*1 were still when that feasible he learned bankruptcy reopened. ease had not Emily been MIKSCH, Appellant, Catherine Specifically, Judge claims Cohn Smith discov- ered bankruptcy that Goffs case had not EXXON CORPORATION d/b/a reopened
been at or about the same time he Company U.S.A., Appellee. did, and Glasper thus could have ordered the No. 14-96-01495-CV. ease to trial or not whether Cohn notified the words, court. In other Cohn concludes his Texas, Appeals Court of ability inaction on had no effect court’s (14th Dist.). Houston legal take remedial measures hence Sept. 1998. part notify efforts on his the court would however, position, Rehearing have been Cohn’s Dec. futile. Overruled 1998. presumes lawyer’s obligations that a Opinion Concurring Overruling 3.03(e) hindsight. Rule reviewed Rehearing Dec. disagree. According testimony, Cohn’s after he
informed bankruptcy the court that Goffs reopened
case had been and an automatic effect,
stay message he received a p.m.
from Goff 2:00 around that the ease had
been Approximately reset. thirty minutes
later, phoned Eaton informed Cohn bankruptcy reopened. case had not been knew,
There was no evidence that Cohn point, Judge Smith been in- had bankruptcy
formed of the true status of the court,
case. Because he never contacted the
Cohn could not have known it was whether Judge
still feasible for Smith to cancel
resetting put the case The fact to trial. Judge learned the status Smith correct bankruptcy through case own dili- his
gence obligations does not reheve Cohn of his 3.03(c).
under Rule Comment 14 to Rule provides:
3.03 rectify
The time on the obligation limit presentation testimony of false or oth-
er evidence varies from ease to case but
continues as as there is a reasonable
possibility taking legal ac- corrective tions before a tribunal.
Tex. DISCIPLINARYR. Prof. 3.03 Conduct added). (emphasis sup- cmt. 14 The record
ports the trial there court’s conclusion that possibility taking
was still a reasonable legal
corrective actions at the time Cohn representations Judge
learned that his
Smith were false. Point of five is error
overruled. the trial court is affirmed. *2 Price, McLaughlin, A. Allen Michael
G. Houston, appellants. for Gibson, Schwartz, B. Douglas Anne
Mark Houston, appellees. Neagli, LEE, ANDERSON and Before EDELMAN, JJ.
OPINION LEE, Justice. in wrongful termination case
This is a Emily Catherine Miksch sued which Corporation Company U.S.A. d/b/a (“Exxon”) allegedly firing violation employment agreement. parties’ oral granted summary judgment The trial court favor, perfected Miksch Exxon’s part appeal. affirm in and reverse and part. remand in
Background employed as a Miksch was secre- Engineering tary the Real Estate and department. marketing Division of Exxon’s time, Mize, Renny supervisor at Her Manager Exxon’s “Real Estate for the West- began husband ern Zone.” leasing and investigating possibility operating service station located (the Houston, “43rd on 43rd Texas Street Chevron”). time, Exxon had a At Street prohibiting written conflicts of interest spouse employee’s obtaining with Exxon first competing without company’s approval. Specifically, subsequently wrongful filed ter- policy provided, pertinent part: Exxon, against mination suit and Exxon summary judgment moved for on all of An employee, employee’s spouse, or a Following hearing, Miksch’s claims. dependent employee’s member fam- granted trial ily may compete Company *3 Exxon stating favor of without its basis for through its affiliates outside business activ- doing brings point so. Miksch one of error ities, except with knowledge and con- complaining generally that the trial court management. sent of granting summary judgment against erred in policy Miksch was aware of above and her.3 was concerned that her husband’s business plan jeopardize her employment with Standard of Review thereafter, Shortly Exxon. Miksch discussed The standard we follow when re the situation with and him Mize asked wheth- viewing is well-re er her husband’s 43rd Street Summary judgment proper only hearsed. is position Chevron would her with threaten when movant establishes there are no company. purportedly1 Mize told Miksch genuine proves fact issues material and he all,” venture “would not be a is judgment entitled to as a matter law. relayed and Miksch information her 166a(e). See Tex.R.Civ.P . To be entitled husband. subsequently Miksch’s husband summary judgment, a defendant must either began operating leased and the 43rd Street (1) conclusively negate at least one essential month, following Chevron. The Miksch re- plaintiffs each element of of the causes of promotion assigned ceived a and was to a (2) action, conclusively each ele establish supervisor, new Dan Stevens. Stevens was ment of an affirmative defense to each claim. supervised Rollins, turn, by Mike who in was Co., Grinnell, See American Tobacco Inc. v. supervised by Marketing Depart- Exxon’s (Tex.1997). deciding In head, ment Gordon Thomson. disputed whether there fact exists a issue August In Exxon revised its con- summary precluding judgment, we treat evi policy provide flicts of interest that all dence favorable to the nonmovant true approved by conflicts of interest must be indulge and all reasonable inferences company’s manage- member of the “senior summary nonmovant’s favor. id. A ment.” The policy revised defined “senior judgment may be affirmed on of the management” “department or high- heads movant’s theories that has merit. See Cin er level In executives.” December of the Cates, cinnati Ins. Co. Life year, same Stevens informed Miksch that she (Tex.1996). 623, 627 was in violation of Exxon’s that in and working company, order to continue for the Against Claims relinquish husband would have to control of the 43rd Street Chevron. Miksch causes of action refused, contract, shortly against and her husband and there- Exxon for breach of com after, fraud, employ- negligent misrepresentation, Exxon terminated Miksch’s mon-law ment.2 and “waiver of terminate.” testify point preserve and single, Mize is now deceased did not 3. This broad sufficient to this conversation before his death. argument possible error allow as to all grounds upon summary judgment may which fired, 2. At the time Miksch was her husband had Intern., granted. have been See Plexchem Inc. v. acquired also certain in the interests Dist., County Appraisal Harris However, parties two more service stations. Bros., 1996) (Tex. (citing Malooly 930-31 Inc. v. negotiated eventually whereby (Tex.1970)). Napier, Miksch’s husband’s limited interests in these sta- tions would not Exxon’s of inter- violate conflicts 4. Miksch also asserted a claim for the intentional undisputed est It is therefore that Miksch distress, emotional she infliction of which aban- for the was fired sole reason that she shortly summary relinquish doned before husband refused to control of the 43rd granted. Street Chevron. Chevron modified 43rd tion of the Street properly granted trial court contends the employment status. summary there judgment because motion of Miksch’s issues as are no fact response to to her affidavit attached of Miksch’s each summary address judgment, claims. motion Exxon’s judgment in day challenging she arguments what occurred Miksch detailed plan to appear in her they brief. Mize about her spoke the order station: 43rd operate the Street Breach of Contract office [Mize’s] I went into May of of inter- the conflict specifically discuss ground for Exxon’s first Mize, was the man- who situation. Mr. est that Miksch’s contract claim judgment was Zone of the Real the Western ager of at-will. the doctrine barred Division, my Engineering Estate *4 century, has adhered more than a Texas For I told Mr. at time.... supervisor that pro employment, which to rule of at-will the [43rd I about the Mize the details knew agreement to the specific that vides absent location, which was and its Chevron] Street by may contrary, terminated employment be Mr. specifically I asked home. near our time, any at employer or the the leasing operation and whether the Mize cause, cause, at all. bad or no cause good for dealership pose would the Chevron Dutschmann, Corp. Express Federal v. See Mr. my position at Exxon. problem with (Tex.1993) curiam); 282, (per 846 S.W.2d 283 pen to me his and seemed put Mize down 70, Scott, R.R.R. v. 72 Tex. Line Co. East & intently carefully and about thinking to be (1888).5 99, validity of an 102 The 10 S.W. that then told me what I said. He limit an purporting to agreement deal- operation the Chevron leasing and discharge employee at-will right to I problem at all. ership not be a would principles. governed by general contract I also understood remember this well.... See, Hosp. v. e.g., Montgomery County Dist. of Exx- speaking on behalf that [Mize] Browan, 501, Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 41 537 965 S.W.2d leasing and he me that the on when told (1998). exist, agreement to For such an dealership operation of the Chevron employer unequivocally must indicate a defi from problem at all. I understood not be a not terminate the nite intent to be bound to Mize Exxon my with Mr. that conversation employee except clearly specified cir leasing and agreed or to consented words, In other to cumstances. See dealership and of the Chevron enforceable, modify agreement an the em to conflict object not to that Exxon would (1) relationship ployment must be ex result at-will of interest which would (2) the Chevron deal- pressed implied, leasing and rather than and clear by my husband. ership (citing Byars City specific. See id. and Austin, 520, added). (Tex.App 523 (emphasis . —Aus denied)). 1995, recognizes tin Miksch writ testimony, Relying on the above Exxon, employee at that she was an at-will that her Mize’s oral assurance claims that proof rais but claims her operation of 43rd Street Chev- all,” fact as to whether Mize’s oral be a at es a issue ron “would not limiting agreement an Exx- opera sufficient to form regarding her husband’s statements reporting statutory charge public employee for violation Legislature enacted several 5. The has authority); See, appropriate of law to e.g., Civ.Stat. general exceptions to this rule. Tex.Rev Lab. Tex 1998) 4512.7, (Vernon (discharge § 3 Ann art. (Vernon 1996) (discharge § 21.051 Code Ann. abortion); refusing participate an for sex, Tex. race, color, religion, disability, based on (Vernon 502.013(c) Safety § & Code Ann. Health origin, age); national Agric Code Ann. Tex 1992) (discharge exercising rights under the for (Vernon 1995) 125.013(b) (discharge exer- § for (dis- Act); §Id. 592.015 Hazard Communication charge rights Agricultural cising Com- under the Hazard retardation). supreme due mental Act); Tex.CivPrac. munication & Code Ann. Rem recognized ex- also one common-law court has ception 1997) (Vernon serving (discharge § for 122.001 employment at-will doctrine. See (Vernon duty); § jury 161.007 Code Hauck, 733, Svc., Tex.Elec Ann 687 Inc. v. S.W.2d Sabine Pilot attending (discharge political Supp.1998) for (Tex.1985) (holding employee may 735 convention); § crime). 431.005- refusing Gov’t Code not fired for to commit Ann. Tex (Vernon 1990) military (discharge apply ser- exceptions to the situation .006 None those (dis- vice); (Vernon Supp.1994) § before us. Id. 554.002 704 1988, on’s to terminate at-will. it (Tex.App. Mikseh As 846 [14th no Dist.] — Houston writ); Coast, Inc., Polysar did motion for Benoit Gulf brief, (Tex.App. supporting S.W.2d argues Mize’s state- — Beaumont n.r.e.); Kellogg writ refd Webber v. ment not M.W. could have modified Miksch’s at-will Co., (1) (T ex.App.—Houston employment status because Mize’s state- n.r.e.). (2) [14th writ refd have Dist.] writing,
ment was never
reduced to
carefully
they
reviewed these cases and find
clear, definite,
not
statement was
factually distinguishable
either
are
from the
(3)
enforceable,
specific enough to be
at
proposi-
case
bar or do not stand
authority
unilaterally
Mize
lacked
tion Exxon claims.
modify
employment
Miksch’s at-will
status.
Stiver,
example,
For
had a
support
argument,
To
its first
Exxon ar-
company policy
specifically required any
gues
per
se
rule
Texas
employment agreements
modification of
to be
modify
employee’s
at-will
writing
signed
particular
officer.
status
be in writing. Recently,
Here,
845.
had
Supreme
implicitly rejected
Texas
Court
Collins,
appellants
such
were
Brawn,
argument.
Exxon’s
permitted
argue
appeal
on
that their
Broum,
Tex.Sup.Ct.J.
orally
at-will
status was
modi-
granted
specifically
writ of error
they
fied because
did
raise the issue
*5
employer’s
consider whether an
oral state-
summary judgment response.
871
their
See
modify
employ-
ments were sufficient to
the
And, Lumpkin,
at 934.
the appel-
S.W.2d
Although
ee’s at-will status.
id.
the
See
allege
lant did not
at-
that his status as an
ultimately
employer’s
concluded the
employee
by
express
was modified
specific
oral assurances
not
to
enough
were
contract, written or oral.
at
See 755 S.W.2d
modify
appellant’s
employment
the
at-will
case,
pleadings
this
Miksch’s
and
status,
open
possibility
the court left
that
response
clearly
spe-
could,
such statements
under certain circum-
cifically allege
employment
that her at-will
stances, be sufficient to create an enforceable
status was modified Mize’s oral assurance
See,
(“We
agreement.
e.g., id.
hold
an
that
that she would not
be fired because of
employer’s
modify
oral statements do not
in the
husband’s interest
43rd Street Chev-
employee’s
definite,
a
at-will status absent
ron.
contrary.”) (emphasis
stated intention to the
The remainder of the cases Exxon cites
added).
support
position
every
simply do not
its
that
Nevertheless,
a significant
Exxon devotes
agreement modify
employment
to
at-will
amount of time
cites
several eases
relationship
writing.
inbe
These cases
support
any agreement
that
its contention
to merely
agreement
such
recognize that
modify
employment
relationship
at-will
particular
writing
employ-
must be in
if
See,
writing.
e.g.,
must be in
v.
Collins
contract,
modified,
ment
as
not
could
have
Inc.,
Pharmacy Management,
871
Allied
See,
performed
year.
e.g.,
been
within one
929,
(Tex.App.
932
5.W.2d
[14th
— Houston
Winograd,
(holding
789
at 310
S.W.2d
that
1994,
writ);
no
Farrington
Sysco
Dist.]
written confirmation of the contract is unnec-
(Tex.
Servs.,
247,
Food
Inc. 865 S.W.2d
252
essary
performed
if the contract could be
1993,
denied);
App.
writ
[1st Dist.]
Benoit,
year);
406
within one
728 S.W.2d at
— Houston
Co.,
1,
5
Wilhite H.E. Butt
812 S.W.2d
(same); Webber,
(same);
720
127
S.W.2d at
1991,
writ);
(Tex.App. Corpus
Christi
Brown,
503,
41 Tex.
see also
965 S.W.2d
—
Willis,
Winograd v.
(holding
employer’s
Sup.Ct.J. at
that
oral
(Tex.App.
Dist.]
writ
[14th
employee’s
modifying
statements
at-will sta-
— Houston
denied); Lumpkin
Hv. & C Communica
“only if the
writing
tus must be reduced to
tions, Inc.,
(Tex.App.—
promises
within
performed
cannot be
one
denied);
case,
undisputed
writ
year”).6
Dist.]
Houston
Stiver
In this
it is
[1st
Instruments,
Inc.,
employment agreement
v. Texas
Miksch’s
oral
Stiver,
writing
writing.
(citing
requirement
at 846
6. This
stems from the Stat-
provides
agreement
26.01(a), (b)(6) (Ver-
"an
ute
Frauds which
§
Com.Code
Ann.
Tex.Bus.
&
performed
year
which is not to be
within one
1994)).
non
making
agreement”
from the date of
must be
require
speculate
terminology
one to
year.7 uous
or
performed within one
could have been
parties’ purport-
of the
parameters
as
Thus,
not
summary judgment could
have
The
agreement.
ed
granted based on Exxon’s contention
been
Mize
specifically asked
proof
shows
agreement
purported
modification
plan to lease
whether her
writing.
required
to be
Chevron would
operate
43rd Street
argues that Mize’s statement
Exxon also
Mize’s
position
Exxon.
threaten
employ-
could not have modified Miksch’s
definite, and when
specific and
response is
is not
ment status because
statement
context,
proper
communicates
viewed in
clear, definite,
specific enough
to be en-
message
would not
that Miksch
the clear
noted, the
factor in
forceable. As
critical
ordinarily
violated
would have
fired
what
determining
validity
Accordingly, we
Exxon’s conflicts
relationship
modify the at-will
was,
conclude that
statement
cannot
“unequivocally in-
has
whether
law,
modify
insufficient
as a matter
intent to be bound
definite
dieate[d]
employment status.8
Miksch’s at-will
except
clearly
terminate the
if
argues that even Mize’s
Exxon next
This
specified
at 538.
circumstances.” Id.
clear, he lacked
sufficiently
statement was
agreement, the
true
absent such an
because
authority modify
at-will sta
reasonably expect to limit
employee cannot
assertion,
at
support
To
tus.
terminate him.
policy to
of interest
its 1994 conflicts
tached
pol
judgment. That
its motion for
Brown,
specifically prohibits employees
icy
argued
em-
appellant
with the
except
competing with
by assuring
ployer modified her at-will status
knowledge
manage
“senior
and consent of
good
doing
“[she]
her that
manage
policy defines “senior
ment.” The
job
fired unless
there was
[she]
“department
higher
level
ment”
heads
good
good
reason or
cause.” See id.
*6
points
in her
Exxon
out
executives.”
rejected
appellant’s argument,
was
deposition, Miksch conceded that Mize
holding
“general
that an em-
comments”
“higher
a
“department head” nor
neither a
as
ployee
long
will
as
his
not
terminated
had never
and that she
level executive”
themselves,
not,
satisfactory
work is
do
for
management” approval
sought “senior
not to
manifest a definite intent to be bound
ar
Exxon
her husband’s business activities.
employee except
clearly
terminate the
under
gues
summary judgment proof conclu
this
specified
id.
In its anal-
circumstances. See
position
that Mize
sively establishes
ysis,
emphasized
the court
any
authority to bind Exxon to
lacked the
promise
appellant
that the
would not be ter-
employ
terminate Miksch’s
agreement not to
except
“good
for “good
minated
reason” or
disagree.
ment. We
enough
was
to constitute
cause”
not definite
con-
undisputed
It is
that at
time the
was
an enforceable contract because there
allegedly
Miksch and Mize
versation between
understanding
mutual
as to
occurred,
policy
conflicts of interest
the 1994
encompassed.
what those
See id.
terms
inter-
Exxon’s conflicts of
was not in effect.
Brown,
only
Unlike the situation in
Mize’s
at
relevant time
policy in effect
est
ambig-
required employees
obtain the consent
statement Miksch does not contain
your
opens a
problem at all if
husband
7.
is true
even under Miksch’s theo-
This
because
will
ry
a
dealer.
It
her at-
and becomes Chevron
that Mize’s oral statements modified
station
status,
position
your
at
pose
have
here
Exxon could
fired
not
a
with
not, however,
any
(except
her at
time and for
reason
for
We
read Brown
Exxon.”
do
employer
her
ron).
of the 43rd Street Chev-
suggest
must utter certain
that an
agree
"magic
to limit its
words” in order to
Rather,
employee
our
at-will.
to terminate the
employer's
oral
is
determine whether
task
argues
8.
Mize’s statement was not suffi-
Exxon
a
not to ter-
evidences
definite intent
statement
ciently
specifically
clear
Mize did not
because
clearly speci-
except
minate
for
be fired
her
state that Miksch would not
Brown, 965 S.W.2d
fied circumstances. See
Street Chevron.
husband's
43rd
case,
Tex.Sup.Ct.J.
a
at 538. In this
we find
agree
that the issue would be
response,
complicated
exists as to whether Mize’s
fact issue
much less
had Mize answered
context,
such an issue.
question
when read in
raises
as follows: "It would
“management”
engaging
compet-
before
in a
support
are insufficient to
such a claim. To
ing
business. The 1987
did
prevail
not define
negligent
on a
misrepresen
claim for
“management”
the term
and Exxon has nei-
tation,
plaintiff
prove, among
other
cited,
found, any summary
ther
nor
we
have
things,
misrepresented
that the
defendant
judgment proof suggesting that Mize was not
existing fact in the course of the defendant’s
part
“management”
company’s
as de-
business. See Federal Land Bank
Ass’n
this,
Apart
fined
the 1987
Sloane,
(Tex.1991).
Be
Rothwell,
Terry
executive,
an Exxon
testified
every
negligent misrepre
cause
element of a
upon
reading
that based
his
of the 1987 sentation claim must
be established
order
policy,
complied with
Miksch had
its terms
recovery,
there to be
the absence of
discharged
obligation
report
grounds
judgment.
element
activity.
husband’s business
on
Based
this
Lawyers
Corp.,
Title
Stone
Ins.
record, we have no basis to conclude the
(Tex.1977).
183, 185
summary judgment proof conclusively estab-
Freight
The situation Airborne
is analo
argument
lishes Exxon’s
that Mize lacked
gous
present
to the
case. See Airborne
authority
company’s
to act on the
behalf.
Freight Corp., Inc. v.
Enterprises,
C.R. Lee
Accordingly,
judgment would be
(Tex.App.
Fraud that, independent assured contractor “as you your job, you’ll job.” do have a for summary also moved employer subsequently at 292. The id. ground on the that Miksch’s com who, turn, fired the contractor sued mon-law fraud claim is barred because for various contract and tort allegation nothing fraud more than re claims, packaged including misrepresenta- negligent Al breach of contract claim.9 though Miksch contends considering tion. See id. at 293. After inappropriate was claim, because there are unre contractor’s the court em- found the claim, relating solved fact issues to her fraud ployer’s qualify oral statement did not specified has not she what those fact issues misrepresentation” “negligent because it provided any argument why are or they conduct, promise merely a of future rather Appel are fact issues. Rules The Texas promise existing than a fact. See require party’s late Procedure each brief of case, Similarly, argument to contain “such discussion of promise oral not to terminate Miksch *7 upon may the facts and authorities relied misrepresentation existing a but of fact requisite point to maintain the at issue.” was, most, promise to refrain from tak- TexR.App.P. 38.1(h). See Points of error such, ing some action in the As future. supported by argument that are not may negli- Miksch maintain a claim for authorities are deemed waived. Tren See Exxon, gent misrepresentation against (Tex. Ratcliff, holm v. 646 S.W.2d 934 in granting the trial court not err sum- did 1983). By failing comply briefing to with the mary judgment of Exxon on favor 38.1(h), requirements of Rule has Miksch cause of action. right challenge portion waived her to of iy judgment trial to relating court’s her fraud claim. Right to Waiver of Terminate
Negligent Misrepresentation ground Exxon’s final judgment of asserted that Miksch’s “waiver it Exxon next asserted that was right to terminate” claim must fail as a mat summary judgment entitled to on Miksch’s recognize ter of law because does not negligent misrepresentation action Texas cause of any allegations petition agree. because the such cause action. We of Corp. Although relationship a contractual can create tract itself. Formosa Plastics USA See Inc., law, Contractors, Eng’rs 960 duties under both contract and tort Presidio (Tex.1998). plaintiff’s right recovery ordinarily of on the motion for is In its (1) right judgment, re- contract alone if: conduct Exxon claimed Miksch’s of defendant’s liability give only covery, any, would rise to because it breach- if is in contract alone because her contract, (2) injury only injury solely alleged failure es or is stems from Exxon’s employment agreement. subject purported to the the con- to honor her economic loss matter of Enterprises, BioZyme found, any Supply, Inc. v. cited, nor have we has neither (Tex.1981); that a S.W.2d BaR of authority supporting her contention State Jury Charges Business, is a Texas right terminate” claim Pattern “waiver of — Employment 101.1, 101.3 addition, PJC of action Texas. & viable cause Consumer (1997) exis- instruction on (jury question and out, points “waiver” correctly as Exxon case, Miksch’s In this agreement). party may em tence of merely theory a a defensive to her attached affidavit prevent party’s loss of the exist ploy to specifically asked that she response states Bank rights. See Hruska v. First State ing Mize, (Tex.1988). her husband’s whether Deauville, supervisor, pose would station of a Chevron operation may not be used concept waiver The position at Exxon. problem any obligations. rights contractual create told that Mize further states The affidavit properly Accordingly, the trial court station Miksch’s her that granted summary judgment on at all” and “would not be terminate” claim. “waiver of this that Mize was Mikseh understood Conclusion that he had of Exxon and speaking on behalf object thereby agreed that us, find the record before we Based on arising from of interest conflict genuine of material fact exists that a issue operation of the Chevron station. oral statement alleged whether Mize’s em- Miksch’s status as an at-will Brown, modified there the situation Unlike portion Accordingly, reverse the ployee. we only circum- specificity lack of here. relating court’s of the trial alleged Mize’s statement stance to which re- Miksch’s breach of contract claim and of Exxon’s application is the pertain eould claim for The remainder mand that trial. service to the conflict judgment is affirmed. trial court’s regard, In that by Miksch’s husband. station whether, as to could differ reasonable minds EDELMAN, Justice, concurring on motion it was which under the circumstances rehearing. made, conveyed an alleged statement to be creat- employment For contract of contractually bind Exxon to waive intent to ed, unequivocally indicate a fact issue conflict Because intent to be not to terminate a definite bound whether the remains this ease therefore specified employee except clearly únder parties created actions County Montgomery circumstances. modify their rela- Brown, Hosp. Dist prop- tionship, summary judgment eould not (Tex.1998). An who has no formal for lack of erly granted on that claim employer cannot con- agreement with his specificity. comments, en- struct one out of indefinite couragements, See id. assurances.
Therefore, statement that an *8 discharged
employee satisfactory employee that the
his work is do discharged only good cause
would be CLARK, Appellant, Demetria intent not to termi- not manifest definite clearly specified cir- nate HOUSTON, OF UNIVERSITY agreement there is no cumstances because Matthew Stewart Jon “satisfactory” “good en- what cause” Williams, Appellees. compasses. See id. No. 14-96-00005-CV. however, Importantly, the fact in Brown statements addressed particular Texas, Appeals Court of law, sufficiently not, as a matter of were Dist.). (14th Houston change does not specific to create contract Sept. agreement general that whether an rule parties question was reached
fact where existence of Farm, See, & Ranch disputed. e.g., Preston