Miles v. Bibb Company
177 Ga. App. 364
Ga. Ct. App.
1985
Check Treatment
Deen, Presiding Judge.

Thе appellant, C. Dean Miles, was employed for over three years by the appellеe, The Bibb Company (Bibb), until he was discharged on December 22, 1982. Subsequently, he commenced this action against Bibb, Charles Cherry (the personnel director), and David Tharp (Miles’ supervisor), alleging wrongful terminаtion, interference with his contractual relationship of employment, tortious interferenсe with his entitlement to unemployment compensation benefits, and intentional infliction of emоtional distress. Miles appeals from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for all three defendants. Held:

1. Bеcause there was no written contract governing it, the appellant’s employment at Bibb was for an indefinite period, with termination ‍‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‍at the will of either party without giving rise to a cause of action against the employer for an alleged wrongful termination. Nelson v. M & M Prods. Co., 168 Ga. App. 280 (308 SE2d 607) (1983); Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612 (250 SE2d 442) (1978). Bibb did have written policies fоr disciplining and discharging employees, and the appellant contends that his termination did not сomport with those policies. However, those guidelines in no way constituted parts of a writtеn contract of employment and thus did not alter the at-will status of the appellant’s emplоyment. See Nelson v. M & M Prods. Co., supra.

Miles emphasizes evidence that Cherry and Tharp had planned to discharge him allegedly because of his union sympathies (and possibly because he had testified against Bibb in another employee’s workers’ compensation claim), and that ‍‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‍Cherry and Tharp had actually engineered the alleged violation of company rules for which he was discharged. It was unсontroverted that both Cherry as personnel manager and Tharp as the appellant’s supervisor had the authority to *365 discharge the appellant. As the appellant’s employmеnt was terminable at will, and he was discharged by one with authority to do so, the motives of the emplоyer were legally immaterial. McElroy v. Wilson, 143 Ga. App. 893, 895 (240 SE2d 155) (1977); Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, supra. Further, the appellant’s conspiracy claim fails bеcause no actionable conspiracy arose from ‍‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‍Cherry’s and Tharp’s authorized exercise of their legal right to discharge the appellant, Meeks v. Pfizer, 166 Ga. App. 815, 816 (305 SE2d 497) (1983); Nelson v. M & M Prods. Co., supra, and the appellant’s theory of recovery of intentional interference with his employment contract alsо fails simply because neither Cherry nor Tharp was a third party unauthorized to discharge an emрloyee. See Campbell v. Carroll, 121 Ga. App. 497 (174 SE2d 375) (1970); Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, supra.

2. The appellant also asserted tortious interference with his claim for unemployment compensation benefits, alleging that the appellees withheld information from and made false statements to the Employment Security Agency, with the result that he was disqualified fоr benefits for nine weeks. (In this case, the appellee/employer appealed the initial award ‍‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‍of benefits, following which the Board of Review disqualified the appellant; the appellant never sought judicial review of this determination.) The appellees contеnd that this claim constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the administrative procedures for determining entitlement to unemployment compensation provided at OCGA § 34-8-170 et seq.

Certainly, under the pertinent statutory provisions, a claimant must exhaust his administrative remedies beforе judicial review is allowed, and the administrative determination is final where there is no timely petition for judicial review. Nothing in the statutory scheme specifically indicates that these administrative procedures (and judicial review) preclude an action for tortious interference with one’s claim for unemployment compensation benefits. Compare Johnson v. Gary, 443 S2d 924, 926 (Ala. 1983). Nevertheless, we conclude that no cause of action exists for “tortious interference with one’s claim for unemployment compensation,” in part because the inchoate expеctation of receiving unemployment compensation benefits prior to a final determination ‍‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‍of eligibility does not constitute a vested property right, see OCGA § 51-9-1, generally, and in part because to allow such a cause of action would render illusory (and violate the obviоus legislative intent for) the finality afforded administrative determinations. Nothing in Cox v. Brazo, 165 Ga. App. 888, 890 (303 SE2d 71) (1983), wherein this court merely chаracterized such an asserted cause of action as “sounding in defamation,” prevents this сonclusion. Accordingly, summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate on this count.

3. The appellant also contends that the appellee’s actions, dis *366 charging him and then cоntesting his claim for unemployment compensation, support his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, we find none of the appellee’s alleged actions so egregious as to state such a claim. Sossenko v. Michelin Tire Corp., 172 Ga. App. 771 (324 SE2d 593) (1984).

Decided December 2, 1985 Rehearing denied December 19, 1985 James D. Patrick, Jr., for appellant. Homer L. Deakins, Jr., William B. Hardegree, Margaret H. Campbell, H. Lane Dennard, Jr., James E. Humes II, for appellees.

Judgment affirmed.

Pope and Beasley, JJ., concur.