Middlebrooks v. Godwin Corp.Middlebrooks v. Godwin Corp.
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Huvelle
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE, District Judge.
Plaintiff Lillie Middlebrooks, proceeding
pro se,
has sued defendants Godwin Corporation (“Godwin”), Janice Williams, Karen P. Watts, and the District of Columbia (“the District”) for discrimination on the basis of race and color, retaliation, and hostile work environment in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that in 2008, Godwin was awarded a two-year contract from the District of Columbia Department of Health (“DCDOH”) to provide healthcare staffing for the District of Columbia Healthy Start Program (“Healthy Start”). (Compl. ¶ 11.) According to plaintiff, Healthy Start is federally funded by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and is “designed to reduce infant mortality [and] premature infant births and to promote healthy lifestyles among pregnant and parenting women residing in Wards 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the District of Columbia.” (Id. ¶¶ 16-17.) Plaintiff alleges that she was interviewed and hired by defendant Williams, an African-American female, in July 2008 as a “contract at will employee” of Godwin to work as a Registered Nurse on behalf of Godwin for the DCDOH. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 9, 12.) When plaintiff reported for work at the DCDOH on or about August 1, 2008, defendant Watts, also an African-American female, assigned her to work as a nurse case manager in Healthy Start to assist with a pilot program focused on high risk pregnant and parenting women. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 15, 27.) Watts also assigned two family support workers, Kenya Singleton and Erica Proctor, to work in the pilot program with plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 28.) According to plaintiff, Singleton is a “dark skinned African-American female” and Proctor is a “milk chocolate African-American female.” (Id. ¶¶ 29, 31.)
Plaintiff alleges that in October 2008, she encountered several difficulties with Proctor and Singleton as a result of their purportedly substandard care for Health Start clients. (Id. ¶¶ 57-63.) According to plaintiff, Singleton violated Healthy Start policy by touching the stomach of a Healthy Start client, taking her blood pressure, and inquiring of her weight. (Id. ¶¶ 63-66, 68.) Plaintiff maintains that upon learning this information, she made an appointment with Watts for October 27, 2008. (Id. ¶¶ 64, 69.) Plaintiff alleges that she also informed Williams of Singleton’s actions, but that Williams failed to follow up with plaintiff or with Singleton. (Id. ¶ 73.) On October 27, 2008, plaintiff met with Watts, Singleton, Proctor, and two other women. (Id. ¶ 74.) During the meeting, plaintiff claims that Singleton and Proctor lodged a complaint against plaintiff for failing to drop a client from Healthy Start. (Id.) Plaintiff then alleges that Proctor left the meeting so that plaintiff and the other women could ask Singleton about the allegations that she had touched the stomach of the Healthy Start client. (Id. ¶ 75.) Although Singleton denied touching the client, plaintiff informed Watts and the others that she believed the client and that she protested Singleton’s actions. (Id. ¶¶ 75-91.) According to plaintiff, she informed Watts that it was “imperative” that they “safeguard the care” of Healthy Start clients. (Id. ¶ 91.) Plaintiff alleges that although Watts stated that she would investigate the claims against Singleton, and although plaintiff informed Williams of the events at the October 27, 2008 meeting, Watts did not inform plaintiff of the results of the investigation of Singleton. (Id. ¶¶ 94-95.)
Plaintiff further claims that at a mandatory staff meeting on October 30, 2008, she was subjected to a hostile work environment when she witnessed Watts “scream and yell” at another nurse case manager.
(Id.
¶ 96.) She maintains that after that meeting, and after she observed Williams meet with Watts, Williams ordered plain
Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit on October 30, 2009. She alleges claims of race and color discrimination under
ANALYSIS
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
As the Supreme Court held in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss [under
II. PLAINTIFF’S FEDERAL CLAIMS
A.
Plaintiff maintains that defendants discriminated against her on the basis of her race and color (Compl. ¶¶ 119-124), and retaliated against her on the basis of complaints she filed alleging a hostile work environment
(id.
¶¶ 125-130), in violation of
1. No Enforceable Contract with the District and Watts
The District and Watts contend that plaintiffs
Plaintiffs citation to
Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc.,
495 F.2d 1333, 1339 (2d Cir.1974), is inapposite. There, the court held that a paying guest of a club member had an enforceable contract with the club when the guest paid the entry fee
(i.e.,
the payment of the fee created a contract) for purposes of bringing a claim under
2. Discrimination
Defendants Godwin and Williams argue that the Court must dismiss plaintiffs
Even reading plaintiffs complaint in the light most favorable to her and construing all reasonable inferences in her favor, the Court can find no facts that support an inference of discrimination. There is nothing in the complaint that “permitfs] the [C]ourt to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct” on the part of Godwin and Williams, meaning that plaintiff has failed to show that she is entitled to relief.
Iqbal,
129 S.Ct. at 1950. The only suggestion that plaintiffs race or color played any role in her interactions with Godwin and Williams are plaintiffs conclusory statements that she was “terminated . . . based on [her] race” and “color.” (Compl. ¶¶ 106-107.) These two allegations “amount to nothing more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’ of a constitutional discrimination claim” and, because of their conclusory nature, are “not entitled to the assumption of truth.”
Iqbal,
129 S.Ct. at 1950-51 (quoting
Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). And none of the factual allegations in plaintiffs complaint suggest a racially discriminatory motive for defendants’ treatment of plaintiff.
See Alexander v. Wash. Gas Light Co.,
481 F.Supp.2d 16, 30 (D.D.C.2006)
Although
3. Retaliation
Defendants contend that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for retaliation because she has not alleged that she engaged in protected activity triggering the protections of
It is axiomatic that none of plaintiffs alleged complaints concerned discrimination based on race or color
(i.e.,
the characteristics protected by
4. Hostile Work Environment
Defendants also contend that plaintiff has failed to state a hostile work environment claim under
B. TITLE VI (
Plaintiff alleges that Godwin and the District violated Title VI,
Plaintiff states in her complaint that the “D.C. Healthy Start Program is federally funded” and “is designed to reduce infant mortality, to reduce premature infant births, and to promote healthy lifestyles among pregnant and parents women residing in Wards 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the District of Columbia.” (Compl. ¶¶ 16-17.) Because plaintiff fails to allege that the primary purpose of the federal funding to the DCDOH or Healthy Start is to provide employment
8
or that the intended benefi
Plaintiff argues in her oppositions that the only way to achieve the Healthy Start Program goals is to “hire Registered Nurses.” (Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Compl. at 3;
see also id.
at 5 (maintaining that D.C. Healthy Start is federally funded for 48 full time employment positions); Godwin Opp’n at 13 (same).) She further argues that Healthy
III. PLAINTIFF’S STATE LAW CLAIMS
In addition to her federal claims, plaintiff asserts the following state law causes of action: discrimination and retaliation in violation of the DCHRA; promissory estoppel; negligent supervision; and wrongful termination in violation of D.C. public policy. When the federal-law claims providing the Court with original jurisdiction have been dismissed, the Court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over the remaining state-law claims.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiffs
Notes
. The District and Watts filed a motion to dismiss on March 26, 2010. Godwin and Williams filed a motion to dismiss on May 17, 2010.
. In particular, plaintiff alleges that in reference to a Healthy Start client, Singleton stated, “She should be ashamed of herself for living in all that filth.” (Compl. ¶ 40.) Plaintiff also alleges that Singleton stated that the client is “disgusting and nasty” and she Singleton “hop[ed] that she don‘t bring that newborn baby back to that filthy house.” (Id.)
. In relevant part,
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens....
: In her opposition to Godwin’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff states that she can demonstrate that she “had well over 55 enforceable contracts with the District of Columbia, God-win Corporation, Janice Williams, and Karen Watts.” (PL’s Opp’n to Godwin Corp. & Janice Williams’ Mot. to Dismiss PL‘s Compl. [“Godwin Opp‘n”] at 21.) She goes on to state:
[Plaintiff] entered into numerous contracts with the District of Columbia, Godwin Corporation, Janice Williams, and Karen Watts to provide case management services to each DC Healthy Start client that the Plaintiff enrolled into the DC Healthy Start Program. The DC Healthy Start clients are enrolled into the DC Healthy Start program for the length of their pregnancy and until the child turns two years of age. Therefore, [plaintiff] has an enforceable contract for each and every individual that [she] enrolled into the DC Healthy Start Program.”
Id. at 21-22. Even if one ignores the obvious problem that the enrollment of a Healthy Start client with the program would not constitute an enforceable contract between plaintiff and the District, plaintiff failed to include these allegations in her complaint, and plaintiff may not amend her complaint by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Calvetti v. Antcliff, 346 F.Supp.2d 92, 107 (D.D.C.2004) (quoting cases); see also Coll. Sports Council v. GAO, 421 F.Supp.2d 59, 71 n. 16 (D.D.C.2006) (“[T]he Court does not, and cannot, consider claims first raised in the plaintiff’s opposition.”).
. A third-party beneficiary has rights under a contract although she may not be a party to said contract. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 304, p. 448 (1981) (“A promise in a contract creates a duty in the promisor to any intended beneficiary to perform the promise, and the intended beneficiary may enforce the duty.”).
. Although a plaintiff need not establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the complaint, Ware v. Nicklin Assocs., Inc., 580 F.Supp.2d 158, 164 (D.D.C.2008), courts can explore a plaintiff’s prima facie case at the dismissal stage to determine “whether the plaintiff can ever meet [her] initial burden to establish a prima facie case.” Rochon v. Ashcroft, 319 F.Supp.2d 23, 29 (D.D.C.2004), rev’d. on other grounds sub nom. Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C.Cir.2006); see also Ervin v. Howard Univ., 562 F.Supp.2d 58, 70 (D.D.C.2008) (“A plaintiff is not required to plead a prima facie case of hostile work environment in the complaint; however, the alleged facts must support such a claim.”).
. It is unresolved whether, and to what extent, Title VI provides a private right of action for compensatory and/or punitive damages, which plaintiff seeks
(see
Compl. ¶ 141 (claiming humiliation, loss of self-esteem, undue stress, mental anguish, emotional and psychological harm, economic losses, and loss of earning capacity)), in addition to front and back pay, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief.
See, e.g., Dorsey v. U.S. Dep‘t of Labor,
41 F.3d 1551, 1554 (D.C.Cir.1994) (declining to decide whether to judicially infer private right of action for compensatory damages under Title VI). Because the Court finds that
. In her opposition to the motion to dismiss filed by defendants Godwin and Williams, plaintiff argues, without support, that the National Healthy Start Association, Inc., “states that the Healthy Start Projects have given real jobs to hundreds of unemployed women, particularly those on welfare.” (Godwin Opp’n at 14.) However, again, plaintiff may not
amend her complaint by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.
See, e.g., Calvetti,
346 F.Supp.2d at 107;
see also Coll. Sports Council,
421 F.Supp.2d at 71 n. 16. Moreover, plaintiff apparently refers to the goal of Healthy Start “to assist . . . clients to obtain suitable and sustainable employment.‘’ (Godwin Opp’n at 14);
see also id.
(program provides “job training” for clients). Plaintiff does not allege that the federal funds received by Healthy Start have the primary objective of “providing” employment, as required by Title VI.
See
. There is some question in the decisional authority as to whether the limitation in