89 Iowa 567 | Iowa | 1894
It appears from the evidence that the plaintiff was what is known as “head brakeman” on a freight train of the defendant, and, just before he received the injury of which he complains, he was riding in the cab of the engine. No question is made as to that being the proper place for him to ride when not employed at the brakes. The alleged injury was received in the night, as the train approached a station
We have thus briefly stated the grounds upon which recovery is sought. If the plaintiff was in the line of his duty in taking the direction he did to get on top of the train, and in stepping on the covering of the manhole, and was not negligent in failing to discover that it was defective or out of position, he was entitled to recover, if the manhole was improperly or negligently covered, either by reason of the lid' being improperly placed over the manhole, or because of the manhole being improperly constructed, or out of repair and in an unsafe condition. It would appear from this statement that the issues in the case were plain ánd unambiguous, and .a review of the questions involved upon an appeal ought not to be atteuded with difficulty. But a great many questions were raised during the trial. Many of these question will be disposed of in a general way, without special mention of them. Such as we think require particular consideration will be set out.
“When on the stand, you said in reply to a question by the gentleman on the other side as to whether it is the custom to step on the lid or cover of the manhole. and then step on the next car, that that is not the way you did it? A. Well, I done it once, and it caved*572 in. I thought I had better quit. I did not make that a practice. I don’t think it is the practice or custom todo that on the Illinois Central.” “Do you know what the custom was on the Illinois Central Railroad as to the brakemen 'stepping on the lid of the tank? (Objected to, as notproper cross-examination, improper, and incompetent.) By counsel for defendant to the court: This is merely a question that we omitted to ask the witness when he was on the stand before. (Objection sustained, and defendant duly excepts.)” Redirect examination by the plaintiff: “You testified that you stepped on this lid, and it caved in. "What engine was that you did that on? (Objected to,' as improper and incompetent, — ‘We asked him generally, and not as to this -particular engine;’ also, as irrelevant and immaterial. Objection overruled, and the defendant duly excepts.) A. It was'on engine number 365.”
We think the court should have sustained the motion to strike out the testimony of the witness, and that it was error to allow it to go to the jury. Engine number 365 was the one on which the plaintiff received his injury, and if the plaintiff had, in the examination in chief, sought tó prove that another person had stepped on this manhole, and found it deficiently covered, it would have been error to admit the evidence. Hudson v. Chi. & N. W. Railway Co., 59 Iowa, 581; Bell v. Chi. B. & Q. Railway Co., 64 Iowa, 321; Phillips v. Town of Willow, 34 N. W. Rep. (Wis.) 731. As we understand it, the evidence drawn out by the defendant was strictly in the line of proper cross-examination. The re-examination, it is true, was directed to the same subject-matter as the cross-examination. We discover no reason why the defendant should be required to remain silent during the redirect examination, and allow incompetent evidence to be introduced, because counsel did not move to
IY. As the judgment must be reversed for the error last above considered, it is proper to say, in view of a new trial, that the failure of the fireman to notify the plaintiff that the lid of the manhole was in an unsafe and dangerous condition is not a ground of negligence averred in the petition, and that question should not have been submitted to the jury. We do not intend to hold, however, that, with proper averments, the knowledge of the fireman, and his failure to communicate any defects in the manhole to the plaintiff, may not be evidence of negligence. There are no other grounds of complaint on the part of the appellant which appear to us to demand consideration. Revebsed.