Summаry Judgment. Sara Miles was employed by Brown Transport Corporation. Her duties were as a general clerk, including dispatch duties, dock duties and work in and around the warehouse area. She wоrked from 9:00 a. m. until finished. This might require her to work a 30-hour week or a 70-hour week, but she was guaranteed only a 40-hour pay period. Mrs. Miles was allowed a lunch break each |day and that break was takеn at whatever time the work load permitted. She often did not leave the premises and simply ate a sandwich on the job. On occasion she would perform employer-related aсtivities while on her lunch break although this was a rare requirement.
On March 12,1980, Mrs. Miles was at work. She started to leave the premises on her lunch break. Her purpose was to go see her daughter whо was in the hospital awaiting a tonsillectomy. While exiting the building, a heavy wooden door (one оf two similar double doors) which was standing open was caught in a gust of wind. As Mrs. Miles was starting to descend a flight of about four steps, the door swung into Mrs. Miles causing her to lose her balance and fall to the Jpavement below the steps. Mrs. Miles suffered injuries which caused ¡her to lose approximately six months of work. Initially Brown disputed that the accident was subject to the Workers’ Compensation Act because Mrs. Miles was on her lunch break. However, subsequently Brown paid certain medical bills аnd charged the cost to its workers’ compensation insurance. There is no indication that Mrs. Milеs was aware of that payment, and no other payments were ever made to Mrs. Miles under thе workers’ compensation coverage. Apparently, however, up to as much as 80% of her medical expenses were paid under a group insurance plan.
Mrs. Miles brought the prеsent complaint alleging that by its tortious negligence in failing to secure the door in question, Brown wаs responsible for Mrs. Miles’ injuries. Brown moved for a summary judgment asserting that the injury presumptively was work-related as it occurred upon the work site and out of her employment and therefore Mrs. Miles’ sole source of recompense was under the
An injury to an employee occurring during working hours and on the employer’s premises ordinarily and presumptively will be considered as arising out of and in the course of emрloyment and as such, the employee’s sole course of action is against the emplоyer under the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Code Ann. § 114-103.
Fox v. Stanish,
supra. An exception to coverage, however, has been carved out for injuries occurring during a regularly schedulеd lunch break or rest break and at a time claimant is free to act as she chooses. Whеre these two facts concurrently exist, i.e., “regularly scheduled” and “freedom of action,” thе injury does not arise out of and is not in the course of employment even though within working hours and on thе employer’s premises.
Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Graham,
In this case, as demanded in
Rampley,
Brown produced evidence through its employees, including Ms. Miles, that the precise timе she took her lunch break was dictated by the current status of the workload. Thus, Ms. Miles’ lunch break was not a “scheduled” one.
Rampley,
supra, p. 613. Moreover, while it was shown that on this particular day, Ms. Miles had nо particular responsibilities or duties toward her employer during her visit to the hospital it was established that she often did subject herself to the performance of job-related duties during her lunch brеak. This too constitutes some evidence demanded of the employer that the employee’s time was not wholly free and was without the untrammelled choice of the employee required on all occasions to show a scheduled free break time.
American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Burt,
In this case the parties did not dispute the factual occurrences leading up to and accompanying thе injury. They disagree only as to the legal implications of these facts. The purpose of the Summary Judgment Act is tp eliminate the necessity for trial by a fact finder
Judgment affirmed.