grantor, with the intention thereby to make delivery of it, so that it shall become presently effective as a conveyance of a title, will, if accepted by the grantee, constitute a sufficient delivery. (3 Washburn on Real Prop. 288-293 ; Benneson v. Aiken, 102 Ill. 284.) The intention to deliver, on the one hand, and of acceptance on the other, may be shown by direct evidence of the intention, or may be presumed from acts or declarations, or both acts and declarations, of the parties, constituting parts of the res gestee, which manifest such intention; and in like manner the presumption of a delivery may be rebutted and overcome by proof
As to whether Martin O. Bissell continued to deal with the property, and the grantees permitted him to continue to deal with it, as his own, after the execution of the deed, other witnesses were examined, but it was clearly erroneous to admit and consider the testimony of Judge Olin as to statements made to him by Bissell when drafting his will, to the effect that he still owned the hotel property and had never given it to plaintiffs-in error. (Guild v. Hull, 127 Ill. 523; Dickie v. Carter, 42 id. 376; Massey v. Huntington, 118 id. 80; Long v. Long, 19 Ill. App. 389, and 118 Ill. 638.) These statements had no connection, either in time, place or circumstance, with the statements made to the witnesses Stevens and Dish-man, to the effect that the property belonged to his brother’s children, and that he was attending to it for them • and his brother, and did not tend to disprove such statements, as supposed by counsel. These latter statements were properly received as admissions by the grantor,—as statements against his interest. They tended to show that he considered the deed as having taken effect, and that the title had vested in the grantees. They also tended to explain his acts in dealing with the property after having conveyed it.
But the question still arises, whether or not, after considering all proper evidence and rejecting all held
It is well settled that the law makes stronger presumptions in favor of the delivery of deeds in cases of voluntary settlements, especially in favor of infants, than in ordinary cases of bargain and sale. The acceptance by the infant will be presumed. And it is even held that an instrument may be good as a voluntary settlement though it be retained by the grantor in his possession until his death, provided the attending circumstances do not denote an intention contrary to that appearing upon the face of the deed. (Bryan v. Wash, supra; Cline v. Jones, supra; Reed v. Douthit, 62 Ill. 348; Walker v. Walker, 42 id. 311; Otis v. Beckwith, 49 id. 121; Masterson v. Cheek, 23 id. 72; Souverbye v. Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. 242; Bunn v. Winthrop, id. 329; Scrugham v. Wood, 15 Wend. 545; Perry on Trusts, sec. 103; Uran v. Coates, 109 Mass. 581; Thompkins v. Wheeler, 16 Pet. 114.) And it was said in Weber v. Christen, 121 Ill. 91, that “the crucial test, in all cases, is the intent with which the act or acts relied on as the equivalent or substitute for actual delivery were done.”
The deed in question must have taken effect at once upon its acknowledgment and delivery to Grinton, or not at all, and the real question is, with what intention was the deed placed in the hands of Grinton? (Blackman v.
Defendants insist that Grinton was the grantor’s clerk, and that his possession was the possession of the grantor. It is not clear, from the evidence, what the business relations were between Grinton and Martin G. Bissell. Grinton testified that he was not employed by the day, week, month or year; that he always had a partnership contract with Bissell in the profits, and that that was the case when these papers were executed; that the partnership papers, as witness called them, as well as his individual papers and those of Martin O. Bissell, were all kept in the safe. Whether he was responsible for the losses and expenses of the business is not disclosed by the evidence. Prom the evidence given he may have been a partner in business with Bissell, or merely an employee receiving a share of the profits as a measure of his pay for his services. In Lockwood, v. Doane, 107 Ill. 235, this court held, that “where parties agree to share in the profits of business the law will infer a partnership between them in the business to which the agreement refers; but this presumption may be disproved. It is prima
We find nothing in the attending circumstances denoting an intention on the part of the grantor that the deed should not take effect, but, on the contrary, there is sufficient evidence that he intended the deed to become presently effective. He at the same time executed and delivered to his brother, the father of plaintiffs in error, and to his brother’s wife, who were already in possession of the property, a life lease therefor. The deed was, on its face, made
The decree of the circuit court is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to dismiss the cross-bill and to enter a decree in accordance with the prayer of the bill of plaintiffs in error.
Reversed and remanded.