42 N.J. Eq. 459 | New York Court of Chancery | 1887
The bill states that the defendants issued a policy of insurance against loss by fire to Runkle Rea, February 11th, 1881, upon a dwelling-house &c. in Hunterdon county, for $1,500, $800 of which was on the dwelling-house; that, February 15th, 1882, Rea sold the property and assigned the policy to the complainant by an assignment which was duly approved by the company; that the policy was under seal; that by it the company insured the property according to the terms of the constitution, by-laws and conditions of the association; that there were annexed to the policy certain “ conditions of insurance,” fourteen in number, each referring to one of the by-laws of the association ; that at the time of and during the negotiations between the complainant and Rea for the purchase of the property, and about five days prior to the making of the assignment of the policy, the complainant asked Rea, who then was the treasurer of the association, in the presence and hearing of the secretary, whether the
The association is a mutual company. Rea was a member and officer thereof. It is not alleged in the bill that he was not aware
As assignee of the policy, the complainant became a member of the company also, and as such is presumed to have known, when he took the assignment, of the existence of the by-law. But he alleges that through the fraud of Rea, who was treasurer of the association, and the silence of the secretary when Rea made the declaration that the conditions annexed to the policy were all of the conditions of the insurance, he was deceived and induced to take the assignment; and he claims that therefore the association is estopped in equity from setting up the condition against him in the suit on the policy. As to Rea, his statements in the transaction were, under the circumstances, no more binding upon the company than those of a stranger would have been. Barnes v. Trenton Gas Light Co., 12 C. E. Gr. 33. Neither he nor the secretary could bind the association by his declaration or silence in respect to the matter in issue. The officers of a mutual insurance company cannot dispense with terms and conditions of insurance which by-laws of the company impose, unless they are authorized so to do. Hale v. Mechanics Ins. Co., 6 Gray 169 ; Baxter v. Chelsea Mutual Ins. Co., 1 Allen 294.
The charge of fraud on the part of the association is unaccompanied by any fact to support it. It rests upon the mere circumstance of the omission of the condition in question from the conditions stated in the policy. It has been decided, in the suit referred to in the bill (Miller v. Hillsborough Assurance Association, 18 Vr. 393), substantially that the condition is binding at law upon the complainant, notwithstanding the fact that it was not stated among the conditions in the policy, because by the policy it is declared that the insurance is accepted according to the terms of the constitution, by-laws and conditions of the association. If the omission would create an estoppel in equity, it would equally do so at law. The complainant insists that because
The demurrer will be allowed.