157 P. 5 | Cal. | 1916
Lead Opinion
The defendant appeals from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
The object of the action was to obtain a writ of mandate directing the defendant as city clerk to draw his warrant in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $750.50, being the amount due and remaining unpaid by the city of Fresno to one J.G. Simpson. The clerk refused to issue the warrant, basing his refusal on the ground that the plaintiff's claim was founded solely on a garnishee process under section 710 of the Code of Civil Procedure, upon a judgment against Simpson in favor of plaintiff, that the money was due to Simpson as the final payment upon a contract by him with said city for the erection of a public building, and that after said garnishee notice was served certain other persons who had furnished material and performed labor for Simpson in the erection of *207 the said building had served notices upon said clerk to withhold payment from Simpson of said sum of money due him and to apply the same in satisfaction of their claims for said labor and material furnished to Simpson. They claimed this right under section 1184 of the Code of Civil Procedure. These claims amounted to more than the amount due Simpson from the city. On May 2, 1910, the sum of $750.50 had been duly allowed by the city authorities as a claim due Simpson for the performance of his contract to erect the building. The transcript of the plaintiff's judgment was served on the city clerk on May 5, 1913. On May 10, 1913, the aforesaid laborers and materialmen served their notices upon the clerk demanding payment of their claims out of the money due Simpson. The sole question presented is whether or not the claim of a person who garnishees a debt due to his judgment debtor, in the manner provided in section 710, is subordinate to the claims of laborers and materialmen who, under section 1184, afterward give notice to intercept the money due to the contractor from the owner.
We are of the opinion that upon the facts above-stated, and under the provisions of the law relating to claims of such materialmen and laborers, the giving of a notice by the judgment creditor, prior to their notice and after the maturity of the claim, gives the judgment creditor precedence over said laborers and materialmen in the payment of money due the contractor.
Neither the constitution nor the statute gives laborers or materialmen any lien against public buildings. This was expressly decided in Mayrhofer v. Board of Education,
These principles control the decision in the present case. Before the claimants under section 1184 gave their notice to the city clerk, the plaintiff, as judgment creditor, had served upon the city clerk the transcript of his judgment, and in all respects duly complied with the provisions of section 710 necessary to entitle him to have said fund paid and applied upon his judgment. The judgment creditor was, therefore, *209 entitled to precedence in payment over the persons subsequently giving notice under section 1184 The money was due and payable to Simpson on May 2d. He had at that time the right to assign the same and his creditors had the right to reach the same by attachment, execution, or creditor's bill. Under these circumstances, the one first in time is first in right. The claimants under section 1184 must yield to the prior claim of the judgment creditor.
Section 1184 gives laborers and materialmen a right to give their notice at any time after they contract to furnish the labor or materials. By doing so they may anticipate any subsequent attachment or execution. But by no process of construction can the statute be held to mean that the fund due to the contractor upon a public building, upon which no lien is given, is set apart for an indefinite period after the completion of the building and maturity of the payment therefor, as a fund for the payment of persons furnishing labor and material, free from all demands of other creditors of the contractor and beyond his power to transfer or assign. Section 1184 fixes no limit upon the time in which the notice therein provided for may be given. Under the decisions cited, and upon sound principles of construction, if they await the maturity of the payment to the contractor before giving the notice, it must be given before any assignment is made, or attachment or other claim has accrued against the contractor on account thereof, or their claims will be postponed to those of attaching creditors whose attachments are prior in point of time.
The judgment is affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
Hearing in Bank denied.
In denying a hearing in Bank, the following opinion was rendered on March 27, 1916:
Addendum
In a petition for rehearing the defendant contends that of the $750.50 which the city of Fresno, on May 2, 1913, ordered paid to Simpson on his building contract, only $363 was due, and that the remainder, $387.50, did not become due until thirty-five days after May 1, 1913, the date *210 of the completion of the building. From this he argues that under the mechanic's lien law the claimants under the building contract were entitled to preference over the judgment creditor as to the $387.50 not due on May 10, 1913, when they served their notices to withhold payment for their benefit.
The record does not establish the facts as claimed. The complaint alleges that the city allowed the Simpson claim for $750.50 on May 2, 1913, and ordered that a warrant be drawn for its immediate payment. The answer does not aver that this allowance anticipated the final payment on the building contract and included the installment of $387.50 that was not due until June 4, 1913. It cannot be presumed that the city would pay a debt before its maturity, and the only inference remaining is that the $750.50 was made up of the installments which fell due at and before completion. The answer alleges that the $750.50 is the full amount due under the building contract, but as the action was begun on May 16, 1913, which was before the final payment became due, this would be true only if the allowance covered the installments which were then due. The demurrer to the answer included a specification that the answer was uncertain in this respect, and defendant was therefore duly advised that if the facts were as now claimed, the pleading was defective.
Sloss, J., and Lawlor, J., concurred.