176 Ky. 268 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1917
Opinion op the 'Court by
Affirming.
The city of Corbin, Kentucky, is a city of the fourth class; about two-thirds of its territory located in Whitley county, and about one-third in Knox'county. On the 9th day of April, 1912, it adopted a system of city graded schools as is provided by the charter of such cities, being sections 3588 to 3606, inclusive, Kentucky Statutes, under which system “The Board of Education” for the city had the power, and is was its duty, to maintain and manage graded schools for both colored and white pupils living within the city.
On February 8, 1916, a petition was filed with the mayor of the city of Corbin, at a regular meeting of its city counsel, signed by more than one hundred of the
This proposition to convert the graded schools of the city from one system of control to the other of the two systems provided by our statutes, was suggested by and had the unanimous approval of the board of education for the city. In accordance with the request of the petition, the mayor, on February 14, 1916, not a regular meeting day for the city council, called an election to be held in the city on March 27, 1916, exclusively for the white voters of the city, which election was called for more than forty days and was duly advertised as required by law. There were cast in favor of the change in the- school system 185 votes and opposed to it 106 votes, being a majority in favor of the proposition of 79 votes. This proposition was submitted by secret ballot. At the same time a board of trustees was elected by viva voce election, who are the defendants to this suit. These trustees afterwards, by appropriate orders and which are not questioned in this suit; except that the authority of the trustees to make the orders is contested, called an election to be held in said city on the 8th clay of May, 1916, for the purpose of taking the sense of the white voters therein as to whether or not the graded free white common school district should issue and sell bonds in a sum not to exceed $25,000.00 for the purpose of constructing a suitable school building, the one previously existing having been burned some time in the early part of the year 1916. At this last election there were cast in favor of the proposition of issuing the bonds and levying a tax of not exceeding fifty cents- on each one hundred dollars ’ worth of property and a poll tax not exceeding $1.50, 461 votes, and against it 23 votes. It is conceded that both of the elections above mentioned were duly canvassed and prop
The grounds for relief sought are: (1) That the city of Corbin had no right under section 4489 of the statutes, or at all, to accept or to adopt the system of graded common schools provided by sections 4464 to 4500b, inclusive, Kentucky Statutes, after having adopted the system of city schools provided for in charters of cities of the fourth class, sections 3588 to 3606, inclusive. (2) That section 4464a of Kentucky Statutes permitting parts of two counties to' be incorporated into a graded school district was not complied with as should have been done since the city of Corbin lies partly within two counties. (3) That if both of these positions are incorrect, the attempted change was ineffectual for the following reasons: (a) that the call for the election to take the sense of the voters upon the question was illegal and void because the mayor did not hold the petition filed with him from one regular meeting of the city council to the next; (b) because the question was submitted by secret ballot rather than viva, voce. (4) That at said election no tax was voted, and, therefore, no graded school district -established, and that the attempted election of trustees for a district which had not been established and had no existence was illegal and conferred nd authority upon them to call the election upon the question of issuing bonds and that that election was, therefore, void.
“The legislative purpose, if any doubt arises upon the language employed in the acts, will be looked to, rather than the mere dates of enactments, as the guide in construction. The import of the acts in question, viewed in connection with the general state of the law, and the history of the legislation, and previous judicial utterances, if any, upon the subject, are all legitimate and helpful means of arriving at the legislative purpose in the enactment of statutes which may appear to be inconsistent in terms or means provided.”
As stated above, the legislature was in session when the Taylor v. Russell opinion was rendered and immediately thereafter enacted the statute involved. In the city of Richmond, Kentucky, where the controversy arose which was before the court in the case cited, graded schools were maintained and operated for both white and colored pupils under one board, the board of education, and the effect of the vote considered in that opinion is stated to have been “merely for the white voters to vote out the colored graded common school already adopted by the legal authorities in manner provided by law.” Assuming, as under the circumstances we must, that the legislature in the enactment of the law, was dealing with
“3588a. — That any city of the fourth class having heretofore organized a system of free graded schools for the education of the white and colored pupils of said city, under and by virtue of the charter for cities of the fourth
“If the city council shall pass an ordinance as herein-before provided for, separating the white and colored schools, either the white persons or the colored persons living in said district may hold an election as provided by the laws governing school elections in said district for the purpose of abolishing the white or colored graded common school system therein existing, the white persons only to vote with reference to the white graded common schools, and the colored persons only to vote with reference to the colored graded common schools; and if such election shall be held and the majority of the votes cast at same shall be in favor of abolishing the white or colored graded common school system in said district, the same shall be abolished.”
It is insisted, however, by appellants that the act is unconstitutional because the power to change the system, if conferred, was not indicated by the title of the act, which is as follows:
“An Act to Empower Cities of the Fourth Class to Separate the Management and Control of their Schools Where the Same are now Under the Control of a Board of Education.”
Section 51 of the constitution is as follows:
■ “No law enacted by the Greneral Assembly shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title, and no law shall be revised, amended or the provisions thereof extended or conferred by reference to its title only, but so much thereof as is revised, amended, extended or conferred, shall be re-enacted and published at length.”
In construing this section of the constitution, it has been frequently held that if all the provisions of an act relating to the same subject are naturally connected and are not foreign to the subject expressed in the title, it is sufficient. See citation of authorities in note to thé section in Kentucky Statutes. We think all of the provisions of the act under consideration are related to and connected with the subject of the act as expressed in the title
It is true the act provides that the change in the graded school system shall be by an ordinance separating the management and control of the schools for the white- and colored children, and this was of course upon the theory that separate schools were maintained in all cities of the fourth class, but the fact remains that the city council is authorized to make the change by ordinance and without an election.
• The city council of Corbin did, on April —, 1916, regularly adopt an ordinance changing the management of its graded schools from the city graded school to the district graded school, and that ordinance, we think, clearly effected the change without reference to the election held with that purpose in view. It is true the ordinance is not aptly drawn and states incorrectly the. sections of the statutes under which the change is authorized, but these facts do not alter the fact that it does ordain’the change the city council was authorized to make
We are ■ therefore of the opinion that the election at which the bonds were voted was legal and that appellants have failed to present any reason why the injunction should have been granted.
Wherefore, the judgment is affirmed.