191 So. 245 | Ala. | 1939
The suit was for personal injuries and damages sustained by plaintiff's wife, as a proximate result of alleged negligence of the defendant non-resident corporation under the rule of "manufacturer's liability."
Demurrer to the successive counts being sustained, plaintiff moved the court to enter a judgment of non-suit in said cause. Said motion was granted by the court, and on February 1, 1939, a judgment of non-suit was entered in the cause, the defendant and garnishee were discharged and a judgment for costs was entered against the plaintiff. To review the action of the trial court in sustaining demurrer to the several counts, this appeal is taken.
Under the facts as presented by Counts C D, at common law, where there was no privity of contract, there was no liability. In the course of human events, however, this was found to be unjust and exceptions were made in the rule laid down by the common law under the doctrine of "manufacturers' liability" in what may be now called the pioneer cases. Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 8 Cir., 1903,
The several early cases reviewed by Mr. Justice Cardozo, in the case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., supra, are as follows:
"We hold, then, that the principle of Thomas v. Winchester [
"In reaching this conclusion, we do not ignore the decisions to the contrary in other jurisdictions. It was held in Cadillac Motor Car Co. v. Johnson [2 Cir.] 221 F. 801, L.R.A. 1915E, 287 [Ann.Cas. 1917E, 581], that an automobile is not within the rule of Thomas v. Winchester. There was, however, a vigorous dissent. Opposed to that decision is one of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky. Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer,
The counsel for appellee makes observation of the Buick Motor Co. Case, supra, as follows:
"At the time of the Buick opinion Cardozo foresaw some of the dangers of the doctrine of manufacturers' liability. He recognized that by fixing a liability where there was no privity, unscrupulous claimants might easily collect on fraudulent demand. Consequently, in so far as he could, Cardozo framed the rule so as not to depend upon the purchaser but upon the nature of the thing, and that in turn governed by a general standard. As he founded the primary liability in the law instead of by privity of contract, he likewise placed the limitations in general principles of law, rather than made the limitations referable to individuals. Would it probably cause injury? Was it reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made? Was the 'thing' imminently dangerous?
"That he so clearly understood not only the immediate problem but the expected effects, is shown by this statement:
" 'The principle that the danger must be imminent does not change, but the things subject to the principle do change. They are whatever the needs of life in a developing civilization require them to be.' (Page 1053).
"Cardozo's rule removed the unjustness of the rule requiring privity for liability. At the same time, the limits which he fixed or suggested gave protection against misuse of the law."
It is to be deduced from the cases of Sterchi Bros. Stores v. Castleberry,
We may further observe that when the instrument or agency, or challenged *363 defective part thereof, is used and operated with due care, for the purpose for which it was intended, without knowledge of that danger on the part of the user or purchaser, it is imminently dangerous to life and limb when so operated without knowledge.
We have examined Counts C and D in the instant case and hold that they comply with the rule of the case of Altorfer Bros. Co. v. Green,
As there was error in the ruling causing the non-suit, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the cause is remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
ANDERSON, C. J., and BROWN and KNIGHT, JJ., concur.