2006 Ohio 3861 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2006
{¶ 2} Miller brought a cause of action alleging invasion of privacy against CHMC and Kinman. Her claim stemmed from comments Kinman had made to her, in the scope of her employment, which she felt had intruded on her private affairs. Kinman's comments concerned Miller's care of her infant granddaughter and her work performance as it was affected by her responsibilities for her granddaughter.
{¶ 3} Because the trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of CHMC and Kinman, we affirm
{¶ 5} In December of 1999, Miller's young daughter gave birth to a medically fragile infant who underwent a heart transplant at the tender age of one. This heart transplant was performed at CHMC, and it received attention in the hospital newsletters as well as in the local media. Miller participated in the media coverage, giving interviews when requested.
{¶ 6} After her granddaughter's birth, Miller sought guardianship of the infant and eventually adopted her. Kinman often asked Miller about her granddaughter, and he cautioned her against seeking guardianship. Kinman's comments concerning the infant's heart transplant were somewhat pessimistic.
{¶ 7} But Kinman also facilitated Miller's care of her grandchild by approving a "telework" arrangement that allowed Miller to work several days from home and still care directly for the infant. Some time after Miller began "teleworking," complaints began to circulate at CHMC about her job performance.
{¶ 8} Miller and Kinman discussed these issues during weekly meetings. Kinman told Miller that he felt she could not handle the stress associated with her granddaughter on top of managing two divisions. He ultimately encouraged Miller to relinquish control of one of her divisions.
{¶ 9} The relationship between Kinman and Miller continued to deteriorate, and Miller sought emotional counseling. She eventually took a medical leave of absence and was advised by her therapists that she could return to work if she were not subject to Kinman's supervision. CHMC declined to make such an arrangement, but did offer counseling to resolve the tension between Miller and Kinman. Miller never returned to work, but instead sued CHMC and Kinman.
{¶ 10} In granting summary judgment to CHMC and Kinman, the trial court concluded that Miller had not experienced an intrusion into her private affairs as was contemplated by the tort of invasion of privacy. The trial court additionally concluded that Kinman and CHMC had a legitimate interest in matters that affected Miller's work, and that a person of ordinary sensibilities would not have suffered mental anguish or humiliation as a result of Kinman's comments.
{¶ 11} Miller has raised two assignments of error on appeal. She alleges that the trial court made improper findings of fact and that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to CHMC and Kinman. Because these assignments are related, we address them together.
{¶ 15} This concept has been adopted by the Restatement of Torts. The Restatement recognizes an intrusion upon seclusion as a type of invasion of privacy, and it provides that "[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person."5
{¶ 16} This court has considered the elements for a claim of tortious invasion of privacy in Contadino v. Tilow, a case with several factual similarities to the case before us.6 InTilow, we discussed the type of invasion-of-privacy claim involving an intrusion upon one's seclusion, although we did not label it as such. We held that, to establish such a claim, a plaintiff must "produce evidence that the area intruded upon was private, and that the intrusion * * * was unwarranted and offensive or objectionable to the reasonable man."7 We thus established a two-prong standard requiring an intrusion upon private matters that would be offensive to a reasonable person.
{¶ 18} Further, we can find no evidence that Kinman overstepped the bounds of his duties as Miller's supervisor when, after receiving complaints from other employees, he questioned her ability to discharge the responsibilities associated with managing two divisions. "Where * * * the act complained of is within the scope of a defendant's duties, a cause of action in tort for monetary damages does not lie."8 Kinman would have been derelict in his own duties had he ignored the complaints regarding Miller and allowed her to continue her telework unquestioned.9
{¶ 19} We do not presume that every comment Kinman made concerning Miller's granddaughter was associated with his duties as her supervisor, although many of the comments were. Evidence that Kinman had acted within the scope of his supervisory duties, coupled with Miller's own publication of her granddaughter's condition, demonstrate that Kinman did not intrude upon a private area.
{¶ 21} The trial court, in its conclusion that Kinman's comments would not have caused a person of ordinary sensibilities mental suffering, arguably made a subjective determination concerning a disputed and material fact. But this finding was irrelevant, as there had been no intrusion into Miller's private affairs. The two-prong test enunciated in Tilow must be read in the conjunctive, and failure to establish an intrusion into Miller's private affairs necessarily ends our inquiry.
{¶ 23} These facts clearly demonstrated that Miller had not experienced an actionable invasion of privacy. Because no genuine issues of material fact existed, and because CHMC and Kinman were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we affirm the trial court's entry of summary judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
Hildebrandt, P.J., and Sundermann, J., concur.