No. 4895 | 8th Cir. | Nov 12, 1917
This is an appeal from a decree of dismissal of the complaint in a suit in equity upon the ground that the matters which the pláintiffs sought to litigate were res adjudicata by reason of a former suit and decree. On December 9, 1910, James C. Cowles, Jr., the lessor, brought a suit in equity against Alva C. Lee, his lessee, in the district court of Washington county, Old., to cancel and avoid his oil and gas lease, and for such other equitable relief as might be just and proper. Pleadings were made, the Belvy Oil Company, an assignee of the lease, was made a party defendant and answered the complaint, the trial was had and a decree was rendered that the plaintiff take nothing by the action, that the Belvy Oil Company was the full legal and equitable owner of the lease, and of all the rights of the lessee thereunder, that the plaintiff James C. Cowles, Jr., and -any and all persons acting by, through or under him, were enjoined from interfering with or molesting the Belvy Company in the possession of the leased premises, or in the operation of the lease, and that the plaintiff pay the costs. This decree was rendered on September 5, 1911. During the pendency of that suit in the state court Emil C. Miller and W. H. Byron succeeded to the rights of the lessor, Cowles, Jr., and the Belvy Oil Company succeeded to the rights of the lessee, Lee. After the rendition of the decree Miller and Byron brought suit in the court below against the Belvy Oil Company to cancel and set aside the lease involved in the first suit, to enjoin the Belvy Oil Company from entering upon the leased premises, operating them for oil and gas, or developing the production of oil or gas thereon, and for' such other relief as the equity of the case might warrant. As Miller and Byron succeeded to the rights of the lessor, Cowles, Jr., and the Belvy Oil Company succeeded to the rights of the lessee, Lee, pendente lite, their respective rights against each other are the same as they would have
Janies C. Cowles, Jr., was a member of the Cherokee Tribe of Indians. He had only a small fraction of Indian blood. On March 6j 1907, when the lease was made, he was a minor, and he became of age on July 1, 1910. The lease was made by James C. Cowles, Jr., and James C. Cowles, as guardian of James C. Cowles, Jr., pursuant to an order of the United “States Court for the Northern Judicial District of the Indian Territory, which court had both chancery and probate jurisdiction. It covered the allotment of Cowles, Jr., as a Cherokee Indian and its term was 15 years, thus extending more than 11 years after he became of age.
In the course of the litigation through the two suits the plaintiffs have alleged in all 12 reasons why the lease and the assignment to the Belvy Oil Company should be decreed to be void and be canceled:
(1) That the lessee had failed to pay the royalties reserved in the lease.
(2) That the lessee had failed to explore and develop the leased land for natural gas and oil as he had agreed to do by the terms of the lease.
(3) That the lessee assigned the lease without the consent of the lessor.
(4) That Cowles, Jr., had attained his majority, that he had never ratified the lease, and that it had been and was avoided as to that part of its term which extends beyond his minority.
(5) That the court under whose order the lease was made had no jurisdiction to direct the lease of his^land beyond his minority.
(6) That that court had no authority to permit or make the lease, because the proceedings therein for that purpose failed to comply with indispensable statutory requirements relating to such proceedings.
(7) That the lease was assigned without the consent or approval of the lessor or the Secretary of the Interior.
(8) That the lease was not recorded as required by section 20 of the Act of April 26, 1906 (34 Stat. 145, c. 1876).
(9) That the lease of the land of the minor Indian allottee, Cowles, Jr., was forbidden, unless made in the manner expressly authorized by statute; that the proceeding in the United States Court for the Northern District of the Indian Territory, pursuant to which the lease •was ordered and made, was a proceeding to give rights of majority to Cowles and to allow him to make the lease; that this was not an authorized method of alienation, and was not a proceeding permissible or in conformity to the applicable statutes in order to permit a guardian to make a lease of the lands of a minor Indian allottee.
(10) That the consent of the Secretary of the Interior to the assignment of the lease to the defendant had never been obtained.
(11) That the assignment of the lease to the defendant was not made in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Secretary and
(12)' That after the Secretary’s authority to approve the assignment had been abolished the plaintiffs presented to him the facts regarding the same and he declined to act because he had no authority so to do.
The fundamental cause of action in both suits is that the lease and its assignment to the defendant are apparently valid, but were actually void; that they apparently conferred rights on the defendant, but actually conferred no rights; that they, therefore, created a cloud upon the plaintiffs? title, and gave to the defendant an apparent right to possess, develop, and operate the premises for oil and gas, while it had no such right. In their original complaint in their first suit the plaintiffs pleaded the first four grounds or reasons above stated for this cause of action; in a second amended complaint in that suit, which the plaintiffs first tendered after the court had announced its decision of the case, and which the court refused to permit to be filed, but marked tendered and made a part of the record, they pleaded the fifth, sixth, and seventh grounds or reasons above stated; and in the complaint in this, the second suit, they have pleaded the eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh grounds or reasons for this cause of action. The question in this case, therefore, is: May the plaintiffs, in view of the decree against them in their first suit to cancel this lease and assignment, remove the cloud they are alleged to cause, and enjoin the defendant from their use, maintain this second suit for substantially the same relief ?
In Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Drake, 214 F. 536" court="8th Cir." date_filed="1914-04-16" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/union-cent-life-ins-v-drake-8792330?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="8792330">214 Fed. 536, 546, 547, 131 C.C.A. 82" court="8th Cir." date_filed="1914-04-16" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/union-cent-life-ins-v-drake-8792330?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="8792330">131 C. C. A. 82, 92, 93, upon which counsel seems to place some reliance, the insurance company had three separate and independent liens upon the property of a bankrupt, its lien for $10,080 by subrogation to the rights of the mortgagees of three prior mortgages, its lien for $10,000 by its separate and independent mortgage, and its lien for about $50,000 by virtue of a transaction termed the mortgage of December 20, 1907. It brought its suit to foreclose the mortgage of December 20, 1907, and made no claim in that suit on account of any of its other liens. The trustee for the bankrupt’s estate defended on the ground drat the mortgage of December 20, 1907, was a voidable preference, and the insurance company was defeated. The trustee then brought a suit to set aside the mortgage of December 20, 1907, as a voidable preference, and also to avoid the claim of the insurance company to a lien upon the proceeds of the mortgaged property for $10,080 by subrogation to the rights of the three first mortgages. The insurance company answered and pleaded this claim, for the $10,080, and the trustee asserted that the insurance company was estopped from maintaining its lien for this amount by the decree in the former suit. The court held that the suit on the $50,000 mortgage was upon a different cause of
The case in hand is better typified by United States v. California & Oregon Land Co., 192 U.S. 355" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1902-12-10" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/united-states-v-california-and-oregon-land-company-california-and-oregon-land-company-v-united-states-95998?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="95998">192 U. S. 355, 356, 358, 24 Sup. Ct. 266, 48 L. Ed. 476" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1904-02-01" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/united-states-v-california--oregon-land-co-1087661?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="1087661">48 L. Ed. 476; Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Slaght, 205 U.S. 122" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1907-03-11" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/northern-pacific-railway-co-v-slaght-96626?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="96626">205 U. S. 122, 27 Sup. Ct. 442, 51 L. Ed. 738" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1907-03-11" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/northern-pacific-railway-co-v-slaght-96626?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="96626">51 L. Ed. 738; Dowell v. Applegate, 152 U.S. 327" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1894-03-05" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/dowell-v-applegate-93836?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="93836">152 U. S. 327, 332, 333, 334, 341, 342, 343, 345, 14 Sup. Ct. 611, 38 L. Ed. 463" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1894-03-05" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/dowell-v-applegate-93836?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="93836">38 L. Ed. 463 ; Beloit v. Morgan, 7 Wall. 619" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1869-03-22" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/beloit-v-morgan-88051?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="88051">7 Wall. 619, 622, 19 L. Ed. 205; Wilson’s Executor v. Deen, 121 U.S. 525" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1887-04-25" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/wilsons-v-deen-91945?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="91945">121 U. S. 525, 534, 7 Sup. Ct. 1004, 30 L. Ed. 980" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1887-04-25" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/wilsons-v-deen-91945?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="91945">30 L. Ed. 980. In United States v. California & Oregon Land Co., 192 U.S. 355" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1902-12-10" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/united-states-v-california-and-oregon-land-company-california-and-oregon-land-company-v-united-states-95998?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="95998">192 U. S. 355, 356, 358, 24 Sup. Ct. 266, 48 L. Ed. 476" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1904-02-01" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/united-states-v-california--oregon-land-co-1087661?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="1087661">48 L. Ed. 476, the United States brought a suit in equity to avoid certain of its patents- and to forfeit all claims of the defendant thereunder on the ground that-certain wagon roads in the state of Oregon were not completed within the time required by the grants of the United States under which the patents were issued. The defendant pleaded matters showing the validity of the patents and a decree was rendered in its favor. Then the United States brought a second suit to set aside the same patents and to recover the lands they described from the same defendant on the ground that the lands were excepted by the terms of the granting act from the grant under which the patents were issued. The Supreme Court held that the United States was estopped by the decree in the former suit from maintaining the second suit and said:
“The best that ean be said, apart from the act just quoted, to distinguish the two suits, is that now the United States puts forward a new ground for its prayer. Formerly it sought to avoid the patents by way of forfeiture. Now it seeks the same' conclusion by a different means, that is to say, by evidence that the lands originally were excepted from the grant. But iu this,, as in the former suit, it seeks to establish its own title to the fee. * * * But the whole tendency of our decisions is to require a plaintiff to try his whole cause of action and his whole case at one time. He cannot even split up his claim (Fetter v. Beale, 1 Salk, 11; Trask v. Hartford & New Haven Railroad, 2 Allen [Mass.] 331; Freeman, Judgments [4th Ed.] §§ 238, 241); and, a fortiori, he cannot divide the grounds of recovery.” 192 U. S. 358, 24 Sup. Ct. 267, 48 L. Ed. 476" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1904-02-01" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/united-states-v-california--oregon-land-co-1087661?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="1087661">48 L. Ed. 476.
In Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Slaght, 205 U.S. 122" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1907-03-11" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/northern-pacific-railway-co-v-slaght-96626?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="96626">205 U. S. 122, 128, 131, 133, 27 Sup. Ct. 442, 51 L. Ed. 738" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1907-03-11" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/northern-pacific-railway-co-v-slaght-96626?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="96626">51 L. Ed. 738, the predecessors in interest of the Northern Pacific Railway Company brought a suit in equity against Slaght, who was in possession of the land which was the subject of the suit under a homestead patent, to have him decreed to he a trustee of the title to the lands for the use and benefit of the plaintiffs on the . sole ground that at the date of the issuance of the patent the land was not, nor was it at the time Slaght applied to enter it as a homestead, public land subject to settlement or entry under the land laws of the United States other than the grant of the land to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company óf July 2, 1864, under which the plaintiffs claimed their title. The plaintiffs neither claimed nor pleaded any title or right to the land under any statute or theory, except that the land passed to-them under the railway grant of July 2, 1864. . Slaght demurred to-the plaintiff’s amended complaint, his demurrer was sustained and a
“.Although there may be several different claims lor the same thing, there can he only one right of property in it; therefore, when a cause of action has resulted in favor of the defendant, when the plaintiff claims the property of a certain thing there can, be no other action maintained against iho same party for the same property, for that would he to renew the question already decided, for the single question in litigation was whether the property belonged to the plaintiff or not: and it is of no importance that the plaintiff failed to set up all his rights upon which his canse of action could have been maintained. It is sufficient that it might have been litigated.”
It then cited the California & Oregon Rand Company’s Case, which has just been reviewed, and numerous other cases of like character, held that the former decree estopped the railway company from maintaining the second suit, and closed the discussion with these words:
“In other words, plaintiff in error, as successor of the Spofeane & Palouse Railway Company, again asserts title to the very property that was the subject of the other suit, the source of title, only, being different. If this may bo done, how often may it be repeated? If defeated upon the new title, may plaintiff in error assert still another one, either in its predecessor or in itself, and repeat as often as it may vary its claim? The principle of res adjudicata and the cases enforcing and illustrating that principle declare otherwise.”
In the light of the opinions in these cases and those cited with them above, there can be no doubt that the alleged causes of action in the two suits under consideration are the same, and that the decree in the first suit renders every point, reason, ground, and suggestion made in the second suit res adjudicata; because every one of them might have been litigated in the first suit. The cause of action in each suit was the apparent validity of the lease and the assignment, and their actual invalidity and the apparent grant, but actual failure to grant, by them substantial rights to the defendant to possess, develop, and operate the leased premises for oil and gas. The reason for the rule on this sub
Counsel also cites Bingham v. Honeyman, 32 Or. 129" court="Or." date_filed="1898-01-17" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/bingham-v-honeyman-6897536?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6897536">32 Or. 129, 51 Pac. 735, 52 Pac. 755, which is irrelevant, and Major v. Owen, 126 Minn. 1" court="Minn." date_filed="1914-05-29" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/major-v-owen-7977133?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="7977133">126 Minn. 1, 147 N. W. 662, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 589, wherein the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that a judgment in favor of Owen in an action brought by Major and others against him to quiet the title of land against adverse claims, in which the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners of flic land and the defendant Owen claimed the same, but had no right or interest in it, the defendant answered that lie was the owner, and the plaintiffs had no right or interest in it, none of the parties pleaded any equitable rights or claims, and the judgment was that Owen was the owner, holding free of all claims of the plaintiffs, was not a bar to a subsequent suit in equity by Owen to recover from the plaintiffs in the first suit the proceeds of the land, upon the ground that the deed, by virtue of which he secured his judgment against Owen, was fraudulent and void, because it was procured by him without consideration- with the intent and purpose of cheating and defrauding Owen. But this decision of the Supreme Court of Minnesota runs clearly counter to repeated decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and of the other national courts, and may not prevail here. Dowell v. Applegate, 152 U.S. 327" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1894-03-05" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/dowell-v-applegate-93836?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="93836">152 U. S. 327, 341, 344, 345, 14 Sup. Ct. 611, 38 L. Ed. 463" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1894-03-05" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/dowell-v-applegate-93836?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="93836">38 L. Ed. 463; Eastern Building & Loan Ass’n v. Welling (C. C.) 116 F. 100" court="None" date_filed="1902-05-21" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/eastern-building--loan-assn-of-syracuse-v-welling-8747767?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="8747767">116 Fed. 100, 105; In re Dutton’s Estate, 208 Pa. 350" court="Pa." date_filed="1904-03-07" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/duttons-estate-6247547?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6247547">208 Pa. 350, 57 Atl. 719, 720, 721. Owen was called upon in the suit against him to quiet title to- set forth any adverse claim, legal and equitable, which he had; he could have pleaded and proved his claim of fraud in the first action, and under the rule ill the federal courts he was estopped by the judgment against him there from pleading it thereafter.
The only other citations which have any particular pertinency to the matters here in issue are 23 Cyc. 1172, 1292, 1312. But the most pertinent statement in Cyc. upon this subject is at 23 Cyc. 1173e, in these words:
“A judgment is not a bar to the further prosecution of claims or demands which, although set up in the action, were excluded toy the court or withheld from the jury, and therefore formed no part of the verdict or judgment, or which were withdrawn by plaintiff voluntarily before verdict, or on being re.'piiml to elect between two or more causes of action joined in his declaration, or which for any reason were not submitted to the c-onrt or jury and not considered or passed upon, provided always that the claim withdrawn or withheld was a distinct and independent matter, leg-ally detachable from the rest of plaintiff’s case, and not an inseparable part of it.”
This case falls within the proviso of the statement. The grounds and reasons for the plaintiffs’ cause of action were not different causes of action from the plaintiffs’ cause of action in their first suit, which it ivas optional for them to present in that suit, or to withhold for .subsequent suits, as was the cause of action for damages in Kirven’s Case;
Not only this, but the refusal of the trial court in the first suit to permit the filing of the second amended complaint, when it was tendered for the first time after its announcement of- its decision of the case, was in itself an adjudication either that the grounds or reasons therein stated were barred by the laches of the plaintiffs in failing to-set them forth in either their original or first amended complaint, or that they w;ere without legal merit. That decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the state, and it constitutes as conclusive a bar to the plaintiffs’ relitigation of the claims set forth in the second amended complaint as the decree against them on evidence and trial would have made. If they had not pleaded these grounds at all in the first suit, they would have been barred by their laches in failing to plead them. They are equally barred because they failed to plead them until so late a time that their laches barred them from so doing.
Finally, it is contended that the judgment in the first suit is a nullity, because its effect is to maintain an alienation of an Indian’s allotment when that was forbidden by the acts of Congress. If we concede that such an effect has been produced, the record of the first suit demonstrates the fact that it was the laches of the plaintiffs in failing to plead and prove their whole cause of action in that suit, which was the primary cause of that result, and also of the judgment in the state court, which they now claim accomplishes it. That judgment cannot be lawfully attacked collaterally here; and, if it could be, the acts and laches of the plaintiffs in the conduct of that suit would bar them from any relief therefrom.
The decree of the court below was right; and it is affirmed.