9 S.W.2d 1004 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1928
Reversing.
In March, 1917, the appellee entered into an oil lease with Jos. L. Bond, the pertinent terms of which are:
"Agreement and lease made and entered into the 6th day of March, A.D. 1917, witnesseth: That J.D. Cochran and Lon Cochran, lessors, in consideration of $1.00 to us in hand duly and truly paid by Jos. L. Bond, New York City, lessee, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do hereby grant, demise and let unto the lessee all the oil and gas in and under the following described tract of land; also the said tract of land for the purpose of entering upon, operating thereon and removing therefrom said oil and gas for the term of five years from date *677 . . . with the right to use oil, gas or water therefrom . . . the above grant or lease being made upon the following terms; . . . Second: Should oil be found in paying quantities the lessee agrees to deliver to the lessors free of charge into tanks or pipe lines one-eighth part or share of all crude oil produced or saved from said premises. Third: Should gas be found in paying quantities, the lessee agrees to pay $100 each year for the product of each well while the same is being sold off the premises. The lessor to have gas free of cost to heat and light one dwelling house during the same time at the well, to be used at lessor's risk."
The appellant has come into the ownership of this lease as lessee. Thereafter three oil wells were drilled by the appellant on the appellee's land described in this lease. While these wells produce oil in sufficient quantities to market, it is admitted that they are not and have never been gas wells within the meaning of that part of the lease requiring the payment of a royalty of $100 a year on gas wells producing gas in paying quantities while the gas is being sold off the premises. Since these wells have been drilled the appellant has daily taken from well No. 1 a small quantity of casing head gas. This casing head gas has been piped by the appellant to a pumping plant located on an adjacent lease also owned and developed by the appellant and there mingled with casing head gas obtained from wells on other leases which the appellant owned in that vicinity. All of this casing head gas has then been used by the appellant in pumping the thirteen wells it owned on various leases, including the three wells on appellee's land. It also appears that some of the casing head gas which came from the appellee's land was probably used by the appellant in the drilling of at least one well on an adjacent lease owned by it. It is admitted that the oil royalties due the appellee from appellant have been promptly paid. Conceiving that the casing head gas obtained by the appellant from the wells on his property, at least when used off his premises, belonged to him, the appellee brought this suit against the appellant to recover the value of this casing head gas so used by the appellant off his premises, and on a trial secured a verdict and judgment of $1,500, to reverse which this appeal is prosecuted.
As to whether or not the lessee must under his lease pay the lessor for casing head gas used or sold by the *678
lessee on or off the premises depends of course on the terms of the lease. In many of the cases dealing with this problem it appeared that the lessee had converted the casing head gas into gasoline which the lessee sold, and the question was as to the liability of the lessee to the lessor for a royalty on the gasoline thus sold. See Locke v. Russell,
We are not unmindful of the fact that in the evidence in this case the appellee made some complaint of lack of gas to run his home due to the use of it made by the appellant in the pumping of the oil wells. But he is not suing in this case for any breach of that part of the lease by which the lessee agreed to let him have gas free of cost to heat and light his dwelling house. He is suing for the value of the casing head gas used by the lessee off the premises regardless of how it affected his use of the gas. As we have seen, this gas was the property of the lessee under this particular lease and the facts and circumstances of this case. The court therefore should have sustained the appellee's motion for a peremptory instruction. For its failure so to do this case is reversed, with instructions to proceed in conformity with this opinion.