Introduction
Bill Poeppelmeyer (Defendant) appeals from the judgment entered by Circuit Court of Cape Girardeau County in favor of Midwest Grain & Barge Co. (Plaintiff). Defendant claims that the trial court erred in: (1) entering judgment for Plaintiff without giving him adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard in violation of his due process rights under the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment, and (2) denying his motion to set aside the judgment as irregular. We reverse and remand.
Background
On August 6, 2007, Plaintiff filed a petition against Defendant for damages arising from Defendant’s alleged breach of the parties’ commodities contract for the sale and purchase of wheat. Defendant allegedly repudiated the contract by informing Plaintiff that he would not be able to deliver the wheat as promised, forcing Plaintiff to purchase more expensive wheat from another seller. In its petition, Plaintiff prayed for damages caused by Defendant’s alleged breach and for attorneys’ fees as permitted under the parties’ contract. Defendant, after filing several pre-answer motions, timely filed his answer to Plaintiffs petition on March 13, 2008.
On July 14, 2008, counsel for both Plaintiff and Defendant appeared before the trial court for a scheduled case review. At the hearing, the trial court granted Defendant’s counsel’s motion to withdraw and allowed Defendant thirty days to obtain
At the August 4 case review, Defendant failed to appear. With only Plaintiffs counsel in attendance, the trial court rescheduled the case review for August 18, 2008. The trial court did not send Defendant notice of the August 18 case review.
On August 18, Plaintiffs counsel appeared before the trial court and submitted a proposed judgment as well as affidavits supporting damages and attorneys’ fees. Without Defendant or his counsel present, the trial court entered judgment against Defendant awarding Plaintiff $60,029.18 in damages, prejudgment interest, and attorneys’ fees. The judgment stated that “[t]his matter is before the Court in response to the failure of [Defendant] to comply with this Court’s July 14, 2008 Order to appear before it either in person or by counsel, on August 4, 2008.”
Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion to set aside the judgment pursuant to Rule 74.05 and Rule 74.06, which the trial court denied. This appeal follows.
Standard of Review
This court will affirm the trial court’s judgment unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares the law.
Murphy v. Carron,
Discussion
In his first point, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in entering judgment at the August 18 case review because it failed to provide him with adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard in violation of his due process rights under the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, Defendant claims that because he was not in default and the trial court failed to notify him of the August 18 case review, he is entitled to have the judgment set aside.
Defendant relies on Missouri cases holding that “[cjonstitutional due process requires that for a judgment entered against a party not in default to be valid, there must have been notice of the trial setting and an opportunity to be heard must have been granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”
Breckenridge Material Co. v. Enloe,
Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s reliance upon the above-cited cases is mis
In our system of jurisprudence reasonable notice to a litigant (when there exists even the possibility of action adverse to his interests) is deemed to be of the essence of fairness and justice. Reasonable notice to parties whose interests are at stake in a contemplated order is a prerequisite to the lawful exercise of the court’s power. Opportunity for a litigant to present his views as to the matters instantly before the court which may affect his rights is the very foundation stone of our procedure.
Plaintiff also claims that Defendant cannot complain about a “lack of notice” because “[a] party has a duty to keep abreast of all proceedings in a case from service of original process until final judgment”, citing
Owens v. Vesely,
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the August 18 judgment should be affirmed because the trial court, exercising its inherent authority to control its docket and the progress of the litigation, acted within its discretion when entering the judgment against Defendant as a sanction for his failure to appear at the August 4 case review. Plaintiffs argument is misplaced because Defendant has not challenged the trial court’s discretion or authority to enter a judgment as a sanction. Rather, the issue on appeal is whether the manner in which the trial court entered its judgment comports with the requirements of due process.
Faced with a similar issue, our supreme court in
Hoppe
distinguished between a trial court’s
power
to render a judgment and the procedural
manner
in which the court must enter the judgment.
Conclusion
We reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to set aside the August 18, 2008 judgment and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.