20 So. 2d 834 | Miss. | 1945
Lead Opinion
On the return day the nonresident defendant presented its petition and bond for removal to the federal court. Thereafter on November 27, 1944, the chancery court entered an order sustaining the motion of the Highway Commission and dismissing it as a party, and two days later, the Court made another order sustaining the petition of the nonresident defendant for removal of the cause to the federal court. Within due time the complainant perfected its appeal to this Court from the order dismissing the Highway Commission as a party.
The principal argument by the Commission is that the order of dismissal is not appealable. The statute, Section 1147, Code 1942, expressly allows an appeal from any final decree, with certain exceptions not here involved. When a decree dismisses the bill as to one party and it is not contemplated that any further proceedings are *767
to be taken against him, it is final as to that party, although other parties remain against whom further proceedings are to be taken. Carter v. Kimbrough,
But the rule as last above stated is not inflexible, as may be seen from the text and annotations 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error, sec. 104, pp. 199 et seq., and as in other cases, it ought to go no further than the reasons upon which it rests. The reasons are that, before an appeal, the trial court should be allowed to go forward and develop the entire case, in the light of which it may be better determined whether in fact there was an error, or, if so, whether harmful, in the order of dismissal as to one or more of the parties. The rule presupposes that the case as to the remaining parties will remain in the trial court and will there be disposed of as to all the parties.
Here, however, the order of dismissal as to the resident defendant produced the result that the other defendant promptly thereafter was able without impediment to procure and did procure an order of removal to the federal court, so that the trial court which made the order of dismissal cannot proceed to develop the entire case, and make a final decree as to all parties, from which an appeal to this Court would lie, including an appeal from the order of dismissal.
The appellate court may say, as it has done, when an appeal such as here presented may be taken, but the court has no authority, in the face of the statute, to say that *768 no appeal shall be taken at all. So long as the case stands as removed to the federal court, whereby the chancery court can do nothing further upon the merits as to any of the parties, than to preserve the statutory right of appeal, the case must for that purpose be regarded as disposed of as to all parties so far as the chancery court is concerned and that in consequence its order of dismissal here involved must be held to be now appealable, else it might turn out that it could never be appealed.
The further argument is made by the Highway Commission that, by the order of removal, the state court, including this Court, no longer has any jurisdiction to deal with the case, regardless of what state statutes may be. For the purposes of discussion we may concede this as a general proposition, but the argument as presented overlooks the fact that the removal did not take along with it the Highway Commission, which, before the order of removal, had been dismissed from the record. The state court in making this order of dismissal was passing upon the meaning and effect of state statutes, wherein the federal courts must follow the holding of the state court, so that the rule that the transfer of a suit from the state court to the federal court does not vacate what was done in the state court prior to removal would have to apply. See 45 Am. Jur., pp. 954, 955.
Finally the Commission says that if this appeal were entertained and the decree of dismissal were reversed the mandate when sent down would find no case pending in the lower court upon which it could operate. It does not follow that such a mandate would find no use when the complainant presented it duly certified to the federal court.
Motion to dismiss overruled.
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting Opinion
The question we are here called on to decide is whether the State Highway Department, a state agency, is a person within the meaning of this statute. This case is on all-fours with Dollman v. Moore,
The judgment of the court below should be affirmed.
Addendum
The bill and agreed stipulation disclose that Trinidad was the prime contractor with the Highway Department for the construction of 11.353 miles of hard-surfaced public highway on route No. 45 in Lowndes County, Mississippi, according to plans and specifications of such Department, and under the supervision of, and subject to final inspection and acceptance by, said Highway Department; that Trinidad entered into a sub-contract with Mid-South, under which Mid-South would furnish and properly lay the asphalt and concrete on said road as required by the prime contract, Trinidad to construct and prepare the road-bed therefor, which contract set out the compensation Mid-South should receive, as well as the respective duties and obligations of the parties thereunder. *770 Both the prime and sub-contractor performed and completed their respective parts of the work under the supervision of the Highway Department, and the completed job had been finally inspected, approved and accepted by the Department; that Trinidad had failed to pay Mid-South, and was indebted to it in the approximate sum of $80,000; that Trinidad was qualified to do business in Mississippi, and that "The State Highway Commission has in its hands a substantial sum of money due the prime contractor, Trinidad, for this work . . .;" and that Trinidad has no assets whatever in this state other than such money.
The Department cites, in support of its contention, McBain v. Rodgers (Miss.), 29 So. 91; Dollman v. Moore,
The McBain case was a garnishment at law. There are vital distinctions between the duties and liabilities of a garnishee at law and a defendant-garnishee in chancery. In a law garnishment a garnishee, in addition to being required to answer whether it owes, or has in its possession effects of, the nonresident defendant, must also answer whether it knows or believes that any other person is indebted to, or has in his possession effects of, such nonresident, and, if so, whom, in what amount, and where he resides. Sec. 2788, Code 1942. And if he fail to answer, the court shall enter judgment against him for the amount of plaintiff's demand and all costs. Sec. 2798, Code 1942. Such law-garnishee, to protect himself, is also under certain duties to raise the question of exemption of the debtor-defendant (Sec. 2799, Code 1942; City of Laurel v. Turner,
And the tendency of the legislature has been to enlarge the right of garnishment against public bodies, even in law cases, as is shown by the enactment of Ch. 321, L. 1936, Sec. 2783, Code 1942, permitting garnishments in such cases against the state, counties and municipalities, and political subdivisions thereof, where plaintiff has obtained a judgment upon which execution may issue, although no default judgment can be taken if such garnishee fails to answer. Sec. 2790, Code 1942. But in attachments in chancery the garnishee is simply made a defendant in the original cause against the nonresident debtor, and the only duty of the garnishee is to answer whether he is indebted to, or has in his possession effects of, such nonresident debtor; and if so, in either case, to deliver the same to the court in that cause, if the court so finally orders, for disposition by the court as it may adjudicate to be lawful and equitable.
In the Dollman v. Moore case the garnishee was the board of school trustees of Yazoo City. The trustees did not raise the question of whether they could be garnished, and the court held that the nonresident debtor could not do so, and that the question was not jurisdictional, and affirmed the case. Therefore, that case is not authority for the position of the Highway Department. However, Judge Cooper did say in the opinion that a municipality was not a "person" within the meaning of that word as used in the then attachment statute. Code 1880, Sec. 1832. But he did not mention the definition of that word as it appears in Sec. 1512, Code 1892 (Sec. 689, Code 1942), which section added to Sec. 1832, Code 1880, these words, ". . . shall apply to artificial as well as natural persons . . ." In fact, Ch. 31, Definitions, which includes Sec. 1512, went into effect November 1, 1892, and the Dollman case was decided in October previously. It might be noted, too, that the board of school trustees was not a corporation or legal entity subject to suit, had the right to garnish it been raised by that board. But the court, after sustaining the attachment as to the *772
municipaliy, did make this observation, which is pertinent to the case under consideration [
In Dollar v. Allen-West Commssion Co. the county supervisors were the garnishees, and the foundation of the judgment in favor of the complainant, on which the attachment proceeding was based, was a matter with which the supervisors had no concern whatever.
The Compress case was an attachment in chancery, joining as defendants a nonresident corporation as debtor, and the town of Indianola as garnishee indebted to such nonresident. The court sustained the objection of the town and dismissed the garnishment. There, also, the town had no concern, or interest, in the controversy between complainant and the nonresident. The court made this observation: "If a municipality, in its private capacity, should contract debts, so as to be subject to the process of the courts as a private individual, and become thereby liable to garnishment on other principles, it would be for the party claiming such liability to show the nature of the debt, and the amenability of the municipality to suit arising from the nature of the debt sought to be garnished; but that purpose is not sought in this case. That a municipality, unless so subjected by legislative act, is not liable to suit, by garnishment or otherwise, for debts arising from the exercise of its governmental functions, is settled by many authorities." It then quotes this statement from the American English *773 Encyclopedia of Law: "This rule is generally placed on the ground that, as a public corporation is created for the public benefit, with political powers, to be exercised for purposes connected with the public good in the administration of civil government, public policy demands that such bodies should not be subjected to the serious interruptions in the prosecution of public business, the inconvenience and delay in the prompt and efficient discharge of the official duties and the accomplishment of important works and measures, which might result from their subjection to such process." It will be noted this rule refers to public corporations "with political powers" exercised in the administration of "civil government."
The Howell v. Kersh case involved many persons, a number of suits and many questions, with none of which did the county have any concern. The garnishment feature undertook to attach in the hands of the county the salary of one having a contract with the county to transport pupils to the public schools. The court held the garnishment would not lie over the objection of the county.
In the Smith Furniture Co. case the complainant undertook to attach funds owing by Mississippi Southern College of Hattiesburg to nonresident debtors of complainant. The court pointed out the college was not liable to suit of any kind.
We think the case at bar is distinguishable from the foregoing cases. The primary function of the Highway Department is to build and maintain roads. While it is a government agency for that purpose, it must be admitted that this work is not the exercise of "political power" or the administration of "civil government." It is not government at all, as that term is understood.
Again, as to the extent of the powers and activities of the Highway Department, it was said in State Highway Commission v. Mason,
Section 8038, Code 1942, provides: "The state highway commission as herein provided shall be vested with the following powers, to wit: . . . (c) To enforce by mandamus, or other legal remedies, all legal rights or rights of action of the state highway commission with other public bodies, corporations, or persons, and the state highway commission shall be a body corporate, and as such may sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, in any court of justice having jurisdiction of the subject matter of any such suit." It is thus seen that the legislature, in recognition of the necessity therefor in the discharge if its vast duties and responsibilities, vested the Department with far-reaching and comprehensive legal powers and duties.
Again, in the case at bar, the foundation of the demand of complainant is pay for construction the very road for which the Department let a contract to the prime contractor, the nonresident debtor in this cause, and which sub-contract was permitted and recognized by the Department. The Department, through its engineers, supervised and directed the work as it progressed. The work is complete and finished. It has been done according to the prime contract. It has been finally inspected, approved and accepted by the Department. There is no dispute about it. It is just a matter of payment by the Department of the balance owing the prime contractor. This garnishment involves no interruption of work or contest over installment payments, or the final payment. The prime contractor itself could sue the Department for the balance owing. Presumably the Department has separated and set aside these funds to the prime contractor, and an attachment in chancery is primarily a proceeding in rem. Clark v. Louisville N.R. Co.,
Reversed and remanded.
Addendum
We are strengthened in our conclusion by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Federal Housing Administration v. Burr,
The question there presented was whether the Federal Housing Administration is subject to garnishment for monies due to an employee. The Supreme Court of the State of Michigan held that it was. Burr v. Heffner,
It was said by Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, speaking for the Court [
We interrupt here to call attention to Section 8038, Code 1942, which vests the State Highway Commission with the following powers and properties: ". . . (c) To enforce by mandamus, or other proper legal remedies, all legal rights or rights of action of the state highway commission with other public bodies, corporations, or persons, and the state highway commission shall be a *779 body corporate, and as such may sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, in any court of justice having jurisdiction of the subject matter of any such suit."
Continuing now with the Federal case, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States said further: ". . . when Congress establishes such an agency, authorizes it to engage in commercial and business transactions with the public, and permits it to `sue and be sued', it cannot be lightly assumed that restrictions on that authority are to be implied. Rather if the general authority to `sue and be sued' is to be delimited by implied exceptions, it must be clearly shown that certain types of suits are not consistent with the statutory or constitutional scheme, that an implied restriction of the general authority is necessary to avoid grave interference with the performance of a governmental function, or that for other reasons it was plainly the purpose of Congress to use the `sue and be sued' clause in a narrow sense. In the absence of such showing, it must be presumed that when Congress launched a governmental agency into the commercial world and endowed it with authority to `sue or be sued', that agency is not less amenable to judicial process than a private enterprise under like circumstances would be. Clearly the words `sue and be sued' in their normal connotation embrace all civil process incident to the commencement or continuance of legal proceedings. Garnishment and attachment commonly are part and parcel of the process, provided by statute, for the collection of debts. In Michigan a writ of garnishment is a civil process at law, in the nature of an equitable attachment. . . . But however it may be denominated, whether legal or equitable, and whenever it may be available, whether prior to or after final judgment garnishment is a well-known remedy available to suitors. To say that Congress did not intend to include such civil process in the words `sue and be sued' would in general deprive suits of some of their efficacy. . . . But petitioner strongly urges considerations of policy against *780 this conclusion and stresses the heavy burdens which would be imposed on such governmental instrumentalities if garnishment were permitted. It asserts that the task of preparing answers, disclosures and returns to numerous garnishment processes in the courts of each of the states would appreciably impede the federal functions of such an agency. . . . considerations of convenience, cost and efficiency which have been urged here are for Congress which, as we have said, has full authority to make such restrictions on the `sue and be sued' clause as seem to it appropriate or necessary."
The argument in that decision, in our judgment, answers comprehensively within its general scope many of the arguments on the suggestion of error here. The State Highway Commission "can sue or be sued, plead or be impleaded" under the statute of Mississippi creating it. But the suggestion of error contends that if we give the meaning to these words which they import, of including therein the remedy by attachment in chancery under the peculiar circumstances of this particular case, dire consequences will follow to the State of Mississippi. We think that there is no such menace in our views, but since such stress has been laid upon this feature of the argument, simply for the purpose of clarification of our former opinion, we make certain observations concerning its significance.
The matter of the jurisdiction of this Court was heretofore settled in this same case, on a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, which motion was overruled. Mid-South Paving Company v. State Highway Commissioner,
The case was tried in the court below and in this Court on an agreed statement of facts, stipulated in the record. The correctness of these facts is now sought to be challenged by the suggestion of error, which is largely addressed to the alleged inaccuracy of the facts therein agreed. It is sought to bring into the case other and additional supposed or possible facts, of which we are urged *781 to take judicial knowledge. However, suffice it to say that when agreed facts form the basis of decision courts must confine decision to those facts according to the agreement. We did that in this case, and acted here on those facts as the facts of the case, and none other. It is not permitted now to impeach such facts by a unilateral denial of their verity.
In our former opinion, to which we adhere, our decision was based on the agreement that construction under the "prime contract was completed and finished and said highway has been accepted and approved by the Highway Department." In our judgment, therefore, we concluded that no attachment in chancery should or could be had unless the contract involved had been complete or practically so.
We did not and do not now hold that the funds of a nonresident debtor in another concurrent contract or other concurrent contracts with the Highway Commission can be reached by the process of garnishment in a particular and separate contract. We are of the opinion that only the funds involved in the single and specific case at litigation could be so reached by the attachment process therein, and where, moreover, the complainant is a sub-contractor or otherwise involved in the prime contract in the instant suit, so as to have become a creditor therein of the nonresident debtor in the chancery attachment.
We did not and do not now hold that the retained percentages, retained under the prime contract, are such "effects" of the nonresident defendant contractor as may be reached by the process of an attachment in chancery, where and while so retained under such contract in good faith. When and after they have been or should have been released, then such process may reach such funds, but not otherwise.
We did not and do not now hold that funds of the prime contractor to become due under the contract, which, prior to the service of the attachment process, in good *782 faith and for the real purpose of financing the performance of the instant prime contract, had been assigned, as aforesaid, as security for advances therein, constitute such "effects" as may be reached by attachment process, in chancery, until after they have been or should have been released by the lender to the prime contractor.
We believe the department is unduly alarmed by its apprehensions of disaster to follow our construction of the law here. Our duty is to construe the law so as to determine its meaning, and this we have sedulously and earnestly undertaken to do. The suggestion of error must be and is overruled.
So ordered.
Smith, C.J., dissents and adheres to the views expressed in his former dissenting opinion herein.