421 Mass. 477 | Mass. | 1995
In 1989, Middlesex County agreed to lease space in the county’s three courthouses to the Trial Court of the Commonwealth. The lease requires the county to provide security for the premises. The county commissioners’ proposed budget for fiscal years 1993-1994 included an alloca
The defendants moved for summary judgment. A judge in the Superior Court allowed the defendants’ motions and ordered that a “judgment issue declaring that the Middlesex County Advisory Board’s transfer of funds from the county police department’s budget to the sheriff department’s budget is a valid exercise of the Board’s statutory authority to increase, decrease, alter and revise the proposed budget.” The plaintiffs appealed from the ensuing judgment. We transferred the appeal to this court on our own initiative and we now affirm the judgment.
General Laws c. 35, § 28B (b), provides in part as follows:
“The advisory board may increase, decrease, alter and revise the [county commissioners’] proposed budget, provided that: — (i) The statement of the amount to be expended for any object or purpose for which an expenditure is required to be made by law shall not be reduced below estimated expenditure of the current year unless the advisory board shall enter into its minutes a statement of the basis for the reduction . . . (iii) If the advisory board shall make any change in the proposed itemized budget, provision shall be made that the total estimated revenues, together with the amount of county tax to be levied shall equal the total estimated expenditures.”
The advisory board acted within those statutory powers when it revised the county commissioners’ proposed alloca
The breadth of county advisory boards’ appropriation authority conferred by G. L. c. 35, § 28B, is manifested by contrasting that statute with G. L. c. 44, §§ 32, 33, and 33B (1994 ed.). Section 33B, for example, permits a city council to transfer funds between departments only by a two-thirds vote of the council on the mayor’s recommendation and with the written approval of the department losing the funds. Moreover, unlike the discretion provided to county advisory boards by G. L. c. 35, § 28B (6), to “increase, decrease, alter and revise” a proposed budget, city councils “shall not increase any amount in . . . the annual budget nor add thereto any amount for a purpose not included therein except on recommendation of the mayor,” G. L. c. 44, § 32, or on a vote of two-thirds of the city council’s membership where the mayor fails to recommend an appropriation for a function the council deems necessary. G. L. c. 44, § 33.
We reject the plaintiffs’ argument that the omission of the word “delete” from G. L. c. 35, § 28B (¿)’s provision that “[t]he advisory board may increase, decrease, alter and revise the proposed budget” manifests the Legislature’s intent to prohibit advisory boards from deleting budgetary items. The argument is untenable because it would compel the illogical conclusion that the Legislature intended to permit the
The lease of Middlesex County’s courthouses to the Trial Court of the Commonwealth requires that Middlesex County provide courthouse security, but neither the lease nor any law suggests that that security must be provided by the county commissioners rather than by the sheriff as head of the corrections department. General Laws c. 147, § 8 (1994 ed.), provides in pertinent part as follows: “County commissioners may appoint as police officers persons who are in the employment of the county. . . . Such officers may preserve order in any court house . . . .” Asserting that the word “may” as it appears in G. L. c. 147, § 8, denotes command, the plaintiffs refer to the case of Attleboro Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 257 Mass. 43, 52 (1926), where we stated the following: “When a statute directs the doing of an act by a public officer in the interest of justice or the public good, the word ‘may’ is to be construed as ‘shall.’ ” See id. at 52-53 (holding that the commissioner of corporations and taxation was statutorily required to abate taxes improperly assessed). We agree with the motion judge that the word “may” in G. L. c. 147, § 8, denotes permission only. The word “may” ordinarily does not suggest compulsion. Brennan v. Election Comm’rs of Boston, 310 Mass. 784, 786 (1942).
Although no specific provision of the General Laws authorizes sheriffs to provide courthouse security, common law supports such authority, see Commonwealth v. Howe, 405 Mass. 332, 334 (1989) (recognizing that deputy sheriffs are common law peace officers). No statute provides otherwise, nor does any statute suggest that courthouse security may not be provided by deputy sheriffs.
Judgment affirmed.