Defendant Allstate Insurance Company appeals as of right the trial court’s order denying its motion for summary disposition and granting summary disposition in favor of cross-plaintiff PT Works, Inc. We affirm.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in finding that PT Works was entitled to receive insurance benefits from Allstate under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101
et seq.,
for physical therapy services provided by PT Works to plaintiff William Miller, who was insured by Allstate and injured in a motor vehicle accident.
1
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.
Kreiner v Fischer,
MCL 500.3157 provides:
A physician, hospital, clinic or other person or institution lawfully rendering treatment to an injured person for an accidental bodily injury covered by personal protection insurance, and a person or institution providing rehabilitative occupational training following the injury, may charge a reasonable amount for the products, services and accommodations rendered. The charge shall not exceed the amount the person or institution customarily charges for like products, services and accommodations in cases not involving insurance. [Emphasis added.]
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Under the above provision, “only treatment lawfully rendered, including being in compliance with licensing requirements, is subject to payment as a no-fault benefit.”
Hofmann v Auto Club Ins Ass’n,
Here, Allstate contends that PT Works did not lawfully render its physical therapy services because it was incorporated under the Business Corporation Act (BCA), MCL 450.1101 et seq., instead of the Professional Service Corporation Act (PSCA), MCL 450.221 et seq. Allstate argues that PT Works was required to be formed under the PSCA because providing physical therapy services constituted engaging in a professional service. Moreover, according to Allstate, the PSCA mandates that the shareholders of PT Works be licensed as physical therapists, and they are not so licensed. We note, however, that there does not appear to be any dispute that the treatment received by Miller was directly performed by licensed physical therapists.
The trial court found that PT Works was properly incorporated under the BCA and that it was not required to be formed under the PSCA. We need not determine, however, whether it was necessary for PT Works to incorporate under the PSCA and whether the shareholders who formed PT Works complied with the PSCA. Assuming, without deciding, that PT Works was improperly incorporated and that its shareholders must be licensed physical therapists, the no-fault act, and particularly MCL 500.3157, does not bar recovery of benefits for services rendered where the treatment itself was lawfully rendered by licensed physical thera *287 pists. MCL 500.3157, by its plain and unambiguous language, 2 requires that the treatment itself be lawfully rendered. Reference to the terms “rendering” and “treatment” clearly places the focus on the act of actually engaging in the performance of services, here conducting physical therapy sessions, rather than on some underlying corporate formation issues that have nothing to do with the rendering of treatment. A clinic or institution is lawfully rendering treatment when licensed employees are caring for, and providing services and treatment to, patients despite the possible existence of corporate defects irrelevant to treatment.
Cherry
is easily distinguishable from the case at bar because, in that case, acupuncture services were directly provided to the injured party by a nurse who was not licensed to perform acupuncture. This Court found that only a licensed physician could administer acupuncture under the law.
Cherry, supra
at 320. There
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fore, acupuncture treatment was not lawfully rendered because a licensed physician did not perform the services. The licensing of an individual, such as a doctor, dentist, chiropractor, or physical therapist, who personally provides services to a client or patient, has a direct correlation to the rendering of treatment. The connection between the rendering of treatment and the manner in which PT Works was incorporated and the nature of the incorporation is too attenuated to make the physical therapy provided to Miller an unlawfully rendered service. PT Works’ shareholders did not render physical therapy services to Miller; therefore, their licensing status is not pertinent. As this Court has recognized, we may affirm a trial court’s decision for different reasons than those cited by the lower court.
Gleason v Dep’t of Transportation,
Affirmed.
Notes
Miller assigned his rights to any insurance benefits relative to physical therapy services from Allstate to PT Works.
Our primary task in construing a statute is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.
People v Tombs,