24 Ala. 209 | Ala. | 1854
Lead Opinion
The first question presented by the present record is, whether actual delivery of personal chattels is essential, in order to complete the contract of sale, and pass the title to property, as respects the creditors of the vendor. As between the vendor and vendee, the simple contract of sale, when complete in all its parts, undoubtedly passes the title; but a9 respects the creditors of the vendor, when the possession of the chattel remains with the latter after the contract of sale, does the title pass, so as to effect an actual change of prop
The third and fourth exceptions, as to the effect of the proof tending to explain the possession of Thomas Hall after the date of the bill of sale to William T. Hall, may be considered together. In each of these requests to charge, the plaintiff desired the court to say to the jury, that the possession of Thomas Hall was not sufficiently explained by the facts offered in evidence. This the court refused to do; and in the latter, the court left it to the jury to say whether the explanation of such possession Was sufficient or not. We think there was no error in the refusal to charge as prayed in these requests ; nor is there any error of which the plaintiff can complain, in the court’s leaving it to the jury to say whether the possession was sufficiently explained or not. In the case of Planters’ & Merchants’ Bank v. Borland, supra, it is said, that fraud is a question of law, after the facts are found. Without calling in question the cor
Our conclusion is, that the order of the court was ample authority for the sheriff of Dallas to make the sale; and that the purchaser at such sale would take under it such title as Thomas H. Hall, the defendant in the attachment, had, at the time of the levy of the attachment.
The testimony ruled out is said to be that relating to the contents of che order of sale. In excluding this testimony, we see no error, inasmuch as, if the order of sale referred to was the one found in the record, it was of itself the best evidence, and should have been left to speak for itself; if it Ayas an order issued by the clerk of the Circuit Court of Dallas, then it was rightly excluded, because the way Ayas not sufficiently paved for the introduction of secondary evidence. The order itself, if such a one ever existed, was the best evidence. If that could not be produced, then its existence should have been distinctly proven, its absence accounted for, or its loss established, after the requisite searches had been made for it in the proper officer. All this proof was necessary, as preliminary to the competency of the proof of the contents of any order of sale not produced. The record does not show that such proof Ayas made, and the secondary evidence was properly excluded. For the error that
Where a practice has long obtained, and a vast number of titles may fairly be presumed to be dependent upon it, it should require a very clear case to induce the court to depart from it; and an overruling necessity for the establishment of a different practice should exist, before the court would undermine the foundations of title and set them afloat.
It is always better to let the Legislature, in such cases, apply the corrective : for, in this way alone, can the supposed evil be remedied, without destroying titles which have been acquired in good faith and under the sanction of judicial sales. The fact that the practice has long obtained, in several of the circuits in this State, of selling slaves as perishable property, under certain circumstances, by virtue of the attachment laws, that it has been acquiesced in by the Legislature, and that no attempt has been made to alter it, is persuasive to show, that the practice, in the legislative contemplation, is not opposed to the spirit of the eighth section of the attachment law.
By the law, as it stood when this order of sale was made, the sheriff kept the slaves in jail. Now, it might often happen, that to keep slaves in this manner, pending a long litigation, would, in all human probability, result in their destruction; thus, it may be, destroying the only means for the satisfaction of the demand sued for, and inflicting an irreparable injury on the defendant. Besides, if the slaves were sick, with a disease which would be so aggravated by being thus kept as to result in their death, it would be most inhumane to them, as well as greatly prejudicial to the parties, to hold that they must be kept until the final decision.
All we hold is, that the order of the court, under the circumstances of this case, is not void, but effectual to pass the title to the purchaser. I do not think such orders should ever be granted, except in cases where the keeping of the property would likely result in its destruction, or great deterioration;
Dissenting Opinion
I dissent from the conclusions attained by a majority of the court, as to the construction of the seventh and eighth sections of our attachment laws. — Olay’s Dig. 56.
I hold, that the terms “clearly of a wasting and perishable nature,” used in the seventh, and “tobe likely to waste or be destroyed by keeping,” employed in the eighth section of the act, as descriptive of the property which the judge or justice may command to be sold by interlocutory order, before judgment, were never intended by the Legislature to include slaves ; nor are slaves necessarily included in them ex vi termini.
It will be remembered, that when this statute was passed, (1823,) personal property alone could bo levied on by attachment, and consequently the terms were not employed to designate such property generally, but to distinguish one class of it from another ; nor were they used to contradistinguish personal property from real estate. The question then arises, Are slaves so “clearly of a wasting or perishable nature,” or so “likely to be destroyed by keeping,” that we can suppose the Legislature intended to put them in this category? If other acts of that body are entitled to any weight, (and I feel bound to allow them some share in settling this question of intention,) wo may safely answer, they did not. That they have been uniformly regarded as the most valuable and permanent of all personal property, by the law-givers of this State, will abundantly appear by the many enactments, whoso object is to prevent their sacrifice, when sold by officers under legal process, or by executors and administrators to pay the debts of their testators or intestates.
It is provided, that slaves shall not be sold under execution, when the judgment is for a less sum than $100, if other property is to be found (Olay’s Digest 202 § 7). Neither sheriff, coroner, nor constable, shall sell them at any other place than at the court-house of the county, or such other public place as is provided by law; and then, on a more
Apart from this, this court has invested this species of property with attributes which pertain main]}' to real property, and which exclude the idea that they should be regarded as of a “wasting and perishable nature,” and “likely to be destroyed by keeping.” In Price v. Price, 5 Ala. 578, and Williamson and Wife v. Mason, 23 ib. 488, it is held, that a contingent remainder may be limited in slaves; and in McWilliams et al. v. Ramsey, adm’r, at the last term, 23 Ala. 813, we have held them subject to a reversion after the tci’mination of a life estate. I have been unable to rocon- ' cile these decisions with the idea that slaves arc property, so wasting and perishable in its nature, as to require it to be sold, lest it may become valueless within the ordinary period of litigation in a suit in the Circuit Courts, or before a justice of the peace.
It is, also, a sale rule in ascertaining the meaning of terms employed in a statute, when they are not technical in their character, to give to them the meaning ordinarily attached to them in the community in which the law is to operate, or, in other words, to give to them that sense in which they are commonly received. I am inclined to think, it would be difficult to find a man, outside the pale of the legal profession, who would include slaves in the terms “perishable and wasting property,” or “such as will be likely to be destroyed by keeping.”
These sections of our law are not such, in my opinion, as to require that the terms used in them should be extended by construction. They are in derogation of the common law, and tend generally to abridge the right of the citizen to his property. Ordinarily, the property of the defendant, in an
If slaves are not included in the terms used in the seventh and eighth sections of our attachment laws, then the court below had no jurisdiction to order the sale of those in controversy. The fact that the plaintiff in attachment takes the oath required by the law, cannot change the nature of the property levied on, or give the judge or justice authority to sell such as is not within the meaning of the statute. Those officers do not derive their power.to order a sale from the affidavit of the plaintiff, but from the nature of the property, and the provisions of the law. The affidavit is the means appointed by the statute to bring the levy and the character of the property to the knowledge of the judge; and if one swears that property is perishable, which is not so in fact, the judge should not credit the absurd affidavit and order a sale. If he does, he acts without authority, and his order is null and void.
Such is the case here; and my conclusion is, that the sale made under the order is void, that the purchaser takes no title by his purchase, and that the right of property in the slaves remains where it was before the order and sale wore made.
The practice under this statute by the judges of the Circuit Courts, it is said, generally conforms to that adopted in this case. I know that this practice is not universal. But were it so, I would not sanction it; because I am satisfied that it is erroneous, and that the courts below ought not to be allowed to make rules of construction or practice for this court, but should receive their rules from us.
Note by Reporter. — After the delivery of the foregoing opinions, the counsel for the defendant in error made application for a re-hcaring ; and in support of his application he submitted the affidavits of several attorneys of this court, stating that they had never known slaves to be sold as “perishable property” under the attachment law, and that the practice of the Bar, so far as their experience extended, did not warrant such orders. On this application the following opinions were pronounced:
Rehearing
In this case, an application is made for a rehearing, predicated upon a supposed error into which the court fell in the opinion delivered in the cause, in recognizing the doctrine as correct that negroes can, in any case in attachments, be sold on the order of a judge as wasting or perishable property, under the acts of our Legislature, found in Clay’s Digest, page 56, § § 7 and 8.
In the opinion delivered by a majority of the court, the doctrine above stated was recognized simply, but no attempt was made to argue the question. The member of the court who prepared the opinion delivered by the majority, deemed it sufficient to base his conclusion upon this point upon his own observation and experience, both at the bar and upon the circuit court bench. Inasmuch, however, as there seems to be a different understanding as to the practice in different portions of the State, amongst members of the profession, and’ inasmuch as one member of the court has deemed it his duty to dissent from the conclusion attained by a majority in the opinion pronounced, we deem it proper to consider the question as one entirely new, and to discuss it, by itself, upon principle independent of any practice in any portion of the State. Thus regarding the question, we are free to announce, in the commencement of the discussion, that our subsequent examination and reflections upon the subject have but confirmed the majority of the court in the correctness of the doctrine announced in their first opinion.
The language of the eighth section is : “ When any estate attached shall, on the oath of the plaintiff, his or her attorney, or agent, or other credible person, be certified to any judge, or justice of the peace, to be likely to waste, or be destroyed by keeping, and if the person to whom it belongs, his or her attorney, agent or factor, shall not, within twenty days after the levy of the attachment, replevy the same, then such estate shall, by the order of said judge or justice, be sold,” &c.
The language of this act is : “ When any estate attached shall be certified to be likely to waste or be destroyed by keeping.” It will not be contended, we apprehend, that there, is anything in this phraseology which, in itself, necessarily excludes slave property. The term “ any estate” may well comprehend all property upon which a levy may be made. If, therefore, slave property is exempt, it must be because it is not comprehended within the spirit and scope of the statute. This is the precise question that we propose to discuss.
Let us look, for a moment, at the obvious intent and design of the statute. The Legislature has provided a summary remdy for the collection of debts, in cases where, by the ordinary process, there would be no remedy at all. It has authorized the seizure of goods and chattels as the leading process in the cause, and has also provided for the replevy of the goods so
Keeping in mind this object and intent of the statute, let us advance now to the inquiry into the meaning of the terms “ likely to waste or be destroyed by keeping.” These terms are obviously susceptible of two constructions : the one, the strict construction, meaning those articles only which are in themselves perishable, and contain within themselves the elements of their own destruction and decay ; as, for instance, ripe fruits, fresh meats, and articles of a similar nature. With this definition applied to the terms, they would necessarily comprehend but very few articles of the vast variety of personal estate liable to attachments. Giving to the terms this rigid construction, it would not matter if it was shown to perfect demonstration that, at the termination of the litigation, the article attached would become utterly worthless to the creditor ; if the expense of keeping until the final judgment and execution would be fourfold the value of the article levied on, unless it contained in itself the element that would necessarily effect its own destruction, no order could be made by any judge or court for its sale.
Take, for instance, a horse, a mule, or live stock of any kind. These could not be brought within the above stated definition, for they are not perishable in that sense of the word, and yet they would destroy themselves twice over, in nine cases out of ten, if they were to be kept by the sheriff, after being levied on
The other construction of which the terms above mentioned are susceptible, is, that they comprehend all those articles ■which not only contain in themselves necessarily the elements of decay, but also those which, by being kept by the officer levying upon them, would become fruitless to the creditor, and by consequence an entire loss to the debtor. This construction certainly agrees entirely with our ideas of the object and intent of the statute. Giving to the statute this construction, it will be seen that its terms are quite comprehensive: all that is necessary to be shown is, that the article levied upon is likely to waste or be destroyed by keeping. It need not be shown that it will necessarily waste or be destroyed; but, if it be likely to Avastc or be destroyed, it may be sold — not one particular article, or one species of articles, but any estate attached. This construction of the terms of the statute, we are satisfied, is what the laAV makers intended by them, and is sanctioned both by sound reason and common sense. Giving to these terms this construction, can they, in any case, comprehend slaves ?
We apprehend no one Avould contend, if ahorse or mule Avas levied on, in a city where the expense of keeping Avould be some fifteen or eighteen dollars per month, and the ordinary term of pushing an attachment to final judgment Avas 12 months, that such horse or- mule Avould be considered as not falling within the spirit of the statute, because, before the final judgment, he would have eaten up his value and much more. ' And why Avould he be considered as falling Avithin the terms of the act 1 There may be nothing in his case that would tend to show that he would not out live a dozen such suits. It is not, then, because he has in himself necessary the element of decay and destruction, but because by keeping he AYOuldbe wasted and destroyed to the plaintiff and defendant, and therefore comes within the spirit of the
We would now ask, where is to bo found in our law, or in our policy, anything militating against the construction of the act above given ? There is certainly nothing in the act itself, which contravenes this idea, but on the contrary, as we have shown by the terms of the act itself, everything tending to show that no exception was intended to be made of anything whatever. It is conceded, that in the administration of estates, and in the law of executors, in this State, distinctions are made in favor of slave property. But it does not follow from this, that slaves were intended not to be comprehended in the above mentioned terms of the statute. As long as slaves are considered u property” and “ estate,” we cannor, by our decision, so legislate as to screen them from the operation of a statute, when the terms which it employs make no exception in their favor. If slaves are to be subjected to the payment of debts, what reason or good sense ip there in saying that they should be liable to be lost to the creditor, as well as the debtor, because they are slaves? It must be recollected that the statute is one designed for the mutual benefit of the creditor and debtor, and every article that is exempted from its operation, when it is levied on and subjected to expense by way of keeping, is to that extent doomed to destruction, so far as the parties litigant are concerned. But it is said, if slaves are to be comprehended in these terms of the statute, it will often operate a great hardship to the debtor, by often causing favorite slaves to be sold at a great sacrifice. We confess we do not comprehend the force of this argument. In the first place, the provision of the statute is for those cases where the party has failed to replevy the property; and a sale of the property, fairly made under the order of the court, must be considered as favorable to the debt-
But it is insisted, that the attachment may be levied, and property sold, upon a false or spurious claim. This argument proves too much. It goes against the whole policy of the law, as well against those cases clearly falling within the terms of the act, as against those which are doubtful. But, as an answer to this argument, it may be said, that, when an attachment is sued out, the attaching creditor has to give bond and security, to answer' in damages for all the wrongs that may result from the wrongful suing out of the same. With this remedy, which the statute has provided, the defendant has in all cases' to be satisfied. If it is defective, the Legislature alone can correct the evil.
According to the views which we entertain, there may be cases, where slaves, being levied upon and put in jail, would be as much subject to the statute as any other species of property. If, for instance, in a sickly season, with an epidemic raging in the vicinity of a jail, where were kept slaves in custody under an attachment; or, if the slaves are so affected by the confinement, or other regimen to which they are necessarily subjected in the hands of the officer, as that they will be greatly deteriorated in value at the termination of the litigation, or, if by the expense of keeping they would become fruitless to the attaching creditor, or be likely to become so, in any and all of the above cases, we consider it entirely proper to obtain an order for their sale, and that such an order is well warranted by a fair construction of the statute.
For these reasons, the application for a rehearing is refused.
Dissenting Opinion
The reasons assigned by the majority of the court, for refusing to grant a re-hearing in this case, have failed to impress me with such force as to cause me to change my opinion in respect to the construction of the seventh and eighth sections of our attachment laws, under which the sale of the slaves in controversy was ordered.
The reasoning adopted by them would, in my opinion, be much more prevailing than it now is, were it not for the
It appears to me, that no other property was intended to be subjected to the speedy sale provided for in those sections, than such as would waste, or be destroyed, by the mere act of keeping, irrespective of the costs and charges incident to having it safely kept until the termination of the suit. Thus, grain ; ungathered, or unpacked cotton; merchandise on shelves, or in boxes ; woollen goods, subject to be attacked and rendered valueless by insects; provisions; groceries; and numberless other articles of every day possession and utility, which may be readily enumerated, and which, in the aggregate, form a large portion of the personal property in every community, may well be included in these terms; while it would be difficult to extend the words of the statute to slaves, who are intelligent beings, endued, in an eminent degree, with the instinct of self-preservation, and with sufficient reason and judgment to render the promptings of this instinct effectual. While the former class of personal property, from its very nature, must be presently used, or disposed of, in order to prevent deterioration instate and value, the latter may remain for years not only uninjured, but often increasing in value. The idea of permanence in state and value, when applied to personal property, must always be relative, and not absolute.
The words of the statute necessarily imply a comparison, as to permanence, between several classes of personal property : while they assert, in terms, that one class is likely to waste, or be destroyed by keeping, they impliedly admit the existence of another class which is not. The opinion of the majority of the court, in effect, destroys this distinction, and cannot, therefore, be a correct exposition of the statute under review.
I have said, that when the seventh and eighth sections of our attachment laws were enacted, real estate was not sub
Eor these reasons, and those set-out in my ^dissenting opinion heretofore delivered in this case, I think a re-hearing should be allowed.