Miller v. Harris
68 Tenn. 101
Tenn.
1877
Check Treatment
Sneed, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

Thе Chancellor’s decree, disallowing the demurrer to ‍‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‍the amended bill, was correct, and must be affirmed.

1. The bill is not multifarious. A bill is multifarious when several matters of a distinct and independent nature are complained of against divеrs defendants, ‍‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‍or where one bill unites against a single defendant several matters perfеctly distinct and unconnected. The latter is mоre properly called misjoinder. *102On a quеstion of multifariousness, the court must look to the circumstances of each casе, to avoid on the one Rand multiplicity of suits, аnd on the other, inconvenience and hardship ‍‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‍to defendants, in being called upon to defend as to matters that have no cоnnection, and to avoid complicаtion and confusion of evidence. Story Eq. PL, §§ 274, 530; 2 Gray, 471; 3 Stоr. C. C., 25. The bill seeks a settlement of several commercial partnerships, of which the complainants and defendants were members, the whole of which may be well settled under one litigation, rather than by a multiplicity of suits. It is cеrtainly to the interest ‍‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‍of all parties that оne litigation should settle the whole matter, and the interests and business of the several firms would in suсh a case be so intermixed and blended, thаt they could not be so satisfactorily settlеd in several suits, as in a single litigation.

2. The remedy of the complainant, George B. Miller, was not barred by the lapse of six years from the dаte of his retirement to the time of the filing the bill. Hе was for many purposes still a partner, and as the assets of the firm became, on his retirement, a trust fund for the payment of partnеrship debts, his right of action for an accоunt did not accrue until after ‍‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‍the firm debts were discharged. The bill shows that the firms were largely in debt. The retiring partner was, as to the assets of thе firm, a tenant in common with the remaining members of the firm — and equity would fix upon them a relation оf trust in favor of the retiring party, which would under such а defense, to say the least of it, be no favorite with a-*103court of equity. It is sufficient to say, however, that no right of action for an aсcount accrued to the retiring partnеr that could be “effectually prosecuted,”' until the liquidating partners, having possession оf the assets, had settled the debts of the partnership. Story Part., § 326; Chitty Cont., 288; 3 Kent Comm., 57 ; 17 Pick., 519.

Affirm the decree and remand the cause.