78 Miss. 904 | Miss. | 1901
delivered the opinion of the court.
The bill and exhibits show, that in 1897 Gen. William R. Miles, a man of large wealth, a very prominent citizen, and then quite old, having reached the age of about seventy-five years, was, and had been for a long time, married to a second wife, and had only two descendants, Edward H. Miles, the appellant, and Theus N Miles, one of the appellees.
During the lifetime of the father, Theus was anxious to buy the interest of Edward in the father’s estate, and it appears that the General was willing that negotiations to that end might be taken up. The first mention of this matter is in a letter from Theus to Edward, of date March 23, 1897, containing these words: ‘ ‘ Did father have the talk with you about the property question ? If so, at what conclusion did you and he
On June 19, 1897, he writes from Goodhope, his father’s house: “It is absolutely impossible to get just now so large an amount of money as $5,000. . . . Now, I will make you the following proposition: I will, on the 1st of January next, pay you $2,000, and thereafter on the 1st of January, 1899, 1900, 1901, and 1902, $2,000 each, the deferred payments to bear interest at six per centum per annum. You, in consideration of these payments, to sell to Alice and myself a life interest in your portion of father’s estate, remainder over to our children, reserving a lien on the estate until all the payments shall have been made.” On the basis marked out in these letters, Edward and Theus and their father met at Goodhope on July 1, 1897, and the following acts were done: Edward executed a conveyance of ‘ ‘ my entire interest in the estate of W. B. Miles, my father, to Theus N. Miles and Alice Herrick Miles for and during their lives, with remainder over to the issue of their bodies. This contract embraces anything and everything
This will provides that, ‘‘Whereas, my son, Edward H. Miles', sold his entire interest in my estate to his brother, Theus N. Miles, and, whereas, on the first day of July, 1897, I made a deed to said Theus N. Miles of the Omega and Quofaloma plantations, which, in connection with advances theretofore made, constituted his and his brother Edward’s full share of my estate, ’ ’ therefore he proceeds to devise his remaining two plantations, Goodhope and Black Bayou, to his wife.
If there had been no understanding at the time as to what the particular part of the property was, but for the conveyances, to go to Edward, it is plain from the will that his interest was an undivided one-half interest in Omega and Quofaloma, and Edward would have had an enforceable .vendor’s lien by contract on this interest in the land and the personalty on them. But the bill charges that in fact Omega was Edward’s part.
It is incontrovertibly plain that there was no intent on the father’s part to disinherit Edward, and it is equally plain that Edward was the real vendor to Theus, and that the father’s conveyance was to ratify that contract by his own conveyance of the legal title. There can be no question that the two sons and the father all knew what Edward’s interest in fact was.
The bill avers that Omega was the interest sold; that $10,000 was a very small price for it; that no payment has been made except the first year’s interest on the notes, and prays enforcement of the vendor’s lien and general relief. The bill was met
This being a lien specifically made by contract, is enforceable, if it be competent to show by parol what the interest was which was conveyed. Griffin v. Byrd, 74 Miss., on page 33. What that interest was is a latent and not a patent ambiguity. We refer to the briefs of counsel and the authorities they cite, and say this, further: Parol evidence is admissible to show the meaning which the parties themselves attached to words they themselves employed in their own written contract. Shackelford v. Hooker, 54 Miss., 716, and cases there cited; 2 Am. & Eng. Enc. L. (2d ed.), 287, title, “Ambiguity,” and particularly page 289, “Ambiguity of intermediate class,” and notes,.and page 293, “Acts under the instrument.”
Edward Miles conveyed to Theus his ‘ ‘ entire interest in the estate of W. E. Miles,” his father. If his father had been then dead, there would have been no ambiguity whatever of any sort. But we learn, aliunde the deed, that his father was then living, and Edward, therefore, had no interest in his estate. This creates a latent ambiguity, an immediate one, and raises the question, What is meant by the terms, “entire interest in the estate of W. E. Miles ? ’ ’ The bill shows what they meant and understood to be conveyed by these terms, which are not in themselves ambiguous, but are made so by the development of the fact that General Miles was then alive. The deed related to property as conveyed, and expressly reserved a lien on it for $10,000. It appears from the bill that Omega was the subject of the conveyance and the property understood by the parties as the interest of Edward in the estate of his father, and Edward also renounced claim to anything else of the estate. The express lien is clearly enforceable against Omega.
Reversed, demurrer overruled, and thirty days from date of filing mandate below allowed for answer.