Appellant Millar appeals from a denial of his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. On October 21, 1971, after trial by jury, appellant Millar was found guilty of Second Degree Murder. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed that conviction. Millar
v. State,
(1973)
Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment under Ind.Code § 35-1-54-1 (repealed 1976), which permitted the imposition of either life imprisonment or the imposition of a fifteen to twenty-five year prison term upon conviction of second degree murder. Appellant claims that his life sentence is unconstitutional because the above statute provided for two widely divergent sentences, but set forth no specific criteria by which to determine which sentence should be imposed. He claims that this provision allowed the life term to be arbitrarily imposed, which is a denial of equal protection of law and renders the punishment cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Sections 16 and 23 of the Indiana Constitution.
I.
The defendant-appellant was charged with first-degree murder, found guilty of second-degree murder, and sentenced to life imprisonment. Ind.Code § 35-1-54-1 (repealed 1976), the statute under which he was convicted read as follows:
“Whoever, purposely and maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any human being, is guilty of murder in the second degree, and, on conviction, shall be imprisoned in the state prison during life, or shall be imprisoned in the state prison not less than fifteen (15) nor more than twenty-five (25) years.”
The appellant relies heavily upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Furman v. Georgia,
This Court has previously considered and decided this issue and found that
Fur-man
did not apply. In
Wilson v. State,
(1978)
“Appellant further argues that the jury was not provided with adequate guidelines to choose between a life sentence and a lesser sentence of fifteen to twenty-five years in prison for the crime of second-degree murder. He argues that the lack of guidelines makes the jury’s choice of the greater sentence cruel and unusual punishment under the concept of Furman v. Georgia, (1972)408 U.S. 238 ,92 S.Ct. 2726 ,33 L.Ed.2d 346 . Appellant does not demonstrate that Fur-man, which dealt with the death penalty, applies to sentences of imprisonment for murder as are involved in this case. Neither is it demonstrated that Furman stands for any constitutional mandate of ‘guidelines’ for use by the jury any time the sentencing function is undertaken. We do not believe that Furman so applies, and find this argument to be without merit.”
Identical constitutional claims were also considered and rejected in
Jones v. State,
(1979) Ind.,
II.
Appellant also alludes to a claim that the statute involved is unconstitutionally vague. This argument is not supported by citation to relevant authority nor developed to a point which would enable this Court to make a reasoned response thereto. There being no discernible argument presented, we must deem this issue waived. Ind.R.Ap.P. 8.3(A)(7);
Guardiola v. State,
(1978)
III.
Appellant also contends that the life sentence imposed upon his conviction of second-degree murder is in violation of Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution because a life sentence is also the penalty imposed for a first-degree murder conviction. The appellant bases his claim on language from
Heathe v. State,
(1971)
“ * * * The constitutional mandate that ‘all penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense’ requires that the maximum for a lesser offense be less than the maximum for a higher offense.”
An argument identical to the appellant’s argument here was considered in
Brown v. State,
(1973)
In rejecting Brown’s argument the Court explained the above quoted passage from Heathe, supra, as follows:
“However, such is not the rule of that case. Heathe had been convicted of the offense of entering to commit a felony, a lesser included offense of second degree burglary. He had been sentenced to imprisonment for a period of from one to ten years, the penalty provided by statute for entering to commit a felony. We *1108 remanded the case with instructions to modify the sentence by reducing the maximum to five years, which is the same as, not less than, the maximum provided the greater offense.”
The
Brown
Court went on to state and reaffirm their holding from
Dembowski v. State,
(1968)
This Court reaffirmed its
Brown
decision in
Shackelford v. State,
(1976)
“We believe that opinion was a correct statement of the law. A person who kills with purpose and malice, but without premeditation, has still killed intentionally and without justification or excuse. While the state permits the trier to find that the offense was substantially less reprehensible and the act less likely to be repeated than other homicides, the statute also permits the trier to find the act of such a quality and so likely to be repeated that this defendant should be punished and confined during his life, just as he would have been punished and confined if his act were the result of premeditation. Neither the Constitution nor common sense requires the penalty to be less.”
Brown, supra,
was also reaffirmed in
Emery v. State,
(1973)
“Nevertheless, we have held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 16 of the Indiana Constitution require only that the maximum sentence for a lesser included offense not exceed the maximum sentence for the greater offense.”
There is no error on this issue.
Judgment affirmed.