40 F. 15 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Connecticut | 1889
This is a bill in equity by one of the residuary legatees under tlie will of Irene Clark, deceased, to compel throe of the defendants to deliver to the executor of said will three savings bank books alleged to be in their possession, and to compel the executor to receive said books, to inventory the deposits named therein as a part of the assets of said estate, and to collect the amount due thereon for the benefit of said estate. Airs. Irene Clark, of Milford, Conn., died in April, 1887, leaving a last will, which was executed in November, 1881, by which, after a specific legacy to her husband, she gave all the rest of her personal estaie to six nieces, Irene M. and Martha A. Buckingham,Emma J, and Mary Belle Clark, Ellen C. Platt, and Ilosalie Merwin, to be equally divided between said persons; and appointed Alburtus N. Clark, the husband of said Emma J., her executor. At the time of her death she was from 76 to 78 years old, without children, the second wife of Bela Clark, to whom she was married lato in life. Tier living relatives were a sister and a brother, divers nephews and grand-nephews, nieces and grandnieces. Her personal property, besides a small amount of household goods and wearing apparel, amounted to $7,509.83, mostly consisting of deposits in savings banks. On October 15, 1884, she had $5,871 on deposit in the Connecticut Savings Bank, of New Haven. In
The facts bring the case within any rule which has been laid down in regard to the validity of gifts inter vivo?. The courts of last resort in Massachusetts and in New York differ from each other in regard to the absolute necessity of an acceptance of the gift of the donee, (Gerrish v. Institution, 128 Mass. 159; Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134;) but there can be no doubt that the donees in this case knew of and accepted the gifts. The authorities unitedly declare that the gift may be made by delivering to the donee, or by the creation of a trust in a third person, or in the donor; and that, where there is an express declaration of trust in the donor, the ride which requires cessation of control and dominion by the donor over the personal property which is given, is not applicable. Milroy v. Lord, 4 De Gex, F. & J. 264; Young v. Young, 80 N. Y. 422; Scott v. Bank, 140 Mass. 157, 2 N. E. Rep. 925; Minor v. Rogers, 40 Conn. 512; Boone v. Bank, 84 N. Y. 83. Testimony in regard to the declarations and acts of the donor which were made or which took place before or about the time of the acceptance of the gifts, and which declared her purpose in transferring the deposits to the donees, was objected to. This species of testimony is wont to be admitted in this class of cases for the purpose of showing the intention of Mrs. Clark in making the transfer and holding the booksr and of showing the character of said acts. Scott v. Bank, supra. These statements, being also against the interest of Mrs. Clark, and tending to prove the fact of the gift, are admissible. By the statute of Connecticut, in actions by or against the representatives of a deceased person, the entries, memoranda, and declarations of the deceased relevant to the matter in issue may be received as evidence. No testimony ivas given by any of the parties to the suit in regard to the acts or declarations of the donor. The complainant makes the point that, in case these transfers were gifts, they wore in partial ademption or satisfaction of the residuary bequests under the will. Without stopping to consider the question whether the principle of the ademption of a general or specific legacy is applicable to the case of these residuary legatees, it is sufficient to say that the testimony proves the existence of an intent on the part of the testatrix that the gifts were to have no reference to the testamentary disposition of her property. Let the bill he dismissed.