77 S.W.2d 425 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1934
Reversing.
At 2:15 p. m. November 4, 1933, Curlin Frances was injured in an automobile collision on Jefferson street in Paducah, Ky., for which he sued A.S. Thompson as the owner of the Thompson Transfer Company, Dorothy St. Clair as his driver, the People's Taxie Company, and W.H. Flint and Earl L. Middleton, as the owners of it. The court directed a verdict for Dorothy St. Clair and A.S. Thompson and submitted to the jury the question of the liability of Flint, Middleton, and the People's Taxie Company, which returned a verdict for $1,500 for Frances. Judgment followed, a new trial was denied, and Flint, Middleton, and the People's Taxie Company have appealed.
Frances testifies he called a taxi at 1:25 p. m. and that at 1:35 p. m. he was picked up by the taxi in which he was riding when he was injured. This taxi had painted upon one side of it the word "Peoples" and in figures "111."
"An apparent or ostensible agent is one whom the principal, either intentionally or by want of ordinary care, induces third persons to believe to be his agent, although he has not, either expressly or by implication, conferred authority upon him."
Has not the People's Taxie Company by allowing Harris from and after July 20, 1933, to operate this car from its central office, to cruise about over the city with the name "Peoples Taxi-cab Company" displayed upon it — though it be admitted he was doing all this for Ashley — been guilty of such want of ordinary care, and so held him out and so allowed Harris to hold himself out as to make Harris its agent as to third parties who perhaps took passage with him as a result of the appearances it allowed him to make? We think it has. Such seems to be the rule. See Section 267, Restatement of the Law of Agency, where this illustration is given:
"P, a taxicab company, purporting to be the master of the drivers of the cabs, in fact enters into an arrangement with the drivers by which the drivers operate independently. A driver negligently injures T, a passenger, and also B, a person upon the street. P is not liable to B. If it is found that T relied upon P as one furnishing safe drivers, P is subject to liability to T in an action of tort."
That seems to be the case. *45
See also Rhone v. Try-me Cab Co.,
Under such evidence there is but one way to account for this verdict, and that is the one that first occurred to us when it was read, and that is that it is the result of passion and prejudice rather than proof. For this the judgment is reversed and other questions presented are reserved.
The whole court sitting.