419 U.S. 970 | SCOTUS | 1974
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
On August 25, 1972, a federal grand jury in the Southern District of Florida returned a 12-count indictment against the petitioners. In eight of the 12 counts petitioners were charged with income tax fraud, in violation of § 7206 (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. §7206 (l).
Section 6531 of the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 6531,
Section 6531, however, has as its penultimate sentence the following:
“Where a complaint is instituted before a commissioner of the United States within the period above limited, the time shall be extended until the date which is 9 months after the date of the making of the complaint before the commissioner of the United States.”
With respect to the alleged offenses of July 18 and 21, 1966, a complaint was filed by the Government with a commissioner of the United States on July 17, 1972, just within the 6-year period. The record contains an
A defense motion to dismiss the four counts was granted by the District Court. The Court of Appeals reversed. 491 F. 2d 638, 644-646 (CA5 1974).
In Jaben v. United States, 381 U. S. 214 (1965), § 6531 was construed to apply to a situation where the Government had developed its case within the time period prescribed by the statute of limitations, but was unable to obtain an indictment because a grand jury was not in session. Mr. Justice Harlan, in speaking for the Court, observed:
“More basically, the evident statutory purpose of the nine-month extension provision is to afford the Government an opportunity to indict criminal tax offenders in the event that a grand jury is not in session at the end of the normal limitation period. This is confirmed by the immediate precursor of the present section which provided for an extension ‘until the discharge of the grand jury at its next session within the district.’ I. R. C. 1939, § 3748 (a). Clearly the statute was not meant to grant the Government greater time in which to make its case (a result which could have been accomplished simply by making the normal period of limitation six years and nine months), but rather was intended to deal*973 with the situation in which the Government has its case made within the normal limitation period but cannot obtain an indictment because of the grand jury schedule.” Id., at 219-220. (Footnote omitted.)
Mr. Justice Goldberg, in a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, and joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mb. Justice Douglas, echoed this conclusion:
“I agree with the Court that the purpose of the tolling provision in the statute of limitations before us, as evidenced by its language and its legislative history, is to avoid penalizing the Government when a criminal defendant cannot be indicted merely because no grand jury is sitting at the time the limitation period expires. In keeping with this purpose, the Government ought to be allowed to present a case prepared before the expiration of the limitation period to the grand jury when it next convenes, but it ought not to be allowed to take advantage of a nine-month extension to prepare a case which was not ready for submission before the end.of the statutory period.” Id., at 226.
This analysis of the purpose of the significant sentence of §6531, although not determinative of the issues in Jaben, remains as this Court’s primary interpretation of the statute.
The Government’s position, however, as expressed in its memorandum in opposition to the petition for certi-orari,
The Government, possibly, is right, but its position, under the circumstances of this case, appears to me to be not entirely consistent with what was said in the respective opinions in Jaben by Justices Harlan and Goldberg. I therefore would grant the petition for certiorari and test the Government’s position only upon full briefing and argument.
Ҥ 7206. Fraud and False statements.
“Any person who—
“(1) Declaration under penalties of perjury.
“Willfully makes and subscribes any return, statement, or other document, which contains or is verified by a written declaration that
“shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.”
Ҥ 6531. Periods of limitation on criminal prosecutions.
“No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any of the various offenses arising under the internal revenue laws unless the indictment is found or the information instituted within 3 years next after the commission of the offense, except that the period of limitation shall be 6 years—
“(5) for offenses described in sections 7206 (1) and 7207 (relating to false statements and fraudulent documents).”
“The statute simply permits the filing of a complaint prior to
Lead Opinion
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.