{¶ 3} Subsequently, appellees filed a motion for a change of venue. The motion was granted and the case was transferred to Knox County, Ohio.
{¶ 4} Subsequently, on June 25, 2004, appellees filed a motion for summаry judgment on five of the six counts in appellants' complaint. The matter was set for a non-oral hearing on July 26, 2004, at 4:00 P.M. On July 30, 2004, four days after the deadline for appellants to respond, appellants sought leave of court until August 19, 2004, to respond to appellees' motion for summary judgment.
{¶ 5} On August 2, 2004, the trial court sustained appellees' motion for summary judgment regarding five of the six counts. A trial on the remaining count was scheduled for September 28, 2004.
{¶ 6} On September 22, 2004, aрpellants filed three motions: a motion to vacate the judgment entry granting appellees' motion for summary judgment, a motion to continue trial and a motion to compel discovery. On September 27, 2004, a day before thе trial, appellants' counsel filed an affidavit of disqualification with the Ohio Supreme Court. That same day, the Ohio Supreme Court denied the affidavit of disqualification.
{¶ 7} The next day, September 28, 2004, the day upon which the trial was scheduled, appellants renewed their motion for a continuance. However, by Judgment Entry filed on September 29, 2004, the trial court denied appellants' motion for a continuance, the motion to compel discovery and the motion to vacate the prior grant of partial summary judgment.
{¶ 8} Following the trial court's decision, the parties orally entered into a consent judgment in which judgment was awarded in favor of appellees and against appellants for the sum of $23,000.00. A Consent Judgment was filed on October 5, 2004.
{¶ 9} Appellants appeal, raising the following assignments of error:
{¶ 10} "I. The trial court abused its discretion when it denied plaintiffs' motion to vacate its order granting summary judgment tо defendants.
{¶ 11} "II. The trial court abused its discretion when it denied plaintiffs' motion to continue the within trial."
{¶ 12} Before this court can reach the assignments of error presented by appellants, it must address whether appellants havе appealed from a final, appealable order. This issue was raised by appellees in a motion to dismiss. In response to appellees' motion, this court issued a Judgment Entry in which it held that appellees' motiоn to dismiss would be considered at the time of merit review.
{¶ 13} Upon such consideration, we find that appellees' motion is well taken. Appellate Rule 3(D) provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he notice of appeal . . . shall designate the judgment, order or part thereof appealed from. . . ." We agree with the Eighth District Court of Appeals which has held that "App.R. 3 must be construed in light of the purpose of a notice of appeal, which is to notify appellees of the appeal and advise them of "just what appellants . . . [are] undertaking to appeal from." Parks v. Baltimore Ohio RR (1991),
{¶ 14} Ohio law provides that appellate courts have jurisdiction to review only the final orders or judgments. See, generally, Section
{¶ 15} "A judgment that leaves issues unresolved and contemplates that further action must be taken is not a final appealable order." State exrel. Keith v. McMonagle,
{¶ 16} "An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the following:
{¶ 17} "(1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment;
{¶ 18} "(2) An order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judgment;
{¶ 19} "(3) An order that vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new trial;
{¶ 20} "(4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and to which both of the following apply:
{¶ 21} "(a) The order in effect determines the action with rеspect to the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy.
{¶ 22} "(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meаningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action.
{¶ 23} "(5) An order that determines that an action may or may not be maintained as a class aсtion." . . .
{¶ 24} For the following reasons, we find that the Judgment Entry from which appellants seek to appeal is not a final appealable order. The Judgment Entry denies three different motions filed by appellants. We will consider the dеnial of each motion, in turn.
{¶ 25} The Judgment Entry appealed from denied appellants' motion for a continuance. The denial of a motion for a continuance is not a final, appealable order. Lamont v. Lamont, Geauga App. No. 2004-G-2591,
{¶ 26} In addition, the Judgment Entry appealed from overruled appellant's motion to compel discovery. Discovery orders are generally interlocutory and, as such, are neither final nor appealable, especially those that deny discovery. DeAscentis v. Margello, Franklin app. No. 04AP-4,
{¶ 27} The Judgment Entry also denied appellants' Civ. R. 60(B) motion to vacate the trial court's previous grant of partial summary judgment. Civil Rule 60(B) states in pertinent рart: "On motion and upon and such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding. . . ." (emphasis added). The provisions of Civ.R. 60(B) clearly require a final judgment in оrder for relief to be granted. In this case, appellant sought to vacate a partial grant of summary judgment. An order granting partial summary judgment in favor of a party does not meet the criteria identified in R.C.
{¶ 28} For the foregoing reasons, we find that the September 29, 2004, Judgment Entry was not final and appealable. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to consider appellants' appeal and must dismiss the appeal.
{¶ 29} However, even if this court were to have jurisdiction, we would not reach the merits of appellants' assignments of error. This case reaches this court upon the trial court's entry of a Consent Judgment. In that Consent Judgment, the trial court stated as follows:
{¶ 30} "This mattеr came on for jury trial on September 28, 2004. Plaintiffs, Ralph Miklovic and Kathy Miklovic, were not present. Appearing on behalf of plaintiffs was Mr. James L. Major, Esq. Defendant and counter-claimant, K. Dean Shira, was present and reрresented by William J. Kepko, Esq. The Court, having been advised that the parties reached a settlement on all matters and the settlement, having been read into the record, and the Court, having been further advised that plaintiffs have сonsented to having judgment entered against them and in favor of defendant, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that judgment, in the amount of twenty-three thousand dollars ($23,000.00), is hereby entered against plaintiffs Ralph Miklovic and Kathy Miklovic, jointly and severally, and in favor of defendant, K. Dean Shira. Plaintiffs shall take nothing on their complaint."1
{¶ 31} "A valid consent judgment or decree based upon compromise and settlement precludes parties and their privies from relitigating issues involved therein." Wasson v. Brumbaugh (June 26, 1981), Wood App. No. WD-80-70,
{¶ 32} Appellants do not dispute that they entered into a settlement agreement. However, appellants attempt to claim error based upon the trial court's denial of motions entered by the trial court prior to the settlement agreement between the parties. Appellants waived the right to raise such issues when they entered the settlement agreemеnt.
{¶ 33} However, this appeal is dismissed since appellants failed to appeal from a final, appealable order.
Edwards, J. Gwin, P.J. and Boggins, J. concur.