Miller v. HayesMiller v. Hayes
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Batjer
Lead Opinion
OPINION
By the Court,
Batjer, J.:Howard M. Miller, Special Prosecutor for the State of Nevada, Clark County, petitions
Bellanger pleaded nolo contendere to the felony charge of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor resulting in death or substantial bodily harm to another person.
On July 6, 1979, the district court conducted another hearing, reconsidered the question of probation, announced that the previous sentence was “withdrawn,” and again pronounced sentence of five years in the Nevada State Prison and a $5,000 fine, but ordered that the sentence be suspended and the defendant placed on an indeterminate period of probation, not to exceed five years, on the special condition that she pay for and complete a residential rehabilitation program for alcoholics at Gemini Group Home, Inc., and that she not be released from such program without prior approval by that court. She was further ordered not to drink any alcoholic beverages, and not to drive.
The petitioner contends that the district court was without jurisdiction to modify in any manner, and for any cause, the sentence pronounced, but not signed or entered, on June 26, 1979. We disagree.
The district court pronounced sentence on June 26, 1979 “to commence immediately”. While
At the time the district judge reconsidered his previous action, resentenced the petitioner, and placed her on probation, no judgment had been signed by the judge nor entered by the clerk. Therefore the district judge had jurisdiction to modify or suspend his earlier decision.
Writ denied.
Mowbray, C. J., and Gunderson, J., concur.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
The majority opinion holds that a district judge’s pronouncement of judgment and sentence from the bench is not a final judgment and does not, without more, deprive the district judge of jurisdiction over the matter. I respectfully dissent from that result.
On June 26, 1979, in the presence of the defendant and her counsel, entry of judgment and imposition of sentence were pronounced
On July 6, 1979, the court conducted a second hearing. The judge commented that his primary concern continued to be the protection of the community, but that “a resourceful attorney has come up with an alternative to that which I had originally ordered and in addition some people whom I respect, who have an interest in Mrs. Bellanger and her family, came forward in her behalf since the time of sentencing, and I am impressed with that.” The court then announced that the previous sentence was “withdrawn.” He reaffirmed the sentence of five years in the Nevada State Prison and a $5000 fine, but then ordered that the sentence be suspended and the defendant placed on an indeterminate period of probation, not to exceed five years, on the special condition that she pay for and complete a residential rehabilitation program for alcoholics at Gemini Group Home, Inc., not be released from such program without prior approval by this court, not drink any alcoholic beverages, and not drive. The written judgment filed on July 6, 1979, reflects that the defendant was sentenced on June 26, 1979, which sentence was reimposed and suspended, with the grant of probation.
The state contends that the trial court was without jurisdiction to modify in any manner, and for any cause, the sentence once imposed. While I believe that this contention is over-broad in this factual context, I find that it has substantial merit. Cf. Warden v. Peters, 83 Nev. 298, 301-02, 429 P.2d 549, 551-52 (1967) (trial court had inherent power to correct mistake in sentence); see also
Article 5, section 14 of our constitution provides in part:
The legislature is authorized to pass laws conferring upon the district courts authority to suspend the execution of sentences, fix the conditions for, and to grant probation, and within the minimum and maximum periods authorized by law, fix the sentence to be served by the person convicted of crime in said courts.
The legislature has specifically provided, “in issuing the order granting probation, the court may fix the terms and conditions thereof, . . . except that the court shall not suspend the execution of a sentence of imprisonment after the defendant has begun to serve it.”
Here the court unequivocally pronounced sentence on June 26, 1979, “to commence immediately.”
If, as here, the sentence as orally pronounced has been entered upon the court’s minutes and the defendant has begun service of the sentence, it is impossible to overlook the reality of Mrs. Bellanger’s several days of incarceration following the imposition of judgment and sentence. It is well established that the remand of a defendant to the custody of a sheriff, as was done here, constitutes a partial execution of the oral judgment for purposes of consideration of credit for time served under equal protection guarantees of both federal and state constitutions. See Anglin v. State, 90 Nev. 287, 525 P.2d 34 (1974).
The legislature has provided for the lapse of a period of time prior to the imposition of judgment and sentence within which the Department of Parole and Probation is to investigate the background, circumstances, criminal record of the defendant, and make a recommendation to the court of a definite term of confinement, amount of fine, or both.
Notes
The record demonstrates that one and one half hours following the defendant’s arrest, a chemical analysis of her blood indicated a 0.33 percent weight of alcohol.