109 Ga. 473 | Ga. | 1899
Plaintiff brought suit against Glynn County on a written contract made September 12, 1897, between himself and the commissioners of roads and revenues of that county. By virtue of the terms of this agreement, he was employed as an architect to make plans and specifications for a court-house for the county, and to supervise the construction of the building, for which he was to be paid a certain percentage of the cost of its erection. It appears from the petition that the terms of this contract were practically agreed upon by parol between the parties in February, 1897; and before the written contract was entered into, plans and specifications of a building had been made by the plaintiff, accepted by the commissioners for the county, and he had received a cash payment of $500.00. The petition alleges that the plaintiff fully complied with the contract as to his part thereof, except in so far as he was prevented from so doing by the failure of defendant to proceed with the work in accordance with the terms of the contract. The commissioners, after bids by contractors were made for an
The object of the law requiring an entry of such contracts upon the minutes is to give information, easily accessible to the public, as to the character of contracts being made by county authorities. The entries referred to could not possibly have given such information, not only for the reasons above stated, but for the reason that they were made before the written contract sued on in this case was executed. A party examining those entries on the minutes at the time or directly after they were made, even if they had led him to inquire into the nature of the contract with the architect, would have discovered that no such contract was in existence; the parol agreement that may have been had between the parties being a mere nullity, as.the statute requires the contract to be in writing. We therefore conclude that there was an utter failure to comply with the provisions of the statute requiring the record of such contracts.
The only question left for consideration, therefore, is whether
But the question involved in this case is not an open one before this court. In Pritchett v. Inferior Court, 46 Ga. 462, it appears that a suit was brought against a county on a bond given, after the adoption of the code, by the justices of the inferior court. It was there held that the pleadings must show affirmatively that the contract was entered upon the minutes of the inferior court, and that the contract would not be valid under section 527 of the code, if good in other respects. Section 527 of the Code of 1868, referred to in that decision, is in the exact language of section 343 of the present Political Code, except that the word ordinary is substituted for justices of the inferior court. The decision in the case of Akin v. Ordinary of Bartow County, 54 Ga. 59, does not indicate any modification of this rule laid down in the Pritchdt case above cited. On the contrary, it is expressly declared that contracts with the county must be in writing and entered on the minutes of the court of ordinary; and it will be seen in the opinion, on page 69, that the principle decided in the 46th Ga. was adhered to and reaffirmed. In that case it was held that there had been a compliance with the 493d section of the code. That was an action brought on certain bonds of the county. It appears that the inferior court of Bartow County had authority to issue the bonds, and that they were issued in pursuance of an order so directing, which was entered upon the minutes of that court. They were delivered to the plaintiff, who paid to the county the money therefor, which was received and appropriated to its use. It was held that this was a compliance with section 493 of the code, and that those bonds were valid obligations of the