Wе granted this interlocutory appeal from the denial of a putative father’s motion for summary judgment in a paternity action.
The facts are not in disputе. On June 24, 1991, Debra June Charles brought suit in Lanier County against Terry Miller for determination of paternity and support of her minor child. Miller answered, denying paternity and requesting blood testing. The test results suggested a 12,672 to 1 (99.99 percent) probability that Miller is the biological father of the child. A temporary consent order was then entеred requiring Miller to pay child support. Miller then amended his answer to admit paternity and filed a counterclaim seeking custody. In his counterclaim, he asserted, among other things, that Charles was not a fit or proper person to have custody.
Soon thereafter Miller learned of an action in the Supеrior Court of Clinch County in which the Department of Human Resources (“DHR”) had been the petitioner on behalf of the same child. A consent order had been еntered in that action on October 5, 1989, in which one Calvin Glaze did “acknowledge and recognize” himself to be the father of the child in question. Miller then moved thе court to vacate the temporary consent order in the present case and for summary judgment, relying on a plea of res judicata. His motion wаs denied.
The sole question raised in this appeal is whether the previous *387 adjudication acts as a bar to this action against Miller under principles оf res judicata or collateral estoppel. We conclude that it does not, and we affirm.
The principle of res judicata is codified in OCGA § 9-12-40, which provides: “A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be conclusive between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue or which under the rules of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered until the judgment is reversed or set aside.” In deciding whether OCGA § 9-12-40 operatеs to bar a claim, we must consider: “(a) whether there is a valid antecedent judgment; (b) whether there is identity of parties; (c) whether there is identity of issues; and (d) whether reasons of public policy militate against a strict application of the above statute in this case.”
Fierer v. Ashe,
1. “Privies are all persons who are represented by the pаrties and claim under them, all who are in privity with the parties; the term privity denotes mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Fleeman v. Dept. of Human Resources,
The Stаte’s interest, however, although certainly legitimate and *388 essential, does not fully “represent” the interest of either Charles or the child, and that interest is not сo-extensive or fully congruent with either their interests or their purpose in seeking a determination of paternity. Even apart from the important emotiоnal and human interest involved in a recognition of parenthood, significant rights and duties other than support flow from an order determining paternity and devolvе upon both father and child. For instance, such a determination may entitle a child born out of wedlock to inherit from or through his father or any paternal kin, OCGA § 53-4-4 (с) (1) (B), and vice versa. OCGA § 53-4-5 (b) (1) (B). Mothers’ and children’s interests in these rights were not, and could not have been, litigated by DHR. OCGA § 19-7-49 (a). We hold, therefore, that neither Charles nor the сhild was a “privy” of DHR in the prior litigation. It is undisputed that Miller was a stranger to the prior action. It follows that the prior adjudication may not be used as a bar to the present action.
2. This result harmonizes
Macuch v. Pettey,
3. Finally, “reasons of public policy militate against a strict application of [OCGA § 9-12-40] in this case.” Fierer, supra. Those reasons were also touched upon in McGuire. There, Johnson had been named by the mother of an illegitimate child in an abandonment warrant. Johnson entered a plea of guilty in the prosecution. Subsequent blood testing excluded Johnson as the father of the child, but the abandonment conviction was never vacated. In a subsequent civil paternity action brought by the mother against McGuirе, McGuire raised Johnson’s earlier conviction as a bar. However, blood test evidence excluded Johnson and did not exclude McGuire as the father of the child. The trial court ruled that the prior abandonment conviction did not bar entry of an order finding that McGuire was the father of the child, and this court affirmеd.
The stated rationale in McGuire was based in part on the fact that the prior adjudication was a criminal prosecution, in which “the rules as to the competency of witnesses and the weight of evidence required for a finding are different. [Cit.] ” Id. at 686. However, a prior criminal adjudication would actually militate in favor of the application of res judicata, the standard of proоf in criminal actions be *389 ing higher than that in civil actions and paternity presumably having been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The remainder of the stаted rationale in McGuire defers to an important public policy, and applies to this case as well. Although “there can only be one biological fаther for any one child, [and] the law should not allow the possibility for inconsistent paternity adjudications^] . . . giving the first adjudication preclusive effect would perpetuate, rather than eliminate any inconsistency present. Adjudications of paternity must be supported by evidence to the trier of fact and any prior adjudications that do not have preclusive effect can be used by the trier of fact for their evidentiary value in the effort to arrive at thе truth in a paternity action.” Id. We recognize, as did the court in McGuire, the possibility for abuse in permitting inconsistent paternity adjudications regarding the same child. Howеver, “[t]he object of all legal investigation is the discovery of truth.” OCGA § 24-1-2. Biological evidence points overwhelmingly toward Miller as the father of the child, and here, as in McGuire, giving the adjudication against Glaze preclusive effect would perpetuate not simply an inconsistency, but more probably, a falsehood and an injustice.
Judgment affirmed.