213 F. 6 | 5th Cir. | 1914
(after stating the facts as above). This is an action under section 4424 of the Georgia Code, brought by Mrs. Annie Middleton, a citizen of Georgia, against P. Sanford Ross, Incorporated, a New Jersey corporation, for damages for negligently causing the death of Edwin Middleton, her husband. The court below sus
The decisions cited by the trial court (Armour v. Hahn, 111 U. S. 313, 4 Sup. Ct. 433, 28 L. Ed. 440, and Kreigh v. Westinghouse, Church, Kerr & Co., 152 Fed. 120, 81 C. C. A. 338, 11 L. R. A. [N. S.] 684), are suits by a servant against his master for injuries caused by the alleged negligence of the master—cases which deal with rules applicable to the relation of master and servant. The instant case is not one that involves the relation of' master and servant; that is, the relation of master and servant did not exist between the defendant corporation and the plaintiff’s deceased husband. If it appears that Middleton, the decedent, was not on the premises as the servant of the defendant, and, in fact, was not the servant of the defendant—that the relation of master and servant did not exist between them—it becomes obvious that the authorities relied on to sustain the decision below are not controlling.
The acts of negligence charged are the acts of persons employed and acting for the defendant corporation. Middleton, the decedent, was not participating in the work of getting the dredge ready for the installation of the engine, nor were his employers, John Rourke & Sons. Middleton, the decedent', was a stranger to the work then being done. His death, it is charged, was Caused by the negligence of the defendant’s servants.
“One who employs a servant to do his work is answerable to strangers for the negligent acts or omissions of the servant committed in the course of the service.”
This rule, though modern, is now elementary. Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U. S. 215, 220, 29 Sup. Ct. 252, 53 L. Ed. 480.
. [2, 3] If the averments are not sufficient to- show that Middleton, the decedent, was employed to be on the premises, they are certainly sufficient to show that he was there by invitation. Invitation of the owner or occupant is implied by law where the person goes on the premises for the benefit, real or supposed, of the owner or occupant, or in a matter of mutual interest, or in the usual course of business, or for the performance of some duty. Shearman & Redfield on Negligence (1913 Ed.) § 706; 1 Thompson on Negligence, §§ 968-972; West India & P. S. S. Co. v. Weibel, 113 Fed. 169, 51 C. C. A. 116. And the owner or person in possession of the premises owes it as a duty to those who come on the premises by invitation, express or implied, to exercise reasonable or ordinary care to keep and maintain his premises in safe condition. Indermaur v. Dames, 1 E. R., C. P. 274; Huey v. Atlanta, 8 Ga. App. 597, 70 S. E. 71; Butler v. Lewman, 115 Ga. 752, 758, 42 S. E. 98; The Montrose (D. C.) 179 Fed. 1000; Pioneer S. S. Co. v. McCann, 170 Fed. 873, 96 C. C. A. 49. And he owes such duty to independent contractors and their servants. 1 Thompson on Negligence, § 979.
We cannot, of course, foresee how the case may appear from the facts upon a trial on the merits, but we are of the opinion that the petition is not subject to a general demurrer.
Reversed.