MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Petitioner Wladyslaw Miezgiel (“Petitioner”) filed an 1-130 Petition for Alien Relative (the “1-130 Petition”) with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), seeking recognition of his marriage to Grazyna Miezgiel (“Grazyna”). USCIS denied the 1-130 Petition, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner commenced this action seeking judicial review of the BIA decision. The government moves for summary judgment. (Respt’s Mem., Docket Entry No. 16; Respt’s Reply, Docket Entry. No 19.) Petitioner opposes. (Pet’s Mem., Docket Entry No. 18.) For the reasons set forth below, the government’s motion for summary judgment is granted.
On January 26, 2006, Petitioner, then a lawful permanent resident of the United States, filed an 1-130 Petition with USCIS seeking recognition of his marriage to Gra-zyna. (R.
On August 27, 2009, the District Director of USCIS’s Vermont Service Center denied the 1-130 Petition, holding that Petitioner had failed to comply with USCIS’s prior notice to provide a marriage certificate issued by a civil authority in New York, the state where Petitioner and Gra-zyna allegedly were married. (Id. 140-41.) On September 28, 2009, Petitioner appealed the District Director’s decision to the BIA. (Id. 139-71.) On September 7, 2010, the BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal without prejudice to file another applica: tion that included evidence of a marriage performed in compliance with New York law. (Id. 131-32.)
On May 2, 2011, Petitioner appealed the decision of the BIA to this Court. By notice of motion dated September 28, 2011, the government moves for summary judgment. Petitioner opposes, contending that his marriage to Grazyna is valid.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the district court must resolve all ambiguities, and credit all factual inferences that could rationally be drawn, in favor of the party opposing summary judgment and determine whether there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact, raising an issue for trial.” McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp.,
The moving party bears the burden of “informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] ... which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
B. Review of Agency Action
When reviewing agency decisions under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the Court “begin[s] by reviewing the agency’s construction of the statute at issue ... by applying the familiar two-step process of statutory interpretation’ established by Chevron U.S.A Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
Assuming the agency’s action was authorized by statute, the Court then must consider whether the action at issue was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). An agency decision may be overturned as arbitrary and capricious only “ ‘if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in
Whether an agency action is arbitrary and capricious is a legal question to be resolved on the basis of agency records in existence at the time of the action, and the Court will not engage in an evidentiary hearing or a de novo review. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorian,
II. Application
There is no genuine dispute as to any material fact in this case. The parties disagree only as to whether USCIS’s decision that Petitioner’s marriage to Grazyna was invalid for immigration purposes was arbitrary and capricious. The government argues that it was reasonable to require Petitioner to submit documentation of a marriage in compliance with New York State law. (Respt’s Mem. at 6.) Petitioner argues that it was arbitrary and capricious for USCIS to deny his 1-130 Petition, because a marriage ceremony conducted by a foreign consular officer at a foreign consulate located in New York is valid for immigration purposes. (Pet.’s Mem. at 3.)
A. The Agency’s Choice of Law Rule
The Court begins by inquiring whether Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue. Clearly it has not. The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (“INA”), does not define the term “spouse,” nor does it dictate criteria for the USCIS to use in examining the validity of a marriage.
Turning to the second step of the Chevron analysis, the Court finds that US-CIS’s interpretation of the INA is reasonable. In determining whether a marriage is valid for immigration purposes, USCIS applies the laws of the place where the marriage was celebrated. See, e.g., Matter of Hosseinian, 19 I. & N. Dec. 453 (BIA 1987) (holding that “[t]he well-established rule is that it is the function of the state to determine how its residents may enter into the marital relationship”); Matter of Bautista, 16 I. & N. Dec. 602, 603 (BIA 1978) (holding that the petitioner’s marriage to the beneficiary was valid for immigration purposes, because it complied with the law of the Philippines, which was the place of celebration); Matter of Arenas, 15 I. & N.
USCIS’s interpretation of the INA is consistent with the choice of law rule applied by many courts in the context of matrimonial law. Indeed, the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, and the New York State Court of Appeals all have held that the validity of a marriage generally is governed by the law of the place where the marriage was celebrated or solemnized. See, Loughran v. Loughran,
Moreover, the BIA’s published opinions interpreting ambiguous provisions of the INA are entitled to deference. Yuen Jin v. Mukasey,
In arguing that USCIS’s decision to apply the law of the state in which the marriage was celebrated is arbitrary and capricious, Petitioner cites the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws. The Second Restatement adopts a flexible approach, providing that “[t]he validity of a marriage will be determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage.... ” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 283(1) (1971). Notwithstanding the inconsistency between the choice of law rule adopted by the USCIS and the rule recommended by the Second Restatement, Petitioner’s argument is without merit. As a preliminary matter, the USCIS has discretion in its interpretation and implementation of the INA. The agency is only required to give the INA a reasonable construction. Bellevue Hosp. Ctr. v. Leavitt,
Even assuming, arguendo, that the US-CIS were obligated to follow the Second Restatement, the agency’s decision to apply New York law in this case was reasonable, because New York State had the most “significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage,” as the Second Restatement requires. Petitioner and Grazy-na have lived in New York State since
Accordingly, this Court concludes that USCIS’s application of New York law to determine the validity of Petitioner’s marriage was reasonable. The Court proceeds to determine whether Petitioner’s marriage was valid under the laws of New York State.
B. Validity of Petitioner’s Marriage Under New York Law
Petitioner concedes that his marriage ceremony “was not done according to New York laws [sic ].” (Pet. Mem. at 4.) Nonetheless, Petitioner maintains that his marriage is valid under New York law, because: 1) the marriage was authorized under Polish law, and, therefore, should be recognizable in all jurisdictions (Pet.’s Mem. at 3); and 2) “there is no strict requirement for how marriage should be performed.” (Id. at 9.)
Petitioner makes two arguments in support of his position that a marriage authorized under Polish law is valid in New York State. First, Petitioner argues that his consular marriage should be recognized under New York law, because “New York State has a history of recognizing judgments rendered in foreign countries.” (Pet.’s Mem. at 8.) Petitioner cites Greschler v. Greschler, in which the New York State Court of Appeals held that a divorce decree rendered by a foreign court was valid. Greschler v. Greschler,
Second, Petitioner relies on Article 25(c) of the Consular Convention between the United States and Poland (the “Convention”) to suggest that his marriage should be considered valid. The Convention provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
A consular officer shall have the right to carry out the following functions within his consular district in accordance with the laws of the sending State:
(c) to prepare documents of vital statistics pertaining to births and deaths of nationals of the sending State, as well as. receive statements concerning marriages in cases where both persons to marry are nationals of the sending State; however, this does not relieve the nationals of the sending State of the obligation to observe the laws and regulations of the receiving State concerning reporting or registering of births anddeaths, and the performance of marriage.
Consular Relations Convention and Protocols Signed at Warsaw May 31, 1972, art. 25(c), 24 U.S.T. 1231.
Petitioner contends that Article 25(c) of the Convention obligates USCIS to recognize his consulate marriage. Petitioner argues, hyperbolically, that Article 25(c) would be meaningless if the Court affirms the BIA’s decision finding his marriage to be invalid under New York law. Petitioner’s reliance on the Convention is misplaced. Article 25(c) explicitly states that foreign nationals are not relieved “of the obligation to observe the laws and regulations of the receiving State concerning ... the performance of marriage.” Since foreign consuls are not authorized to perform marriages under the New York Domestic Relations Law, the BIA’s decision holding Petitioner’s marriage invalid, despite the -fact that it was performed by a foreign consul, was not arbitrary and capricious. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 11 (providing that no marriage shall be valid unless solemnized by an individual holding one of an .enumerated set of religious and civil positions).
Finally, Petitioner argues that “there is no strict requirement for how marriage should be performed,” because: 1) “there is no specific language in the New York Constitution concerning the performance of a marriage” (Pet’s Mem. at 6); 2) “the intention of the parties seeking to be married is paramount” under the Second Restatement (Id. at 9); and 3) “[e]very presumption lies in favor of a marriage.” (Id. at 9.) This argument is frivolous in light of New York State’s statutory requirements for entering into a valid marriage. See generally N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 11.
In sum, USCIS’s application of New York State law to determine whether Petitioner’s marriage was valid and its decision finding that Petitioner had failed to demonstrate that his marriage complied with New York State law were both reasonable. Thus, Petitioner has failed to show that the agency’s actions were arbitrary and capricious.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the government’s motion for summary judgment is grantéd and this action is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. "R.” refers to the USCIS Administrative Record, filed in hard copy due to volume. (See Docket Entry No. 16.)
. The INA does not define the term “spouse,” "wife,” or "husband,” except to clarify that these terms do not include a spouse, wife, or husband by reason of any marriage ceremony where the contracting parties thereto are not physically present in the presence of each other, unless the marriage shall have been consummated. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(35).