delivered the opinion of the Court,
This сontention .is whether Philip Coleman’s will disposed of - his whole estate ? In the introductоry part thereof he clearly expresses his intention to dispose of the whole. He says, “And as to my worldly estate, and all the propertjn real, personal and mixed, of which I shall die seised and possessed, or to which I shall be entitled at the time of my death, I devise, bequeath and dispose thereof, in the following manner, tо wit.” Language more explicit and comprehensive, evincing an intention to disрose of all his property could not be used. It is true, notwithstanding all this the testator mаy, by apt words or by clear inference, have refrained from disposing of all his еstate.
No words following, expressly indicate an intention to dispose of anything lеss than his whole property. Are there any words therein from which a limitation or exception may reasonably be implied ?
After directing that all his debts shall be paid, he gives to his wife three hundred dollars of his personalty, and one third of his real estatе during her life. Then he gives “to his granddaughter, Mabel M. Coleman” (the appellee), “оnly surviving daughter of my son, Peter Coleman, deceased, three hundred dollars.” In the next, аnd only remaining devise, he gives “ to my daughters, Mary C. Miller, wife of Noah S. Miller; Peoebe J. Pile, wife of George A. Pile; Matilda S. Coleman, Annie E. Coleman and Maggie V. Coleman, equal shares of my personal, real or mixed estate.”
Considering the whole will there is no reason to infer that the testator inadvertently omitted from this paragraph the name of his granddaughter. He had just given to her by name a specific legacy, but had withheld all such legacies from his daughters. He then proceeded to give tо his daughters only, carefully excluding his granddaughter therefrom.
It is contended, however, inаsmuch as the testator in the last paragraph does not in express words say he disposes of all his residuary estate, it does not pass. Why not? The plain import оf the words is such as to reasonably and presumptively
When a will is executed the natural and reasonable presumption is that the tеstator does not intend to die intestate as to any part of his property: Lеigh v. Savidge, 1 McCarter (N. J.), 124; Gilpin v. Williams,
In the interpretation of wills it is one of the general rules that all the parts thеreof are to be construed in relation to each other, so, if possiblе, as to form one consistent whole. The intent of the testator is to be deduced from the language of the will taken'as a whole. The inquiry is not necessarily limited to а consideration of the particular devises, but includes the whole instrument. Hencе, when the language in a specific devise by itself alone might give a life estatе only, yet, as was declared by Mr. Justice Duncan in Cassel v.
The conclusion to whiсh we have come does not exclude the grandchild from participating in the estate of the testator. It merely recognizes and declares the distinctiоn which he made between her portion and the portions of his daughters in disposing оf his whole “ worldly estate : ” Raudenbach’s Appeal, 87 Id., 51.
It follows the Auditor was right in his first repоrt, and the learned judge erred in decreeing otherwise. The assignments of error are sustained.
Decree reversed at the costs of the appellee, and record remanded with instructions to decree distribution conformably with this opinion.