95 Kan. 690 | Kan. | 1915
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The plaintiffs have filed an application for a rehearing which the court has carefully considered. One ground of complaint is, in substance, that some of the facts stated in the opinion were based on evidence introduced by the defendants and should not be considered on a demurrer to the plaintiffs’ evidence. There is merit in this criticism. Because of this we restate the issues and the facts, not for the purpose of determining the demurrer to the evidence, but to determine whether or not the plaintiffs can recover on the facts established by all the evidence in their favor.
The petition, among other things, alleges that defendants Armour & Company and Armour Car Lines maintained and operated a car repair shop, where large numbers of men were employed in repairing and rebuilding cars; that in the shop were a number of railroad tracks running parallel with each other; that defendant Luther L. Lucky was the foreman or superintendent of the shop; “that between the said last mentioned tracks in said shop and in close proximity to the sides of cars when standing thereon, at and prior to the - time aforesaid, the defendants . ., . negligently and carelessly, and in disregard of their duty to furnish to the employees of said defendants ... including said Robert Miller, deceased, a reasonably safe place to work, permanently placed and fixed a certain: apparatus, known as a forge, used for the purpose of heating the rivets for use as aforesaid”; and (quoting from defendants’ brief) “negligently and in disregard of their said duty failed to place over and above said forge and the space about the same where an employee was obliged to stand when working on and about said
The facts to support the plaintiffs’ claim, which the-evidence tends to prove, were as follows: Within the grounds, and a part of the plant of Armour & Company, in Kansas City, Kan., were shops for repairing railroad cars, occupying ground about 128 feet wide by 280 feet long. In these shops were a number of railroad tracks running parallel with each other. The. roofs of the buildings were supported by a number of posts, and throughout was a system of pipes, conveying compressed air used for mechanical purposes in repairing cars. Running down one of these posts t& within about a foot or eighteen inches of the floor, between tracks known as 14 and 15,. was an air-line pipe. From this point the pipe ran about at right angles from the post, through an elbow, a distance of about three feet, where it was attached to a forge used for-heating rivets. This attachment was made by a metal piece called a union. This forge, when so attached, was. located half way between tracks 14 and 15, and was about 16 or 20 inches square, and about 24 or 30 inches-high. These tracks were about 14 feet apart. Track
We adhere to our former opinion in this case, holding that the facts established by the evidence do not show negligence on the part of the defendants. There are additional reasons why the plaintiffs can not recover.
Groomer was a fellow servant with Miller. He may have been negligent in handling the bar, but the evidence does not show such negligence. The jury said he was not negligent. In any event, Groomer being a fellow servant with Miller, the employer is not liable for Miller’s death, caused by the act of Groomer. (K. P. Railway Co. v. Salmon, Adm’x, 11 Kan. 83; K. P. Rly. Co. v. Salmon, 14 Kan. 512, 522; Beeson v. Busenbark, 44 Kan. 669, 672, 25 Pac. 48; Bridge Co. v. Miller, 71 Kan. 13, 80 Pac. 18; Gas Co. v. Crist, 78 Kan. 887, 97 Pac. 1134; Lunn v. Morris, 81 Kan. 94, 105 Pac. 15.) While not directly in point, see Iliff v. Cudahy, 83 Kan. 588, 112 Pac. 165; and Harper v. Cement Co., 83 Kan. 788, 112 Pac. 626.
Robert Miller had been working at this place for some time — about two months. He knew of the conditions attending the work there. Whatever danger there was connected with the work at the forge was open and known. There was no evidence to show that
After reconsideration, giving the facts established by the evidence the most favorable interpretation for the plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that the plaintiffs can not recover; that the demurrer to the plaintiffs’ evidence should have been sustained; and that judgment should have been rendered for the defendants. The former judgment of this court reversing the judgment of the district court is adhered to. The cause is remanded, with instructions to render judgment for the defendants. The petition for a rehearing is denied.