Aftеr verdict, defendant, on a settled case, moved for judgment notwithstanding. The motion was denied, and defendant appeals from the judgment rendered in plaintiff’s favor for $1,668.89.
The only assignments of error are: (a) The court erred in denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict; (b) the court erred in denying defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The only question raised is whether the record justifies a recovery, and that depends upon the sufficiency of' the proof of defendant’s negligencе as the cause of the death of plaintiff’s decedent, and the latter’s freedom from contributory negligence as a matter of law.
The action was brought tо recover for the death of June Middaugh, a girl ten years and two months old, through the alleged wrongful and negligent acts of defendant. The record discloses that defеndant has for several years operated a sweet corn canning factory at Waseca, this state. It was so engaged on August 22, 1937, the day of June’s death. The Middaughs lived at 510 Fifth street, some hundred feet south of the canning factory. The loads of sweet corn pass northerly along Fifth street. During the canning operations this street is muсh congested by these loads, which have to move slowly and often have' to stop and start. To the knowledge of defendant’s servants and agents in charge of transporting the sweet corn from the fields to the factory, children are attracted to these loads to pick off sweet corn and to steal rides as *458 the loads pass north on this street. The rig here involved consisted of two wagons coupled together and drawn by a farm tractor. On each wagon was a rack 14 feet long by 7 feet wide, which when loaded was from 5 to 6 feet above the ground. The poles or tongues of these wagons were about 11 feet long. The tongue on the first wаgon was attached to the drawbar of the tractor directly back of its rear wheels. The tongue of the second wagon was attached to the rear аxle of the front wagon with a chain, so that from 4 to 5 feet of the tongue was exposed between the two loads, affording a chance for the children to secure a ride. The Middaugh home was located on the west side of Fifth street. On the day of the fatal accident the parents of June were working at the canning factory. She, a 12-year old brother, and a 2%-year old sister were left at home. It appears that June helped with the household duties and had prepared the evening meal. She was seen with a girl about her age and a boy five to six years old, at about six p. m., standing in the street in front of her home as defendant’s rig just described was рassing by. When the first wagon got by the three children darted in between the two wagons and June mounted the exposed part of the tongue of the second wagon for a ride. She fell off the tongue, her clothing caught in the gear of the wagon, and she was so dragged that her head came under the left rear wheel and was crushed, causing instant death.
The jury could find that, under the conditions existing on this street in the vicinity of this accident and at the time thereof, the coupling of two loaded wagons together drawn by a tractor created an alluring peril to children which the ordinarily careful person would anticipate. Under our decisions, even trespassing сhildren are entitled to protection against hazards created by one having knowledge of their presence and peril. Hepfel v. St. P. M. & M. Ry. Co.
Defendant was here hauling on a public street three units coupled together having a total length in excess of 50 feet, prohibited by 3 Mason Minn. St. 1938 Supp. § 2720-272(c), reading:
“No combination of vehicles coupled together shall consist of more than two units and no such combination of vehicles shall exceed the tоtal length of 40 feet * * *”
Here three units were connected and exceeding 40 feet in length— a clear violation of law. But the claim is that this statute was not enacted in protection of trespassing children, but for the safety of public travel on the highway. Until June laid hold of the tongue or entered between the loads she had thе same right of use of the street in front of her home as had defendant to move its vehicles over it. Statutes of this sort are to protect the public, and it seems to us that the prohibition against coupling together of more than two units for hauling purposes on a public highway may well embrace a purpose to protеct also immature children against their known childish impulse to seek a ride upon any vehicle offering an easily accessible place. The tongue of the third unit offered such
*460
a place. There is a parallel between statutes compelling railroads to fence their rights of way and this statute forbidding coupling-together of more than two units for movements along public highways. In Rosse v. St. P. & D. Ry. Co.
“Negligence is the breach of legal duty. It is immaterial whether the duty is one imposed by the rule of common lаw requiring the exercise of ordinary care not to injure another, or is imposed by a statute designed for the protection of others. In either case the failure to perform the duty constitutes negligence, and renders the party liable for injuries resulting from it.” Osborne v. McMasters,
We think the jury could find that June was within the protection оf this statute forbidding the coupling together of more than two units of moving vehicles on public highways.
Nor do we think that June’s negligence appears as a matter of law so that defendant was entitled to a directed verdict or judgment
non obstante
upon that ground. As a general rule the contributory negligence of a child of June’s age is for the jury. Eckhardt v. Hanson,
The judgment is affirmed.